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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Light Rail on First Avenue in Skidmore Old Town 
SOURCE: Zimmer · Gunsul · Frasca Partnership 
I nvestment decisions for large transportation projects are complex, multifaceted phenomena. Generally re-
quiring many years to bring to fruition , such decisions are 
often reduced at crucial junctures to raw political deals or 
technical data analysis on limited items. Throughout the 
range of alternatives considered, analyses completed and 
policymaking sessions which contribute to such invest-
ments, the imagery of a rational, sequential and wholistic 
decisionmaking process and substance dominates. Re-
cent debate concerning both the desirability of certain 
transit investments and the extent to which inappropriate 
intrusion into the decisionmaking province of state and 
local government have occurred have highlighted at least 
some of the less rational and sequential aspects of 
transportation investments . This study seeks not to 
unravel the most appropriate federal grant process or the 
best structure for state and local investment decisions. 
Rather, it seeks to accomplish the following: 
• To illustrate and analyze the facets of institutional and 
individual behavior in the process of transportation 
investments; 
• To identify roles, procedures, processes, forces and 
factors which influence the character of multiorganiza-
tional decisionmaking; 
• To assess the character of multiorganizational 
decisionmaking; 
• To identify those factors which most centrally affect 
the outcome of such decisions. 
The vehicle for accomplishing this task is a case study 
of a Light Rail Transit (LRT) investment in Portland, 
Oregon. Known as the Banfield project or Transitway, 
this investment provides an excellent, comprehensive 
example of the complexity of transportation decision-
making. While no single case study can fully portray the 
range of issues inherent in such investments, this project 
does exhibit many of the important dimensions . It in-
volves both highway and transit components, capital 
financing from both transit and highway sources, federal, 
state and local agency involvement, major changes in 
policy, technical and political actors and a significant time 
span. 
Portland and the LRT 
Light rail technology has recently emerged from a long 
hibernation in the United States. With almost the same 
vigor that tracks were tom up only three decades ago, 
many cities around the country are building or planning 
to build new light rail systems. Portland was among the 
forerunners in this trend having initiated the decision to 
build its LRT system in the early seventies. As the follow-
ing material will show, LRT was not the preferred or only 
alternative when this effort began. Its emergence as the 
final choice reflected many factors , technical and polit-
ical. More importantly, it was not just a simple matter of 
evaluating transit and highway alternatives , but rather 
more broadly a revolution in metropolitan thinking 
regarding preferred transportation systems. Understand-
ing this emergence of a transportation technology, its 
selection as a preferred alternative and its role in the con-
text of a metropolitan transportation revolution is the 
pragmatic context of this study. 
More significant, however, is the context of the deci-
sionmaking process which produced this outcome in 
Portland. As Chapter Two describes briefly and subse-
quent chapters more fully, the decision involved almost 
ten years, several false starts, significant policy shifts, and 
substantial experimentation with administrative pro-
cedures. More importantly, the participatingjurisdictions 
were not hesitant about restructuring both the context 
and the character of the decisionmaking process. In some 
cases, participants were only too willing to attempt 
modifications of one another's internal policies and pro-
cedures. Far from a sequential completion of well-
established decision steps, the Banfield represents a com-
prehensive evolution in both the process and the object 
of decisionmaking. 
Transportation Decision Systems 
Broadly speaking the analysis of transportation decision 
processes and systems has been the subject of many 
studies. One of the most recent was the Transportation 
Research Board's Improving Decisionmaking for Major 
Urban Transit Investments, published as part of the Na-
tional Cooperative Transit Research and Development 
Program. While specifically an analysis of the Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration's (UMTA) required Alter-
natives Analysis process, the report observes that the 
overall structure and process required by UMTA "makes 
sense in general and in an abstract rational process." 
However, no urban area should be required to conform to 
it "unless that process truly fits the local decisionmaking 
context." Indeed, the general imagery of transit and 
highway investment decisions is of a linear, stepwise, 
continuous, logical process. Yet, as the above observation 
indicates, there are a multiplicity of decision models in 
practice, each with its own ground rules. Further, the fun-
damental notion of a rational, logical process may itself be 
questionable. While some observers attribute this to the 
intrusion of the political realm into technical processes, 
in fact, what they represent may be alternative pragmatic 
approaches to the fundamental question of "How do we 
get something built?" The fundamental procedures of 
any major public works investment may simply be cur-
valinear, iterative, discontinuous, inconsistent, discur-
sive and multi-logical. alternatively, the players may 
simply make up the rules as they go to fit the situation. 
Analysis of this context requires not improvements to the 
process but rather an understanding of the forces and fac-
tors which produce changes in the process. 
Roles, role playing styles, perceptions of ends, percep-
tions of winning/losing and the consequences, the 
character of decision rules, the ease with which rules are 
changed and the fundamental credibility (induced and 
inherent) of the actors and the decision process are the 
focal points for this contextual approach. Institutions and 
institutional models of intergovernmental collaboration 
only provide a limited context for useful analysis. Beyond 
this framework there must be a broader appreciation for 
those factors which provide structure to the more 
ephemeral relationships between the public participants. 
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Key Factors in Understanding 
the Banfield Decision 
Several major issues, concepts or ideas surface in the 
following discussion which provide a means for under-
standing the dynamics of the decision process. On a com-
prehensive level, the Banfield decision represented a ma-
jor shift in the functional and philosophic role of transit in 
the region. This shift was a wrenching experience which 
set a context of opportunity in terms of exploring new 
transportation systems. It also ruptured the political 
fabric of transportation decisionmaking, realigning the 
roles and responsibilities of many political and technical 
actors. 
From one perspective the federal grant-in-aid programs 
for highways and transit represent a process for decision-
making in the pursuit of federal financing. In the absence 
of an established, formal metropolitan structure, these 
grant procedures provide a structure which is adapted to 
local needs. On the other hand, existing processes and 
mechanisms for metropolitan decisionmaking may serve 
as an alternative decision system. The appearance of 
stability in either case may be illusive in that the rigidity of 
intergovernmental collaboration and mechanisms for 
effectuating cooperation are far from those characteristic 
of single administrative organizations. They are far more 
manipulable and intangible. In the Banfield case the 
structures for decisionmaking and the participating 
organizations themselves underwent several major 
changes and transitions. 
Concommitantly, the rules for decisionmaking were 
also very malleable. There were multiple rules initially 
reflecting legislative and administrative policies and pro-
cedures of the respective participants. As the discussion 
of the "Bill Hall Chart" later in this analysis will show, 
there were points when the rules were reinterpreted, re-
designed and/ or applied differently to make something 
happen. In the consideration of alternatives demon-
strated, some of the players felt no compulsion against 
suggesting new approaches and procedures where they 
felt it appropriate. Thus, the sense of known rules and 
procedures was intermittent in the case of the Banfield 
project. 
Often key people were catalysts in completing decision 
tasks or initiating major events. Yet there was no single 
individual that drove the process from start to finish. It 
was almost as if the role of key leader was constant and 
individuals emerged to fill it, rather than a single in-
dividual playing the role throughout the ,Process. The 
roles of given organizations also changed over time 
reflecting internal organizational changes, adaptations 
and the shifting responsibilities assigned to or assumed 
by organizations. These organizational changes mani-
fested significant impacts on the ensuing inter-
governmental decision process. 
Another dimension of some significance is the linkage 
between the political and technical realms. In some in-
vestment circumstances technical analyses and reports 
are window dressing, legitimizing already consummated 
political decisions. Alternatively, many well-founded 
technical recommendations have foundered for the lack 
of political support. For the Banfield, this relationship 
was extremely symbiotic, reflecting both the personal ties 
between technicians and politicians and the general con-
sensus that the final project had to be technically sound 
and politically saleable. Unlike other metropolitan areas, 
Portland did not start with established commitments to a 
given project. Further, the revolutionary change in 
metropolitan transportation philosophy created a mutual 
dependency that probably forced greater technical 
political cooperation than might otherwise have existed. 
Communication processes and avenues were also im-
portant. Much of what is related here is told only from the 
perspective of local officials. Few interviews were con-
ducted with federal representatives. The perspective 
evidenced by many of the local officials was that federal 
agents were often uncooperative or unsure about what 
Portland was trying to accomplish. It is not possible to 
prove this given the information presented here. Similar-
ly, it is probably also impossible to prove whether the 
federal agencies unduly intruded upon local decision-
making prerogatives. Yet, it is possible to suggest that one 
of the clear dimensions of the decison process was the 
imperfect communications between the participants. The 
ability to understand reasons for actions, objectives of 
programs and simple exchanges of information was 
significantly impacted by the flexibility of the Banfield 
decision or exploited by the participants. The presump-
tion of perfect information and knowledge is clearly in er-
ror here. More importantly, the use of the imperfect com-
munication process was also a tool for the attainment of 
goals by some of the players; intentionally garbling 
messages may buy needed time. Similarly, the inability to 
clearly perceive the reasons for a participant's actions 
may stave off conflict. Finally, explaining responsibility 
for actions remains difficult because the participants 
rightfully retain their interpretation of events as correct. 
Financial responsibility and liability issues are also 
highlighted here. The recent creation of a transit block 
grant has interjected changes in the fiscal relationships 
between grantor and grantee. In Portland, the use of the 
interstate withdrawal process to fund the Banfield pro-
duced a block grant effect. In this case, however, it was 
taken one step further in the financing of transit and 
highway improvements. 
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A final dimension is the question of goals and objec-
tives. Multiple organizational settings permit, if not en-
courage, a diversity of objectives. There is no necessity 
that all participants should or must agree upon goals, but 
simply that their mutual participation or non-
participation will serve their individually determined ob-
jectives. The Banfield illustrates this in the mixed motive 
agendas of the participating jurisdictions. 
The Transportation Research Board (TRB) report cited 
above suggests: 
Coordinated multiagency work programs can be carried 
out successfully if properly managed, if roles are clearly 
defined for managing work elements and participation in 
decisionmaking processes, if mechanisms are established 
for periodic progress review, and if a lead agency has suffi-
cient authority and competence (page 5). 
The inherent message is that despite the apparent in-
commensurability of multiorganizational settings with a 
rational sequential decision process, these settings can be 
made to fit a logical sequential process if appropriate 
steps can be taken. This report suggests, however, that 
some of the fundamental pieces of this prescription are 
probably missing in many transportation decision 
systems. The pay-off is not in managing the institutional 
structure properly but in controlling the forces that tend 
to warp it. 
Summary 
There are some inherent limitations to the findings of this 
study. Although interviews were held with over twenty 
officials, the predominant perspective reported here is 
local in character. Public documents from the files of 
metropolitan, state, local and federal agencies were con-
sulted to remedy this deficiency. Yet, they cannot, totally 
compensate for the limited interviews with federal of-
ficials. Moreover, the Banfield may uniquely raise some 
issues in terms of its historical context. Despite these 
limitations, however, it is well worth the chronicaling of 
the transportation decision process. Only through con-
tinued attention to the character of the decision process 
will we continue to improve the success of selecting the 
right project and its implementation. 

Chapter 2 
Background 
Hollywood Light Rail Station adjacent to the improved Banfield Freeway 
SOURCE: Zimmer · Gunsul · Frasca Partnership 
The Banfield Light Rail 
Project: A Thumbnail Sketch 
T he Banfield project is simultan~ousl~ an ~RT sy~tem, 140 other highway and transit projects mcludmg a 
freeway improvement, and a major experiment in shaping 
regional growth management and infrastructure develop-
ment. In its first element, the project consists of approx-
imately 15.l miles of LRT trackage, a maintenance facility, 
overhead electrification, 26 LRT vehicles of European design 
and twenty-five stations. The system will run from 
downtown Portland east to downtown Gresham. In addi-
tion, the project involves 4.3 miles of freeway improvements 
along the Banfield Freeway (I-84 ). The anticipated total cost 
(in 1984 dollars) is $307. 7 million, with the LRT portion re-
quiring $209.7 and highway-related costs of $98 million. 
Guideway Path 
While the LRT will run at grade for its entire length, the 
physical environment of the trackage varies substantially. In 
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downtown Portland the LRT will start from a loop tum along 
Morrison and Yamhill streets which cross the Portland Tran-
sit Mall. From this point it exits the downtown core to run 
parallel with the Willamette River along First Avenue in a 
northerly direction. It crosses the Willamette River over an 
xisting bridge heading east past Uoyd Center, the largest 
concentration of office and commercial space outside of 
downtown. The LRT then enters Sullivan's Gulch through 
which I-84 tran -vcrs ·-- . Paralleling the freeway for approx-
imately four miles, it then turns south past the Gateway 
Shopping Center to parallel the eastern outerbelt of Portland 
(I-205). Following I-205 south for two miles, it then turns 
east on Burnside Street through a mixed residential/ com-
mercial setting. The line continues along Burnside to l 97th 
Avenue where it then follows the Portland Traction Com-
pany line (an old railroad right-of-way) east to the end of the 
line in Gresham. Accommodation of the line within this 
pathway requires major street reconstruction and utility 
relocation in downtown Portland and along Burnside Street. 
The I-84 segment required moving and straightening the 
freeway to create a suitable guideway and observe a twenty-
one foot clearance from an existing mainline railroad track. 
Provision for the LRT along 1-205 was made in the design of 
the freeway. Minimal reconstruction is planned for the 
Portland Traction Company line or in downtown Gresham. 
DIVISION 
'-+-·--l------1--~ 
&mfield Light Rail alignment 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
Stations 
The twenty-five stations will be of three distinct configura-
tions serving the following locations: downtown Portland, 
Old Town, Memorial Coliseum, Lloyd Center, Hollywood, 
Gateway, Hazelwood, Rockwood, and Gresham. Along the 
eastside portion, service will be provided for a diverse col-
lection of schools, neighborhoods and businesses. The three 
types of shelters will reflect the environment of their loca-
tion. Downtown, simple shelters will offer weather protec-
tion. Stations within Sullivan's Gulch will be split level, 
reflecting the topography, with LRT stations at freeway level 
and buses arriving at the street or overpass level. Elevators 
and/ or stairs will permit rider connections. On the eastside, 
stations will provide protection from a notorious east wind 
condition with street- or sidewalk-level rider access featur-
ing ticket vending machines, benches, lighting, telephones 
and transit information signs. Stations, furniture and design 
will complement the surrounding physical environment, 
with curb-high platforms 10 feet wide and 200 feet long. Sta-
tions serving major bus transfer points will be more 
elaborate. 
Tri-Met Light Rail vehicle 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
Vehicles 
Vehicles are being built by Bombardier Limited of Quebec, 
Canada. The latest in transit technology, they are not ex-
perimental. The design is based on a proven and well-tested 
configuration developed by BN of Belgium. Single cars with 
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the capacity to comfortably carry 166 seated and standing 
passengers will be coupled into two-car trains during rush 
hour trips. The vehicles will operate every 10 minutes dur-
ing midday and every five minutes during rush hours. A 
one-way trip along the entire route will require approx-
LIGHT RAIL ROU TE 
• TRANSIT STATION 
8 TRANSIT STATION, LEFT TURN 
.o1. LEFT TURN 
TC TRANSIT CENT ER 
BUS TRANSFER 
PARK & RIDE 
·--- -
imately 45 minutes, approximately 15-20 minutes faster 
than by bus. 
Service Innovation 
Fare collection will involve a self-service fare system. Riders 
will self-validate their tickets at stations or use monthly 
passes. Principally a system of self-service payment, random 
checks by fare inspectors will be performed to confirm proof 
of payment. This will permit passenger boarding at all four 
vehicle doors and reduce station dwell times. In addition, 
the LRT will be served by a restructured bus system on the 
eastside of Portland emphasizing a grid network. 
Ridership 
At its opening in 1986, the LRT is expected to carry over 
15-20 ,000 riders a day during its first year of operation. Pro-
jected ridership is expected to increase to 4 2,500 daily in 
1995, with a peak rush-hour load of 6,800 passengers per 
hour. Coupled with 119,000 trips daily on the freeway por-
tion of the corridor, total transportation loads will approx-
imate 161,500by1995. This will be close to the maximum 
carrying capacity of the corridor. 
Auxiliary Facilities 
In addition to a major, 12.3-acre maintenance facility located 
in Gresham, the system will have several other ancillary 
features. Three major park-and-ride lots will provide 1 ,500 
auto spaces. Fourteen signalized intersections will permit 
motorist crossing of the tracks on Burnside Street. 
Pedestrian crosswalks will also be provided this 
portion of the trackage. Three timed-transfer bus centers 
will provide convenient LRT /bus transfers. 
Operating Characteristics 
Normal weekday and Saturday service will begin at 5:00 am 
and end at 12:00 midnight. Sunday and holiday service will 
begin at 8:00 am and end at 12:00 midnight. Service fre-
quencies for the LRT line, based on Tri-Met policy con-
siderations, will be as follows: 
Operating Schedule 
Maximum 
Time Period Weekday 
5:00 a.m. to 6:30 a.m. 20 
6:30 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. 
Gresham to Portland 10 30 
7:00 a.m. to 7:30 a.m. 
Gresham to Gateway 10 30 
Gateway to Portland 5 30 
7:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. 
Gresham to Gateway 10 20 
Gateway to Portland 5 20 
8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. 
Gresham to Gateway 10 20 
Gateway to Portland 5 20* 30* 
8:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. 
Gresham to Gateway 10 10 30 
Gateway to Portland 5 10* 30* 
9:00 a.m. to •J.:00 p.m. 
Gresham to Portland 10 10 30 
4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
Gresham to Gateway 10 10 30 
Gateway to Portland 5 10* 30* 
6:00 p.m. to 
Gresham to 10 30 30 
7 :00 p.m. to 9:00 
Gresham to 10 30 30 
9:00 p.m. to 
Gresham to 30 30 30 
service between Gresham 
Source: the 
LRT line, 
Normal weekday service during the morning will be 
characterized by twenty-minute headways. Morning and 
afternoon peak period service will have five-minute head-
way service between the Portland terminal and Gateway sta-
tion. From Gateway to Gresham headways will be ten 
minutes during morning and afternoon peaks and midday. 
Night service will be based on thirty-minute headways. Sun-
days and holiday service will be a constant thirty-minute 
headway over the entire system. Saturday service will be 
thirty-minute headways between 5:00 am and 7:30 am, 
twenty-minute headways from 7:30 am to 8:30 am, ten-
minute headways from 8:30 am to 7:00 pm and thirty-
minute headways from 7 :00 pm to midnight over the entire 
system. 
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At this time Tri-Met is still developing a system start-up 
plan and operator training program. Coordination with bus 
system operations is still in the development stage. 
However, both the Gresham terminal and Gateway station 
will be major timed transfer stations, providing bus feeder 
service for LRT patrons. 
Construction Impacts 
Construction impacts of the LRT /highway project are ex-
pected to generate 1,800 worker years or an average of 665 
jobs per year during the construction period. This will pump 
more than $339 million (1980 dollars) into the regional 
economy. Requiring a complex of both the LRT and 
highway components, the total project construction period 
will be just over 31/2 years. In addition, related projects, 
$3 million in sewers along East Burnside and '$5 million in 
downtown improvements matched by a companion Local 
Improvement District, bring the total capital investment to 
over $350 million. 
Financing 
The federal government will pay for about 85 percent of the 
total project cost, predominantly through Interstate transfer 
funding. These funds were made available as a result of two 
Interstate segment withdrawals. An additional $13. 9 million 
is provided by Section 3 grants from the Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration. The local matching funds 
for these grants are being provided by the State of Oregon 
and Tri-Met. State gas taxes will provide $14.6 million, a 
special state construction fund $25 million and $13.2 
million from Tri-Met resources. 
The Scope of the 
Transportation Investment 
Another dimension of the Portland investment process is 
the package of related transit and highway im-
provements. Under the Interstate withdrawal provisions 
of the Federal Highway Act of 1976, metropolitan areas 
with the consent of the Metropolitan Planning Organiza-
tion (MPO ), state governor and the Secretary of Transpor-
tation can fund substitute projects which may be either 
transit, highway or both in character. In packaging the 
local decision for the Banfield corridor, a substantial por-
tion of the entitlement from two Interstate withdrawals 
was promised to the funding of 140 projects. These proj-
ects, spread throughout the metropolitan region, cover a 
variety of efforts including two future LRT segments to 
the west and south of Portland and a number of smaller 
transportation service improvements. Some of these proj-
ects, first authorized for funding in 1978, have already 
been completed. Others are still on the regional transpor-
tation plan to be completed at a future date. While 
benefiting the regional transportation system, they are 
also critical political inducements to a strong local con-
sensus on the desirability of the Banfield Transitway and 
its status as the region's number one transportation 
project. 
Finally, the Banfield project is part of a much greater 
transportation effort reflecting the r gion 's need for an ef-
fective transportation system . ln 1973 the Oregon 
legislature passed Senate Bill 100 which established a 
statewide land-use plannmg proce s. Coupled with a 
desire to develop a transit alternative for the metropolitan 
area which limited neighborhood impacts and preserved 
the vitality of the Portland Central Business District 
(CBD), a basis for an integrated transportation develop-
ment planning process was born. While not employing a 
value capture philosophy directly, the LRT is intended to 
have significant positive land-use impacts throughout its 
corridor. In this context, development projects have been 
proposed for 15 of the LRT stops. Most LRT -related 
development is not anticipated to occur until after the line 
has been in operation for five to seven years. The greatest 
portion of the development potential is located along 
First Avenue in downtown Portland. According to 
Economic Research A sociates of San Francisco (ERA), 
the LRT system will substantially enhance the develop-
ment of this part of downtown. Demand exists for be-
tween 2 to 2.6 million square feet of office space, 240,000 
to 400,000 square feet of retail space and 550 to 700 
residential units . In east Multnomah County the forecast 
is for 20 percent of all residential development east of the 
Willamette River to materialize within a five-minute walk 
of the LRT line. In Gresham, demand potential for 2,000 
to 2,300 multi -family units, a 1-million-square-foot 
shopping center and between 400,000 and 700,000 
square feet of office space exists within the vicinity of the 
LRT stations . 
The Demographic Setting 
The Portland metropolitan region 
SOURCE: Portland Development Commission 
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The Portland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Are 
(SMSA) and the service: area for the Banfield Draft Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (DEIS) are portrayed in Ap-
pendix A. On the westside of the Willamette River, the 
principal area of s rvice is the Portland Central Business 
District. On the eastside of the River, the area is broken 
into two parts : East Portland (the Willamette River to ap-
proximately 82nd Street) and East Multnomah County 
(82nd Street to the County's east boundary). All 
references to the Study Area in the following discussion 
encompass the area east of the Willamette River to the 
County boundary unless otherwise noted. 
In 1970 the population of the metropolitan area was 
1,007,130. By 1980 this figure had grown to 1,245,020 
based on the 1980 census. The population estimates 
used in preparing the DEIS were as follows: 
1975 1,090,700 
1990 1,398,000 
2000 1,608,400 
The latest population estimate for the metropolitan area 
in the year 2000 is 1,739,930. 
Regional employment is summarized in the following 
table: 
Table 1 
Portland SMSA Labor Force and Employment Growth 
(1970-1980) 
(thousands of employees) 
Wage and Salary Employment 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Transportation, Communications, 
Utilities 
Trade (Wholesale & Retail) 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Services 
Government 
1970 1975 1980 
380.6 441 .5 555.2 
85 .7 90.2 114.2 
17.3 18.3 24.6 
30.2 30.5 36.3 
92.6 111 .5 142.2 
24.7 32.1 45.7 
67.7 86.2 111 .0 
62.4 72.7 81.4 
A typical Burnside Street Light Rail station 
SOURCE: Zimmer · Gunsul · Frasca Partnership 
Downtown employment in Portland is as follows: 
Table 2 
Portland Downtown Employment 
1970 49,983 (Source: DEIS) 
1980 82,140 (Source: METRO) 
2000 128,450 (Source: METRO) 
Employment in the downtown area increased by 64.3 
percent over the period 1970-1980. The corresponding 
figure for the SMSA is 45.9 percent and the study area 
69.5 percent. 
Focusing on the Study Area, the 1980 demography was 
as follows : 
Land Area 
Population 
Male 
Female 
Age 
Under 5 years 
5-14 
15-24 
25-44 
45-64 
65&over 
Race 
White 
Other 
Household size 
Median Income 
Housing 
Total Units 
Occupied Units 
Owner-Occupied 
Rented-Occupied 
Development Density (Average) 
Employment 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Transportation, Utilities, 
Communication 
Trade (Wholesale & Retail) 
Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate 
Services 
Government 
Agriculture 
Total 
· 1' 
~ 
--, i 
98. 7 4 Square Miles 
304,006 
47.5% 
52.5% 
8.4% 
11.5% 
18.2% 
30.6% 
18.7% 
12.6% 
94.0% 
6.0% 
2.4 
$14,610 
128,609 
122,722 
69,724 
52,998 
3079 persons 
per square mile 
25,751 
9,035 
13,880 
38,013 
11 ,862 
41 ,774 
6,079 
1,768 
148,162 
(17.4%) 
(6.1 %) 
(9.4%) 
(25.7%) 
(8.0%) 
(28.2%) 
(4.1 %) 
(1.1 %) 
" [ _~ . 
~ ==~~~=--~ 
Side view of a typical Burnside Street Light Rail station 
SOURCE Zimmer · Gunsul · Frasca Partnership 
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Growth Forecast 1980-2000 
1970 1980 2000 Growth 
Population 
Housing 
Employment 
293,045 304,006 385,000 81,654 (26.9%) 
103,627 128,609 180,690 52,081 (40.5%) 
87,427 148,162 166,500 18,338 (12.4%) 
For the City of Gresham, the population figures are as 
follows: 
Total Population 33,005 
White 96.0% 
Other 4.0% 
Age 
Under 5 years 8.7% 
5-14 16.9% 
15-24 17.3% 
25-44 34.5% 
45-64 14.4% 
65&over 8.2% 
Employment 
Manufacturing 2669 (16.9%) 
Construction 1154 (7.3%) 
Transportation, Utilities, 
Communication 1373 (8.7%) 
Trade (Wholesale & Retail) 4091 (26 .0%) 
Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate 1460 (9.3%) 
Services 3953 (25.1 %) 
Government 781 (5.0%) 
Agriculture 281 (1.7%) 
Total 15,762 
During the mid-70 's the East County area witnessed 
significant development and growth. The above figures 
indicate that this trend will continue into the future . 
However, the recent economic recession has slowed this 
growth trend somewhat. 
The Banfield Chronology: 
A Brief Overview 
A schematic outline of the entire local decision process is 
provided in Appendix E. Local decisionmaking started 
from a negative perspective, opposition to a major 
freeway segment. Initially proposed by the metropolitan 
area in the early sixties, the Mt. Hood Freeway would 
have connected Interstate 5 and Interstate 205 along the 
Powell Boulevard corridor in Portland. (See Map in Ap-
pendix A). In reality an intra-urban highway, this Inter-
state segment was included in the regional transportation 
plan as part of the regional Interstate system. Until the late 
sixties, the Federal Highway Administration (FHW A) 
opposed this segment because it did not meet the criteria 
of the national Interstate program. However, after signifi-
cant local political and technical effort, the FHW A finally 
added the segment to its Interstate program. Subsequent-
ly, a freeway revolt came to Portland. The proposed 
freeway would have required removal of approximately 
one percent of the housing stock in Portland, severely im-
pacted southeast Portland neighborhoods and primarily 
served commuter traffic from the East County area. As the 
state moved toward final stages of planning for this 
freeway, substantial citizen opposition developed. 
While not the sole or predominant issue of the 1972 
Portland mayoral campaign, the freeway issue did have 
significant political impacts. The election of Neil 
Goldschmidt, a progressive, liberal Democrat, to the 
mayor's office in 1972 set the stage for a major reevalua-
tion of the region's transportation system. Goldschmidt 
proceeded to develop an in-house technical staff capable 
of articulating alternatives to the auto-dominated, 
alternative transportation approaches. Then Governor 
Tom McCall appointed a Governor's Task Force (GTF), 
chaired by Goldschmidt, to assay transit as a reliable op-
tion to more freeways in the region. The GTF was critical 
not only to the identification of transportation corridors 
with transit capabilities but also to the strengthening of 
the regional Council of Governments, the Columbia 
Region Association of Governments (CRAG). 
Formed in 1969, CRAG assumed responsibility for the 
then current regional transportation plan, the Portland 
Vancouver Metropolitan Area Transportation Study 
(PVMATS). In 1972 CRAG, under state legislation, 
became a mandatory Council of Governments (COG), re-
quiring membership of all local governments within the 
metropolitan area, including Clark County, Washington 
and its local governments. Subsequently, the GTF recom-
mended strengthening the technical capability of CRAG 
which put it into a position, with the help of the Portland 
city planners, to investigate transportation alternatives for 
the region. At the instigation of Goldschmidt, CRAG and 
Governor McCall proposed withdrawal of the Mt. Hood 
Freeway to the US Department of Transportation (US 
DOT) in 1975. At that time, the region had the option of 
relocating the proposed freeway to another corridor or 
BANFIELD LRT IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
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Major milestones in the ten year process of implementing the fun.field Light Rail project 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
planned regional transportation system. Having cam-
paigned on a neighborhood preservation and reinvigora-
tion of the CBD theme, Goldschmidt sought a transit 
alternative which would meet the transportation needs of 
the city and the region. After procedural deficiencies and 
a subsequent court decision held up the completion of 
the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the 
Mt. Hood Freeway, Goldschmidt managed to form a 
coalition of state and local officials willing to investi~ate 
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substituting a major transit investment, either rail or bus 
capital expenditures. The passage of the Federal Highway 
Act of 1976 extended these options to include substitute 
highway projects. Further, the entitlement created by the 
withdrawal of a freeway was to be escalated on the basis 
of the latest cost-to-complete estimate of the FHWA for 
the Interstate system. These new provisions caused delay 
in the approval of the Portland withdrawal request. They 
also provided the political ammunition necessary to 
galvanize a local consensus on regional transportation 
improvements. 
In June, 1976, the Secretary of Transportation ap-
proved the withdrawal, permitting the development of 
transit options to begin in earnest. It should be noted that 
until this point, the transportation focus in the Portland 
region had been anti-freeway-not pro-light rail, or any 
other major project for that matter. 
As part of his withdrawal approval in 1975, the Gover-
nor had designated, at CRAG's request, three major tran-
sit corridors for transportation improvements. In 
September, 1975, a state Banfield Citizens' Advisory 
Committee was formed as part of the Oregon Department 
of Transportation's (ODOT) planning process for the 
Banfield. ODOT had been designated lead agency for the 
corridor in August, 1975. These actions initiated the 
planning process for the Banfield corridor which was 
designated the region's number one priority in 
September, 1976. This commitment was made to the 
eastside partly for the political purpose of replacing the 
lost freeway, the perceived necessity of making some 
form of improvement to stave off eastside congestion, and 
the availability of an already well established eastside 
freeway corridor. A related reason was the pending inter-
connection of the I-205 freeway to the Banfield Freeway. 
The I-205 freeway had been held up for years on a 
number of environmental grounds. A local political 
agreement was reached to permit progress on I-205 con-
struction as part of the overall decisionmaking for the 
Banfield. 
The LRT concept first surfaced officially as a result of 
Multnomah County Commissioner Mel Gordon's and 
Goldschmidt's request for a State Public Utility Commis-
sion (PUC) study in 1973. No commitment had been 
made to a specific project but there was interest in explor-
ing the feasibility of rail transit on existing rail lines in the 
region. The PUC study was not a definitive evaluation of 
the rail option for the region but it did provide input to 
the GTF staff work and final report. The LRT option was 
included in the initial DEIS work for the Banfield in 1975 
but was dropped as technically unfeasible in 1976. In 
1977 it was reinstated after independent technical 
analyses by Tri-Met, which had commissioned a study 
by Wilbur Smith and Associates. Until 1976, Tri-Met had 
been a predominantly silent partner in the decisionmak-
ing process. Formed in 1969, it was still in its organiza-
tional infancy and did not possess the staff capabilities of 
other local agencies. Subsequent to the reinstatement of 
the LRT option in 1977, it became lead agency for the 
Banfield LRT alternatives (all rubber-tired alternatives 
were the responsibility of ODOT). After evaluating five 
major transportation system configurations for the DEIS, 
the LRT emerged as the preferred alternative for the 
corridor. 
The technical justification and process for this deter-
mination was extremely convoluted. Funding for the 
DEIS had been made available from the Interstate 
withdrawal funds by FHW A for the Banfield corridor. 
With the emergence of a major transit alternative, 
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however, the Urban Mass Transportation Administration 
(UMTA) became a major partner in the process. The 
planning and approval processes of these two federal 
agencies were significantly different. Consequently, the 
Portland region had to "invent" and/ or persuade the two 
federal agencies to adopt a single approach to corridor 
analysis. After significant local persuasion, UMT A agreed 
to accept a modified FHWA process. tension re-
mained concerning the technical approach to modeling 
the ridership for the corridor. The Banfield was one of the 
the first new light rail starts nationally and the analytical 
models to evaluate it, in other than a highway forecasting 
approach, were limited. When Tri-Met assumed respon-
sibility for transit modeling, technical accommodations 
were reached which ultimately led to the selection of the 
LRT. 
After local approvals in late 1978, the federal govern-
ment reviewed the project but did not provide its ap-
proval until 1980. The process of federal project approval 
was troubled by UMTA/FHWA tensions, federal funding 
shortfalls and locally perceived federal technical "nitpick-
ing." It is generally accepted locally that Goldschmidt's 
appointment as Secretary of Transportation played a key 
role in gaining final federal approval. 
Funding of the Banfield project was almost an after-
thought. The presence of the Interstate withdrawal en-
titlement clearly allowed local officials to assume away, 
temporarily, the difficult question of where the money 
would come from. Subsequent to the local approval of the 
LRT, a request was made to UMTA to fund $85.7 million 
of the project with Section 3 capital funds and the re-
mainder with Interstate transfer monies. Congress con-
curred in the use of Section 3 funds in December, 1980, 
directing UMTA to issue a "Letter of Intent" for the proj-
ect. In March, 1981, however, UMTA indicated it was 
unable to fund the project, citing a new federal policy 
banning funds for new rail starts. 
Tri-Met had begun developing a program for securing 
the local matching monies in 1978. Unlikely to secure 
favorable treatment in the financial markets because it 
lacked substantial construction experience, it opted to 
seek the matching funds from the state legislature. After 
convincing a new governor to accept this request, it was 
stalled by US Representative Robert Duncan who be-
lieved that Tri-Met, to demonstrate its commitment to the 
project, should provide the matching monies. After 
substantial negotiation, Tri-Met agreed to provide a por-
tion of the funds. Subsequent approval by the legislature 
of a $16 million authorization for the remaining monies 
rounded out the package. 
The Reagan Administration's "No New Rail Starts" 
policy necessitated a new funding arrangement. Senator 
Mark Hatfield, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee and Representative Les Au Coin, a member of 
the House Appropriations Sub-Committee on Transpor-
tation were subsequently able to negotiate an alternative 
arrangement for funding with US DOT. Suggested by 
local officials, the final package involved a Full Funding 
Agreement financed almost entirely from Interstate 
transfer funds in exchange for a Letter oflntent promising 
$76 million in capital improvement funds to the Portland 
area's various bus-related projects, particularly the 
westside corridor. This agreement took the pressure off 
the federal budget for new Section 3 rail grants and re-
duced short-term budgetary exposure to the annual cash-
flow requirements of the project. Funding for the project 
arrived in Portland in the hands of UMT A Administrator 
Arthur Teele in April, 1982. Presenting the Full Funding 
Agreement at the ground-breaking ceremonies for the 
Ruby Junction Maintenance Facility, Teele praised the 
Portland area for its diligence and efforts in developing 
the project. 
With construction underway, the project is slated for 
completion in mid-1986. The project is being managed 
jointly by Tri-Met and ODOT. Tri-Met is overseeing the 
construction of the LRT, while ODOT supervises the 
highway improvements and right-of-way acquisition. 
Construction of the project is being phased, with 
highway work scheduled in two contracts from west to 
east, and LRT work phased from east to west in several 
contracts. The first vehicle is scheduled to arrive in 
February, 1984, with testing to begin thereafter. The last 
vehicle is scheduled for arrival in mid-1986, just before 
service commences. Pending expeditious completion of 
all construction, revenue service will commence in Sum-
mer, 1986. 
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View of the Mt. Hood Freeway cutting through SE Portland neighborhoods 
SOURCE Mt. Hood Freeway Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
The Banfield process really began with the withdrawal of the Mt. Hood Freeway. The major ac-
tors behind this effort were Neil Goldschmidt and Gover-
nor Tom McCall. Goldschmidt, supported by County 
Commissioners Mel Gordon and Don Clark, sought a 
major alternative to the highway proposals of PVMATS. 
The Mt. Hood Freeway had generated substantial 
political debate within the city based on perceived 
detrimental impacts on southeast Portland. While these 
impacts would have been substantial, removal of the 
freeway did not presuppose an alternative approach. 
Goldschmidt supported transit improvements to main-
tain the viability of the inner city, minimize the need for 
highway improvements and improve the commercial 
and retail viability of the downtown core. PVMA TS em-
phasized a regional highway network which would have 
precluded a central core focus and supported suburban 
transportation networks with minimal CBD benefits. 
Further, there was a growing concern among local 
political officials that the proposed new freeways would 
overtax the financial resources of the region. Multnomah 
County officials interested in providing transit services to 
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eastside constituents became allies of Portland in sup-
porting some form of transit improvement. Yet, despite 
these concerns, no single project or approach had been 
identified for the region. 
Genesis of Local Government Interests 
in Transit 
The Mt. Hood DEIS process had produced substantial 
citizen unrest, particularly in southeast Portland. Spurred 
on by Sensible Transportation Options for Portland 
(STOP), a suit was filed in 1973 challenging the pro-
cedural and technical adequacy of the DEIS. A 1974 
judicial opinion brought a halt to the decision process for 
the freeway, providing an important hiatus. Goldschmidt 
had appointed a Citizen Advisory Committee in 1972 to 
review the desirability of the freeway and to suggest 
possible alternatives which would meet the city's policy 
objectives. This Committee's recommendation to aban-
don the freeway and develop a metropolitan transit op-
tion seemed to lay the political foundation for the 
transportation initiatives that followed the court decision. 
Support for transit also grew from the Public Utilities 
Commission study of existing rail corridors in the region. 
Commissioned in 1973 at the joint request of Mult-
nomah County Commissioner Mel Gordon and Gold-
schmidt, the study reviewed the potential for establishing 
light rail service in the existing freight and passenger cor-
ridors. The study concluded that this approach was 
possible but also indicated potential conflict between' 
freight and transit service on existing trackage. It also in-
dicated that a southern route to Oregon City held the best 
short-term potential for the development of light rail ser-
vice. 
Gordon used the results of the PUC study to support 
his advocacy of LRT in the region. He persuaded the 
County to support LRT long before any other jurisdiction. 
In this effort he was aided by Commission Chairman Don 
Clark who was troubled by the highway emphasis of the 
Interstate 205 outerbelt. He saw transit as a major im-
provement over the continued development of auto-
dominated systems. 
Clark had actively opposed I-205, contributing to the 
delay in its construction. Working with Gordon, Gold-
schmidt and Glenn Jackson, Chairman of the Oregon 
Transportation Commission, a political agreement was 
reached to permit progress on the outerbelt in 1975. 
Jackson agreed to support withdrawal of the Mt. Hood in 
return for progress on I-205 and improvements on the 
Banfield Freeway which would make it into an Interstate 
standard east-west connector between I-205 and 
downtown Portland. Clark agreed to drop his opposition 
to I-205 in return for its redesign to include a transit 
guideway. Relocation of the I-205 was also proposed, 
adversely impacting the obsolete Rocky Butte Jail. The jail 
was moved to downtown Portland and a new facility 
built with federal money. These agreements formed a cor-
nerstone for the remainder of the decisionmaking 
process. 
These initial political stirrings for a transit option were 
substantially unsupported by comprehensive technical 
studies, particularly in terms of specific corridors and ser-
vice improvements. The thrust was to wean Portland 
away from a highway-based system and buy time to 
develop a balanced alternative using transit and limited 
highway improvements. 
Portland's regional transit system, in the presence of 
Tri-Met, was only three years old, having been formed in 
1969. As an agency, it was principally concerned with the 
operation of a bus fleet and had not developed a sophis-
ticated transportation planning capability. Indeed, in the 
words of Steve McCarthy, former Assistant General 
Manager of Tri-Met from 1974 to 1976, during this 
period and until 1976, Tri-Met did not even have the 
capacity to adequately site a bus shelter. Hence, the 
agency lacked the political position to lead the changes in 
the transportation system. 
The Governor's Task Force (GTF) 
At the request of Goldschmidt, Governor McCall formed 
a special Task Force to investigate transportation options 
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for the region in 1973. Chaired by Goldschmidt, this task 
force was a sub-committee of CRAG. Its charge was to in-
vestigate the transportation options open to the on 
a systems scale and make recommendations concerning 
both the physical and institutional options. 
Goldschmidt's influence in the process was substantially 
enhanced by his chairmanship of CRAG. A weighted 
voting scheme of the CRAG Board gave him fifteen votes. 
With the votes of the Multnomah County representative 
and the support of any other member, Goldschmidt had 
the necessary leverage to drive the reevaluation of the 
region's transportation future. 
The technical staff for the GTF was provided by 
Systems Design Concepts (SyDec), a Washington, D.C. 
based consulting firm. The principal SyDec represen-
tatives were Lowell Bridwell, a former FHW A Ad-
ministrator, Arlee Reno and Joe Stowers, all well versed in 
the policy and programs of US DOT. The selection of 
SyDec as a consultant to the GTF was intentional. The 
firm had assisted with the first Interstate withdrawal in 
Boston, Massachusetts. The withdrawal in 1973 had at-
tracted Goldschmidt's interest. 
The GTF existed from May, 1973 through 1975, pro-
ducing a major report which set the technical systems 
context for subsequent transportation planning. Com-
posed of officials from the City of Portland, Counties of 
Multnomah, Washington, Clackamas and Clark, CRAG, 
ODOT, the Port of Portland, and Tri-Met, the GTF was 
charged with evaluating transit alternatives for the region 
and identifying possible corridors. The key question fac-
ing the GTF was whether transit was a viable alternative 
to freeway investment. Sixty-eight system configurations 
for the region were ultimately evaluated. These configura-
tions were identified as alternatives to PVMATS and its 
highway emphasis. That study, initiated in 1959 but not 
formally adopted until 1971, assumed that transit rider-
ship and operation would stabilize and, at worst, con-
tinue a trend of decline into the future. Five principal cor-
ridors were evaluated in terms of potential 1990 rider-
ship, with estimates ranging from 20,000 to 70,000 trips 
per day. The GTF estimates for the Banfield corridor 
showed a potential demand of 59,700 riders for LRT and 
71,100 for a busway. The report concluded that the 
choice of mode should be based on factors other than 
potential ridership, such as flexibility, adaptability and 
environmental effects. This analysis provided the initial 
technical justification for transit. 
The report placed an emphasis on the use of existing 
transportation corridors for transit, rather than relying on 
new auto-oriented construction projects with a modest 
transit add-on. Perhaps more importantly, however, it set 
the stage for developing the technical and political deci-
sionmaking capability for regional transit planning. The 
GTF report was a crucial element in the decision to 
withdraw the Mt. Hood Freeway. An alternative 
framework for trip mobility had to be found because, 
unlike other metropolitan areas with withdrawal in-
itiatives, an on-the-shelf alternative project did not exist 
nor did the technical capability to produce one. The GTF 
laid the groundwork for both a future project and the 
development of the organizational capability to plan and 
design it. By underscoring the potential case for transit 
and recommending the strengthening of CRAG's 
technical planning capability, the GTF provided local 
political officials with the first sound basis for redirecting 
transportation planning for the region. 
This technical justification initiated a linked 
technical/political decisionmaking process that 
characterized the subsequent decisionmaking process. 
Further, it gave local officials positive direction in contrast 
to the anti-freeway orientation of the Mt. Hood Freeway 
controversy. Freeways were de-emphasized to the bene-
fit of transit and a CBD focus. 
The Federal Withdrawal Options in 1975 
Employing the findings of the GTF, the metropolitan area 
approached the US DOT with a constructive basis for 
withdrawing the Mt. Hood. Under the withdrawal provi-
sions then in effect (1975), the region had two options: 1) 
move the freeway to another location or, 2) invest the 
funds in a transit option (Section 103(e)2 and 103(e)3 of 
the Federal Aid Highway Act as amended in 1973). 
Moreover, the entitlement created by the withdrawal 
would be fixed at the cost of the withdrawn freeway. 
These provisions restricted the flexibility of the 
metropolitan area to a limited set of transportation op-
tions but did encourage the consideration of transit ap-
proaches. 
PVMATS: Recommended 
Freeways and Expressways 
- Open to Traffic 
-- Under Construction, Planned, 
or Proposed · 
54 new freeways and expressways were planned to serve the region 's needs through 1990 at part of PVMATS 
SOURCE: Governor's Task Force 
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Boston's succes in withdrawing a major Interstate seg-
ment in 1973 provided an ex mple that received national 
attention. During the legislative hearings of 1975 and 
1976 a further refinement of the Interstate withdrawal 
process surfaced which eventually opened up additional 
options for all metropolitan areas. Portland, sensing the 
advantages of these proposed amendments, actively sup-
ported them. Working with Representative Bella Abzug 
of New York and the National League of Cities, with 
which Goldschmidt was actively involved, Portland 
hired a lobbyist to seek passage of the amendments. The 
passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1976 with a 
new Section 10 3( e )4 provided substantial new discretion 
(highway projects were made eligible) and a favorable 
financial advantage (entitlements would escalate with the 
latest FHW A cost to complete estimates for the Interstate 
system). The critical nature of the 197 6 Act is reflected by 
the fact that Portland asked US DOT to delay approval of 
the Mt. Hood withdrawal request after its submission. 
The Local Decision to Request Withdrawal 
In 1974, after the local decision to request withdrawal 
had been made through and by CRAG for the City of 
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Portland and Multnomah County, the City of Portland ac-
tively sought the support of Governor McCall for a 
withdrawal request. McCall announced his intent to in-
itiate the withdrawal in September, 1974. Yet, the formal 
request did not go forward until July, 1975. The delay 
was a product of three factors : a gubernatorial election in 
the Fall, 19 7 4 ; a need to redraft the current regional 
transportation plan; and political opposition to the 
perceived loss of jobs if the withdrawal was successful. 
In the first instance, McCall retired as Governor after 
two terms. His successor, Robert Straub, had not been 
party to the initial negotiations on the withdrawal pro-
posal. His approval ultimately hinged on the support of 
metropolitan politicians who argued that the withdrawal 
made sense for the region and that there would be no loss 
of jobs to the state. As close political allies, most of the 
regional politicians had ready access to Straub, particular-
ly Goldschmidt. Their support for the withdrawal was 
further aided by Straub's campaign experience in the 
metropolitan area which had made him aware of the local 
opposition to the Mt. Hood. His principal concern, 
however, was with the potential job losses created by the 
withdrawal since 1975 was a recession year. 
TRANSIT 
CORRI DOR SYSTEM 
U:GIND 
- SU&URBAN TRANSIT STATION:! 
-TRANSIT ~:-.,';.,;wsw>.Y 
RESEMO ...... , CONNECTIONS 
The Interim Transportation Plan became the basis for a decade of planning for highway and transit investments 
SO URCE: Columbia Regional Association of Governments 
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Despite intense opposition to the Mt. Hood, the poten-
tial loss of jobs and federal grant funds to the region were 
offsetting factors which mitigated withdrawal. 
The withdrawal program was still relatively new and un-
tried nationally. As there was substantial concern 
locally that the federal government might not meet its 
commitments or successfully negotiate a withdrawal. 
Local officials opposing the withdrawal used this as am-
munition for their cause. Ultimately, the groundwork laid 
between Gordon, Clark, Jackson and Goldschmidt pro-
vided the key to a successful compromise. 
The compromise was built around the need to have at 
least one project under construction in the region. The 
I-205 could reach that stage relatively quickly once local 
political opposition was dropped. Hence, the argument 
put to Straub was that given the modifications to 
downsize I-205 (reflecting the elimination of the Mt. 
Hood), a transit guideway could be constructed in the 
leftover right-of-way. I-205 could proceed to con-
struction providing some immediate jobs. This pacified 
the Association of Oregon Contractors which had locally 
opposed the freeway withdraw!. Exercising some faith 
that the metropolitan officials would ultimately come up 
with a replacement project, Straub agreed to support the 
withdrawal. 
One other step needed negotiating before the request 
could be drafted--;-a revision in the Regional Transporta-
tion Plan. In learning of the withdrawal request, FHW A 
had requested the identification of a substitute project(s). 
In the absence of a completed planning process and 
wanting to maintain their options, local officials refused 
to comply with the request. Subsequently, FHWA con-
sidered withdrawal of CRAG's certification as the 
regional Metropolitan Planning Organization. The 
withdrawal of the Mt. Hood would have created a conflict 
with the existing Regional Transportation Plan. In 
response to a potential cutoff of federal transportation 
funds, CRAG developed an Interim Transportation Plan 
(ITP). The Plan indicated a busway as the preferred proj-
ect for the Banfield as a replacement for the Mt. 
Hood, which the US DOT approved. 
With the basis for a local agreement in place, Doug 
Wright, Transportation Planner for Portland, in conjunc-
tion with Leonard Bergstein of Straub's staff, wrote the 
withdrawal request. It is commonly acknowledged local-
ly that Wright was a major force behind the withdrawal, 
based on his knowledge of the federal program and the 
support he enjoyed from Goldschmidt. 
Changes at the Federal Level 
Shortly after the request was made, however, the 
legislative events surrounding the proposed Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1976 led the state and metropolitan area 
to defer US DOT approval. Approval could have been ob-
tained in 1975 but the greater flexibility of the proposed 
withdrawal amendments was too attractive to forego. 
Hence, when DOT sought clarifying documentation and 
information, Oregon was slow to respond. This slowness 
was most evident in the region's dealing with FHW A. 
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FHW A favored construction of the Mt. Hood Freeway. 
Playing off of this federal interest, the state and 
metropolitan area stalled for time. An important ally in 
this process was the Administrator of FHWA, former 
Nebraska Governor Tieman, who-after meeting in 
Washington with Jackson, Goldschmidt, Drummond 
and other local officials-agreed to delay processing of the 
request, pending the outcome of the legislative process. 
Just prior to the passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 
1976 Portland's request was finally approved, grand-
fathered under the new legislative provisions. 
Meanwhile, the region was proceeding from the ITP 
toward a regional transit philosophy. The plan identified 
the Banfield corridor as the region's top priority along 
with two other corridors, the Sunset on Portland's 
westside and Oregon City to the south. These corridors 
were identified in Straub's letter requesting withdrawal 
and were based on the analytical work of the GTF. ODOT 
was designated as lead agency for the Banfield and Sunset 
corridors since initial indications were that a busway 
would be the most likely configuration for transit im-
provements. Tri-Met was designated as the lead agency 
for the Oregon City corridor where light rail looked most 
likely, based on the 1973 PUC study. The City of Portland 
assumed responsibility for studies in the downtown 
predicated on its ongoing arterial streets policy, parking, 
and the consequences of any transit option for 
downtown circulation. 
Summary 
The period of 1973-75 closed on a metropolitan region 
which had successfully introduced and supported a 
move toward greater use of transit. The process, while 
politically charged, had been carried forward on the basis 
of intense cooperation and the active leadership of 
Goldschmidt. Support from the principal jurisdictional 
actors (CRAG, Portland, Multnomah County, Tri-Met 
and ODOT) had been obtained but the future alternatives 
were defined in vague and generalized ways. The ITP had 
specified preferred modes and corridors but the politi-
cians had used this and other technical studies primarily 
to sell the general concept of transit and not a specific 
project, with the possible exception of County Commis-
sioner Gordon. Pressure existed to get on with the con-
struction of a major east-west project but the focus had 
been changed from a suburban emphasis to a regional 
growth orientation with a Portland CBD pivot. In general, 
the political context and interests were polarized not 
around specific projects but a need to move forward with 
a more effective public transportation system in the form 
of mass transit. 
This transition was not without some ill feelings con-
cerning the fate of the Mt. Hood Freeway, however. 
FHW A had indirectly opposed the withdrawal. Many in-
dividual supporters of the freeway were reluctant sup-
porters of the withdrawal, or stridently opposed. The 
issue would continue as a major political problem in the 
region for years after. An example was the 1976 mayoral 
race where billboards appeared proclaiming, "If you had 
The Mt. Hood Freeway was a major political issue for years 
SOURCE: Ivancie Political Campaign Literature 
taken the Mt. Hood Freeway you would be there by 
now." In 1978 Governor-elect Victor Atiyeh, a Mt. Hood 
supporter, agreed to the inclusion of funds in his budget 
for local matching money only after noting that the Mt. 
Hood had been killed and could not be resurrected. U.S. 
Representative Robert Duncan, also a Mt Hood sup-
porter, would provide a substantial roadblock to the 
state's appropriation of these matching funds based on 
his belief that Tri-Met should demonstrate its commit-
ment to the project. These remnants of opposition sur-
faced at later points in the decisionmaking process to pro-
vide obstacles to expeditious progress or at a minimum 
potentially embarrassing moments, when progress was 
not being made to the satisfaction of some political actors. 
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Chapter 4 
Identification of Alternatives 
~and the Decision to Go 
I , - -
.. . - . ·;'/ ··-r-/. . ·\ 
Some 30 different alternatives were considered for the Barifield corridor 
SO URCE: Tri-Met 
Background 
T he Mt. Hood withdrawal process set a context but did not establish more than a general commitment 
to transit. The ITP identified a number of options but 
there was little detailed technical information on the in-
dividual feasibility of these alternatives. Consequently, 
when the Banfield Corridor Project started in the Fall of 
1975, it became necessary to re-examine the technical 
bases for the "systems" level alternatives suggested by 
the ITP. At the same time, however, the busway project 
preferred by the ITP was being refined and advanced as 
the principal project for the corridor. This project had 
substantial political support because it was perceived as 
readily implementable and would satisfy the demand for 
a construction project generating the jobs and federal 
grants that many individuals felt would be lost with the 
demise of the Mt. Hood. Hence, the alternatives analysis 
phase of the project witnessed substantial overlap be-
tween systems and project level analysis, generating 
substantial confusion at times. Sorting out this confusion 
occupied much of the planning effort in the ensuing 
years. Unlike major highway projects with a smoother 
planning process, honed and refined through years of ex-
perience, the planning process for the Banfield seems, in 
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retrospect, to have been semi-organized and chaotic. This 
chaos reflected the lack of an agreed-upon and routinized 
institutional and technical process for accomplishing the 
tasks at hand. The situation was made worse by the lack 
of any substantial regional 'expertise with long-range, 
large-scale capital projects for transit. There was no track 
record or background to call upon in the region. just as 
importantly, major political decisionmakers were not 
content to wait out the sequence of systems and project-
level planning. 
Initiating the Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement Process 
As the official lead agency for the Banfield corridor, 
ODOT initiated the DEIS process in the Fall of 1975. The 
funds for this effort were drawn from the Mt. Hood In-
terstate transfer monies. While the scope of the project re-
mained to be defined, $60 million had been assigned to 
the corridor to start work and fund construction of a final 
project. In starting the DEIS process, ODOT adopted the 
FHW A approach to planning. Initially four major alter-
natives were examined: a separated busway, two 
schemes utilizing high-occupancy-vehicle lanes on the 
freeway and light rail transit. These alternatives were to be 
refined and evaluated on the basis of social, environ-
mental and engineering studies performed or sponsored 
by ODOT. To some extent, the outcome of the assess-
ment process was preordained by ODOT's selection as 
lead agency. The preferred approach of the ITP was a 
busway which ODOT would build, not the transit agen-
cy. Further, the widening and straightening of the Ban-
field Freeway was a "given," extending from the deal on 
1-205 arranged by Jackson, Goldschmidt and Clark 
ODOT initiated the planning process under the Oregon 
Action Plan, a citizen participation process created under 
federal regulation. The process had further significance in 
that the political uproar surrounding the Mt. Hood had af-
fected the political thinking in the region. No one wanted 
to incur citizen unrest with a replacement project. 
ODOT formed a Banfield Citizens' Advisory Committee 
(CAC). This committee was charged with reviewing 
analytical products as they emerged and providing citizen 
input to the decisionmaking process. It also served a 
legitimizing function, which it was hoped would forestall 
any future political unrest. The CAC began its work in 
October, 1975 and by the end of the DEIS process had 
grown to an active membership of over 120 people. 
Initial Technical Efforts 
It is important to understand the chronological context of 
the Banfield technical analysis. The work was initiated in 
mid-1975 in an era of little familiarity with the LRT 
systems in the United States. The eight old rail cities were 
nationally perceived as the only cities where rail systems 
were viable alternatives to bus-based service. San Fran-
cisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, the only 
post-World War II rail start in the nation, was in the early 
stages of operation and had generated some negative im-
agery for rail systems. Only Canada offered an existing 
system of LRT on the North American continent. From a 
technical perspective, the modeling process for transit 
was still heavily linked to highway-demand models and 
lacked technical sensitivity to the unique dimensions of 
LRT. In the metropolitan region, if there was a bias to a 
particular project, it was to a busway between the 
Portland CBD and Gateway Shopping Center. This 
ect, based on bus service, received higher consideration 
because of its implementability (ODOT could build it 
quickly) and because of its inherent comparability with 
highway modal split models. LRT was viewed as a 
futuristic rather than a pragmatic alternative. 
From a broader perspective, the entire transportation 
planning process was more favorably geared to rubber-
tire-based systems. UMT A and FHW A operated separate 
categorical grant programs with discrete planning re-
quirements. As will be discussed later, UMTA seemed to 
approach the evaluation of alternatives more cautiously, 
seemingly requiring more approvals before each stage of 
the analysis could be initiated. More importantly, joint 
projects were beyond the experience of UMTA and 
FHW A. Until the issuance of the interim metropolitan 
planning regulations in 1976, the two agencies lacked a 
common process for the kind of transportation planning 
Portland was developing. As a result, the Portland 
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analytical approach from its very beginnings did not "fit" 
federal procedures and processes well. As an example, 
the UMTA process of Phase I Alternatives Analysis re-
quired, at the time, corridor-level evaluations of systems 
alternatives. The metropolitan area believed that the in-
itial work performed by the Governor's Task Force and 
DeLeuw Cather satisfied this requirement. Hence, 
ODOT, which had the lead for the complete DEIS in 
1975, was embarking on what would now be called 
Phase II Alternatives Analysis, focusing on project-level 
evaluations and comparisons. Indeed, ODOT began its 
technical work with the assumption that some project 
would be built in the Banfield Corridor. At the same time, 
it was also mixing systems-level with project-level 
analyses to account for shifting lists of alternatives pro-
duced by federal involvement and changing local-level 
priorities. In a nutshell, the technical analysis for the Ban-
field approximated the pure model of alternatives 
analysis at best in the abstract rather than the applied ap-
plication of federal procedures. For a discussion of the 
technical modeling process see Appendix B. 
The list of alternative project configurations changed 
substantially over time. Partially attributable to the 
character of the overall process (atypical), the input/ 
demands of local and federal agencies/officials principal-
ly affected the choice and specifications of viable alter-
natives. Over thirty total discrete and combined options 
were assessed during the process, including some sug-
gested by UMTA during the preparation of a Preferred 
Alternatives Report. The options reported in the DEIS are 
described in Appendix C. While this list covers the ma-
jority of alternatives evaluated, it neglects others sug-
gested during the review of the final document by UMTA 
The source of these alternatives and their exact specifica-
tions, while important, is not as significant as the en-
vironment and context within which they were 
generated. FHWA and UMTA input to the identification 
of (highway I transit) options framed the general context 
for technical analysis. In other words, since the Banfield 
was neither a transit project nor highway project but 
both, some alternatives were treated by local officials as 
"impossible" by virtue of the corridor location and 
political context of the decisionmaking process. 
Moreover, the lack of FHWA/UMTA experience with a 
joint process seemed to create confusion for local of-
ficials. As detailed later, this shifted responsibility for 
reconciling procedures and options to ODOT and Tri-
Met, both of which faced other political and technical 
limitations. These conditions significantly affected the 
entire process of alternatives analysis in that there was lit-
tle prior agreement on.alternatives and analytical pro-
cesses. Thus, the entire effort, at times, appeared to be 
"played-by-ear." 
Appendix Two of the Banfield DEIS provides a chrono-
logical history of the alternatives considered for the cor-
ridor up to February, 1978. The discussion in Appendix 
C outlines the evolution of these alternatives. 
The list of alternatives shows an evolving pattern of 
thinking concerning appropriate alternatives and the role 
of transit. Principal responsibility for refining and specify-
ing alternatives fell to CRAG which really took direction 
from Portland, ODOT and Multnomah County. It is clear, 
however, that a consistent theme of transit service and 
highway improvements ran throughout the process. Ad-
dition of low-cost or no-build alternatives was an-
tithetical to local interests which had built their decision 
process around some form of substantial transportation 
improvement for the region. This commitment to build 
something created federal/local tensions the 
review of the DEIS and subsequent Preferred Alternatives 
Reports. In the latter case, UMT A suggested a number of 
specific alternatives for Tri-Met to evaluate, most notably 
greater use of Transportation Systems Management 
(TSM) options such as freeway ramp metering, use of ar-
ticulated buses and use of existing rail trackage for the 
LRT. 
Initial Working Relationships Between 
ODOT and local Entities 
To accommodate the metropolitan region and the Coun-
ty in particular, ODOT opened a Metropolitan Division 
office (1976) in Portland, directed by Robert Bothman. 
Bothman, a highway engineer, had been involved in the 
withdrawal efforts and was intimately familiar with the 
metropolitan area and had access to Glenn Jackson. He 
became a critical actor in the outcome of the planning 
process. The opening of the Division office under his 
leadership initiated an incremental process of developing 
the technical capability in the region to manage the 
development of transit options. 
At the same time, ODOT was undergoing a major 
reorientation in its Salem headquarters. Still primarily a 
highway agency, it was beginning to move more effective-
ly toward a comprehensive transportation philosophy. 
To facilitate this movement, the director of the agency 
was replaced by Governor Straub. The new director, 
Robert Burco, was a transportation consultant from 
California. His principal mission was to galvanize the dif-
ferent organizational components of ODOT into a com-
prehensive whole. These efforts provided greater leeway 
to the Metropolitan Divisfon in terms of reaching 
workable accommodations with local political leaders. 
Jackson, however, had not participated in the decision to 
appoint Burco. 
Behind the scenes a broader political effort was taking 
place. For many years, Glenn Jackson had been "Mr. 
Highways" in Oregon. As Chairman of Oregon 
Transportation Commission, he had successfully guided 
the development of Oregon's highway system. Moreover, 
he was vitally interested in continued transportation in-
vestment in the metropolitan area. His interest in 
highway construction remained unabated. However, the 
agreement on 1-205, and the fact that ODOT had the lead 
role for the Banfield, garnered his support for a transit 
project. Based on this foundation, Jackson was later able 
to ensure the widening of the Banfield. 
Subsequent to reorganization of the Metropolitan Divi-
sion, ODOT refined its modeling procedures in concert 
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with Multnomah County, CRAG, and Portland. While the 
was not smooth in all respects, it was facilitated 
a strong and effective personal relationship between 
Portland's Chief Transportation Planner Doug Wright 
and Bothman. Between them, they led the technical plan-
ning process. 
Shifting local Priorities 
in 1976, the ability of the region to maintain parallel 
planning efforts in all three corridors began to degenerate. 
A decision was made in September, 1976 to designate the 
Banfield corridor as first priority. A variety of factors in-
fluenced this decision: 
• The apparent incapacity of the region to carry all three 
major corridors because of insufficient technical staff 
and ability; 
• An implicit political commitment to the eastside of 
Portland because it had "lost" the Mt. Hood Freeway; 
• Highway improvements were necessary in the Ban-
field to link to the opening of the 1-205 freeway; 
• The political pressure to replace the jobs lost from the 
Mt. Hood withdrawal required politically expeditious 
progress on a replacement project; 
• ODOTs proven track record in construction and lead 
role on the Banfield made it a "natural" in terms of 
developing and building a project; 
• The initial work done by Tri-Met on the Oregon City 
and by ODOT on the Sunset corridors indicated that 
these projects were unlikely in the near term. 
Consequently, ODOT and the region felt it necessary to 
initiate a project in the Banfield corridor as quickly as 
possible. Of the projects under consideration, the most 
feasible appeared to be the busway. 
The feasibility of the busway had emerged early in 
1976 based on prior studies and the ODOT modeling ef-
forts. ODOTs systems analysis focused on a mix of some 
30 alternative combinations of the four major options 
identified above plus a no-build option. From a cost ef-
fectiveness perspective, the busway appeared to have the 
greatest promise of any of the capital alternatives. Further, 
it would reduce automobile usage, pollution and energy 
consumption. It was flexible and adaptable in terms of 
changing ridership patterns and could link effectively to 
the of the bus system in the region. 
other options appeared less acceptable for a 
number of reasons. The High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) 
approach, while mixing carpool capability with buses, 
was perceived as too flexible in the face of potential 
motorist demand for greater single-passenger auto usage. 
Transit advocates argued that the HOV option was an 
eight-lane freeway with only a policy decision by the 
Oregon Transportation Commission necessary to go 
from HOV to freeway. Costs were attractive and minimal 
compared to other alternatives. But, there was skepticism 
about the ability to attract enough ridership to high oc-
cupancy vehicles. Most importantly, without some form 
of high-capacity transit, ODOTs models indicated that 
the capacity of the corridor would be exceeded by 1990. 
LRT, based on the highway models used by ODOT, 
had fared badly in early analyses. Initially modeled at the 
same length as the busway (only as far as the Gateway 
Shopping Center on Portland's east boundary), it would 
not have attracted sufficient ridership to make it cost ef-
fective in comparison to the busway. Indeed, when the 
modeling efforts failed to substantiate it, it was quietly 
dropped by CRAG's technical committee. 
Hence, as of May, 1976, the most viable local project, 
politically and technically, was the busway. Yet, it was 
not without its limitations. Portland completed construc-
tion of a downtown transit mall in 1978 designed for a bus 
capacity during the peak hour of approximately 225 stan-
dard buses. ODOT's modeling indicated that with the 
busway it was possible that a peak-hour load of more 
than 525 buses would hit the Mall. In addition, the 
perceived air pollution and noise impacts would have 
detrimentally affected the aesthetic values the Mall was 
intended to serve. From a political perspective, the 
busway lacked the "drawing power" of a more 
sophisticated technology or freeway. Indeed, in the view 
of Steve McCarthy, then Tri-Met Assistant General 
Manager, the busway would have had substantial 
political liabilities. Auto users perceiving a busway that 
was substantially "empty" most of the time would 
rightfully complain that it was a waste of resources and 
only produced more congestion by limiting freeway 
lanes. Requiring significant construction efforts, it was 
perceived as unlikely to generate the support often 
associated with a major freeway which has perceptible 
benefits for its principal clientele. While viable, the 
busway failed to spark substantial political commitment. 
View of separated busway on north side of the Banfield Freeway. 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
Additional opposition to the busway came from three 
different sources . Multnomah County, an early advocate 
of LRT, felt that the LRT was being unjustly excluded. In 
response, the entire board threatened to sue the state and 
block the DEIS process unless the LRT was added back as 
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an option. Additionally, STOP, originally formed in op-
position to the Mt. Hood Freeway, became a vocal 
citizens group in support of transit. Merging with another 
group, Citizens for the Immediate Adoption of Trolleys 
(CIAT), a new organization, Citizens for Better Transit 
(CBT) was formed. Composed of a limited number of in-
dividuals, no more than a dozen according to its director 
Ray Polani, this group believed that a more advanced 
form of technology held greater promise for the corridor. 
With membership on ODOT's citizen committee, they 
actively lobbied CRAG, Tri-Met and ODOT to reinclude 
the LRT option. Finally, Tri-Met-a relatively passive 
member of the decisionmaking process to that 
point-decided it needed to adopt a more aggressive role. 
Realizing it would have to operate whatever system was 
finally built, it articulated a position based on cost-
effective operating systems. Perceiving an extension of 
the bus system to be counterproductive from a labor 
perspective, Tri-Met set out aggressively to build a case 
for LRT, outside the DEIS process. Using a sketch plan-
ning process and the services of Wilbur Smith and 
Associates , Tri-Met expended approximately $500,000 
on the preparation of a 1990 plan for the organization. 
Looking beyond the issue of an appropriate system for 
the corridor, the agency also assessed the qualities of an 
effective regional transportation system and operating 
agency in the context of 1990. Concluding that a greater 
use of technology as a substitute for labor costs was 
necessary, its efforts produced the first real articulation of 
operating costs as a critical decision criterion. Moreover, 
Tri-Met chose to do this publicly to create support for its 
LRT objectives. 
During the course of the Tri-Met study and in concert 
with Multnomah County's threatened lawsuit, the staffs 
of the respective agencies lobbied hard to convince 
Portland and ODOT to reinstate the LRT. Tri-Met's 
arguments were principally economic, based on the 
operating cost advantages of LRT. Multnomah County's 
position was based on the need to develop a transit 
system that could effectively serve the vast majority of 
East County residents and meet land-use goals . Tri-Met 
was laboring at a particular disadvantage since it was 
generally perceived by all other jurisdictions as incapable 
of effectively operating and constructing an LRT system. 
Therefore, it was not only arguing a technical case but 
also its organizational effectiveness. 
In the context of the political and technical limitations 
of the busway articulated above and the fear that a lawsuit 
would drag the process out even further, Tri-Met's 
operating cost argument convinced the other par-
ticipants-and the most critical decisionmaker, the 
Governor-to put LRT back into the process. In making 
its case, Tri-Met had shown, through its consultants, that 
the LRT could be cost-effective in construction/ ridership 
terms if the system were extended beyond Gateway to 
Gresham, an additional nine miles of trackage. Tri-Met 
not only successfully reintroduced the LRT but was also 
designated lead agency for that portion of the Banfield 
DEIS process. 
Integrating the Roles of FHWA and UMTA 
To the point that the busway and ODOTs role were of 
primary importance to the Banfield process, the principal 
federal agency involved was the FHW A. Once a fixed-rail 
alternative began to emerge as a serious alternative, the 
UMTA entered the picture. UMTA's participation 
changed the intergovernmental decision process. 
Metropolitan transportation planning requires a com-
prehensive, coordinated and continuous regional effort. 
However, both agencies while working within this 
general federal rubric had developed distinctly different 
transportation planning procedures. Since they ad-
ministered separate grant-in-aid programs which 
generally funded unique and discrete projects serving dif-
ferent state and local constituencies, they focused on 
distinct organizational missions. From the Portland 
perspective, however, this added substantial confusion 
and frustration to the planning process. 
The FHW A and UMT A processes at that point (they 
have since been substantially streamlined and modified) 
were radically different. The FHW A process started with 
reconnaissance studies and the A-95 review process and 
then moved directly into preliminary engineering of 
which the DEIS was the culmination. For UMTA, Phase I 
Alternatives Analysis set the context for preparing a DEIS 
identifying demand, cost-effective methodologies, priori-
ty corridors and a small set of promising alternatives. This 
was followed by UMTA approval which then set the stage 
for Phase II Alternatives Analysis, the DEIS. Subsequent 
to UMTA approval, an FEIS would be prepared and con-
comitantly an application for a Preliminary Engineering 
(PE) Grant. With the approval of the FEIS, a PE grant 
would be approved, followed by performance of PE work 
and the development of a financing scheme. UMT A had 
more approval steps than FHW A which made integrating 
the processes difficult. Since the Banfield project was 
clearly a joint highway I transit project in the minds of the 
state and metropolitan officials, they had to integrate the 
two federal processes. More importantly, the region 
under UMTA's procedures would not get PE funds to 
support technical analyses until much later in the pro-
cess. 
From the perspective of the Portland technical and 
political officials, they had to reach some kind of accom-
modation with the federal agencies. Further, in dealing 
with the two agencies they strongly felt that they were not 
getting much cooperation. FHWA was perceived as hav-
ing a streamlined process and more professional 
credibility within the UMTA was perceived more 
negatively for its more complex process and its less effec-
tive administrative procedures. 
After a number of technical-level discussions, Tri-Met 
as lead Banfield transit agency decided to deal with the 
issue directly at the executive level in Washington. 
Meeting with the FHW A and UMT A Washington staffs, 
Tri-Met officials proceeded to explain the basis of their 
problem by demonstrating the lack of consistency and 
congruency between the two agencies. Working from 
what is locally called the "Bill Hall Chart," Hall, Tri-Met's 
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Planning Director, McCarthy, Wright and Bothman lob-
bied the agencies for a compromise process. UMTA final-
ly decided on a modification of the FHWA process which 
meant that the region could continue the technical pro-
cess as designed to date and not have to retrace steps to 
conform with UMTA's policies. 
Preparing the DEIS 
Once the planning process had been agreed to, Tri-Met 
and ODOT proceeded toward preparation of the DEIS. 
However, UMTA, in its review of the technical work, sug-
gested that Tri-Met include two additional LRT alter-
natives in its analysis. One of these suggested a Division 
Street/Burnside alignment to Gresham. The other had the 
LRT follow I-205 to Lents. While Tri-Met was convinced 
from its analyses that neither alternative was viable, it 
complied with UMTA directives in order to complete the 
process with minimal difficulty. 
Evaluating the LRT alternative meant slowing down the 
whole process to allow Tri-Met to catch up. ODOT had 
already made substantial progress in completing its por-
tion of the DEIS/ Alternatives Analysis process. Under the 
pressure to keep the project moving, produced by 
metropolitan and state political figures~ ODOT imposed 
stringent expectations on Tri-Met. The Wilbur Smith 
Study, while providing a systems-level justification for 
had not refined the analysis to a level commensurate 
with the demands of the DEIS. Hence, Tri-Met working 
with another set of consultants had to catch up to 
ODOT's position and produce technical analyses which 
it had not previously accomplished for three alternatives. 
Further, as is more completely discussed in the next 
chapter, the organization was undergoing major staff 
changes and gearing up to manage the technical analyses 
required. 
Meanwhile, ODOT was proceeding with the Citizen 
Advisory process to set the stage for the final DEIS hear-
ing. This was a massive citizen effort centered around the 
Citizen Advisory Committee (CAC). Overlapping this 
process was a related Tri-Met citizen process centering on 
the 1990 Report. For that report, Tri-Met held over 100 
meetings and briefings with neighborhood groups, 
political jurisdictions and other citizen bodies, starting in 
September, 1976 and ending in June, 1977. This entire 
effort took place outside the framework of the DEIS to 
politically justify reinserting the LRT as a DEIS alternative. 
With the reintroduction of the LRT alternative, the CAC 
process overseen by ODOT was altered to include a 
separate citizen review of the LRT alternatives under Tri-
Met. The citizen review process culminated in March, 
1978 with the CAC recommendation to support LRT on 
Burnside as the preferred alternative. 
In conducting the citizen review process both ODOT 
and Tri-Met attempted to maintain an unbiased position 
on the preferred alternatives. Yet, they were engaged in a 
significant interorganizational battle. ODOT had "lost" 
the Mt. Hood and was seeking to maintain its 
pre-eminence in transportation. Tri-Met had "won" on 
LRT and was attempting to establish itself as a major 
Banfield Transitway Project 
Alternative #S 
Portland 
Moll 
Three separate Light Rail alternatives developed for the DEIS 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
transportation entity. The result was a mutual lack of 
trust. At the same time, however, both agencies, par-
ticularly Tri-Met, recognized the need (principally 
resulting from Portland's advocacy) for a major new 
transportation program in the metropolitan area. Hence, 
they attempted to make the process as visible as possible 
and to articulate the options clearly and effectively 
despite their mutual antagonism. Aware of the citizen. 
problems surrounding the Mt. Hood Freeway, both agen-
cies wanted a public process which would legitimize the 
final decision. While substantially successful in their ef-
forts , there were still points where citizen opposition, 
outside the CAC proce · • surfaced. Burnside Street 
residents most directly impacted by the LRT aid, 
previous Mt. Hood Freeway supporters, and many east 
county residents felt that the emphasis should be on 
highway improvements. While never very well orga-
nized, supporters of this opposition movement did col-
Gresham 
Lents LRT 
Alternative 5-3 * Mqjor LRT Stations 
• LRT Stations 
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- - - Gresham Alternative 
lect over 10,000 signatures on a petition to oppose the 
LRT. This effort had little major impact on the final deci-
sion, however. 
The Local Process of Selecting 
the Preferred Alternative 
At the conclusion of the DEIS process, the ODOT and 
Tri-Met staff perceived a need to structure the formal , re-
quired hearings process and decisionmaking by affected 
jurisdictions. This was carefully orchestrated by Tri-Met 
to avoid last-minute holdouts by any of the local govern-
ments. Hence, after the CAC recommended approval of 
LRT as the preferred alternative, the Tri-Met staff 
prepared a staff recommendation in August, 1978, for the 
Tri-Met Board. This recommendation had the support of 
Tri-Met's newly appointed General Manager, Peter Cass, 
who upon assuming his position had requested a careful 
of the viability of the LRT project. 
it made sense for Tri-Met and the region, 
Cass wanted to make sure that there were no last-minute 
in the local political and technical consensus. 
The CAC recommendation 
1978 at the DEIS hearing. The Tri-Met 
tion followed in August. During the 
Board approved the selected Burnside 
Multnomah County, Portland, and the 
This order of 
carefully structured. Start-
ing with the agencies most benefited by the final 
project, successive approvals were intended to create a 
snowball effect toward Portland acceptance. This was 
facilitated by prior work with affected jurisdictions to 
build a political consensus involving other fund-
ed from Interstate transfer monies. Hence, of the par-
ticipant jurisdictions had a substantial interest in 
supporting the overall process as well as benefiting from a 
specific project. Further, the most potentially difficult 
issues, the source of funds for the required local matching 
monies and the downtown Portland argument were left 
to be tackled after the basic modal commitments were 
made. 
Federal Approval of the 
Once approved in Oregon, federal approval of the DEIS 
was required. Again the process was complicated by the 
involvement of two federal agencies. Metropolitan of-
ficials perceived confusion on the part of UMTA and 
FHW A concerning the DEIS. Some of this confusion un-
doubtedly reflected the mixed roles of UMT A and 
FHW A. FHW A had the lead for the overall project but the 
preferred alternative reflected a transit emphasis, the LRT. 
Further, the preferred alternative was mixed-mode, 
highway improvements and transit, unique project for 
UMTA and FHWA to deal with. Finally, a review of 
UMTA's chronological memoranda files indicated that 
there was some internal difference of opinion concerning 
the approvability of the project 
Alternatives to Alternatives Analysis 
While the DEIS was by UMTA, FHWA and the Of-
fice of the Secretary Transportation on February 13, 
1978, this only opened a new phase in the Banfield 
proval process. Intervening between the DEIS and 
were several decisions by UMTA requiring additional 
analysis by Tri-Met and ODOT. Prior to approving the 
DEIS, UMTA had persistently questioned the ridership 
estimates and trip load factors presented by Tri-Met in its 
corridor modeling. UMTA was concerned by the location 
of the Banfield corridor in relation to the bulk of the 
eastside population which was south of the proposed 
LRT line. Local political and technical officials were aware 
that the Banfield corridor was not ideally located to serve 
the bulk of the East County population. Yet, the most 
logical corridor in UMTA's view, US 26/Powell Boule-
vard, had been the proposed alignment for the Mt. Hood 
Freeway. To construct a major project in this corridor 
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after havingjustified a withdrawal was politically 
impossible locally and inconsistent with Portland's 
Arterial Streets Policy. Moreover, the commitment to an 
easrw\.\'t:S[ trlhHU••u 1rnrnrovement for the Banfield would 
ser>anltely from the 
LRT. Thus, the systems planning process empha-
sized the technical feasibility of a joint project in the Ban-
field corridor. 
UMTA's concern over ridership estimates continued 
through the technical ap-
proved. This concern culminated in a letter to ODOT and 
Tri-Met on June 8, 1978 requesting comments on the 
following: 
• A TSM alternative which included both arterial and 
freeway improvements, combining the best features of 
the low-cost improvements alternative, freeway ramp 
metering and HOV bypass lanes with provision for 
bus transfers along the Banfield r-. ... """'".'"''' 
• A modified busway alternative minimizing capital in-
vestments in the corridor, specifically of a 
separated reversible busway adjacent to the ex1sur112 
freeway with access and egress to major arterials; 
• Inclusion ofTri-Met's findings on the use of articulated 
buses in the analysis of alternatives; 
• Clarification of the apparent inconsistency of standing 
policy for bus and light rail alternatives; 
• Consideration of the marginal costs and effects of all 
alternatives in the presentation of the analysis; 
• An additional reassessment of the travel forecasting 
procedures first raised by UMTA in November, 
• A discussion of the entire bus system for the region, 
eluding the Banfield corridor, describing the 
and its costs; 
• Additional supporting information for the conclusion 
that some alternatives offered more positive '"''-'J"'""''" 
development and land-use impacts than others, 
::Lssesssment of joint development 
tunities; 
• An explanation of the reasons why joint LRT operation 
with the existing Union Pacific Rail facilities was 
considered. 
The ODOT /Tri-Met responses to these questions 
as follows: 
• While ramp metering could improve peak-hour traffic 
conditions, this approach would perpetuate the use of 
substandard lane widths and shoulders on the 
freeway. A remedy for these deficiencies would in-
crease capital costs substantially while transit 
tions would remain similar to the HOV alternative. Bus 
transfer stations would require additional cost 
the Banfield and I-205 freeways. For these reasons, 
ramp metering alone was not considered although it 
would be studied for future applications; 
• A reversible busway similar to the one su10&e:ste~d 
been considered as an alternative, but was in 
1976 after analyses indicated minimal capital cost sav-
ings and significant operational problems; 
• In the final analysis, the opportunity for efficiency ap-
pears to be in selected application of articulated buses 
throughout the Tri-Met service network. This would 
compensate for the higher anticipated operating costs 
of articulated buses, placing them where ridership de-
mand justifies the cost savings; 
• Depending upon changes in operating procedures or 
in type of vehicle specified, the peak loads of both 
buses and LRT could change by up to about 14 percent 
of the assumed values (50 passengers per bus and 183 
per LRT vehicle), Even under worst case situations, 
however, (bus down 14 percent of assumed values 
and LRT down by the same) LRT would still be ap-
proximately 7 percent cheaper to operate than a com-
parable bus system; 
• While Tri-Met believed that marginal costs were useful 
for comparing alternatives which generate different 
patronage levels, it also felt that it was necessary to con-
sider the cost effectiveness of the alternatives in coping 
with similar patronage levels. From this perspective, 
the LRT was considerably more cost effective in terms 
of operating cost and total annual cost per passenger 
than other build alternatives. Hence, the Banfield LRT 
would be the most cost effective of all alternatives in 
transporting ridership in the range of 19 .2 million 
passengers per year; 
• In June, 1978 Tri-Met had addressed the travel de-
mand forecasts in a letter to UMTA which had been ac-
cepted as substantial justification for demand 
forecasts. Two other issues, continued employment 
growth in downtown and greater attractiveness of bus 
ridership on the busway, were also addressed by Tri-
Met. It argued that the downtown projections were, if 
anything, understated. Further, the advantage cif LRT 
over less transferring and higher frequency bus service 
would be in greater schedule reliability, more comfort-
able ride and shorter terminal-to-terminal travel time. 
In the final analysis, the advantage of LRT was per-
ceived to be in its extension to Gresham; 
• Initial work for the Banfield assumed that service im-
provements would occur throughout the Tri-Met 
system. An extensive bus network was, "''"''"·'"'' '·"".h' 
devised for the Banfield and other corridors. This net-
work of feeder and local buses was described in 
another report; 
• The LRT alignment to Gresham would penetrate the 
areas of greatest development potential on the eastside. 
Other options would produce stations only on 
Portland's eastside where development patterns were 
more stable and less prone to intensification; 
• The feasibility of joint rail track use was considered 
and discarded as impractical for reasons of track in-
compatibility, lack of track capacity, electrification in-
compatibility, speed, train protection and station 
clearance. 
These responses were first co~municated to UMT A in 
June, 1978 and further elaborated in 1979 in a 
Preferred Alternatives Report. This report the 
desirability of the preferred LRT option as requested by 
UMTA in December, 1978, after repeated technical ex-
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changes between its staff and Tri-Met/ODOT had pro-
duced no resolution of the issues. ODOT and Tri-Met 
reluctantly produced the report, replicating in effect the 
work and further already provided to UTMA. In-
deed, local officials perceived the interim between ap-
proval of the DEIS and permission to proceed with the 
FEIS as a "footdragging" effort on the part of UMT A to 
avoid giving final project approval. During this period, 
UMTA was facing accelerating demands for capital con-
struction funds without a complementary growth in ap-
propriations. In the absence of definitive warrants to 
assess the feasibility of capital projects and its generally 
poor administrative reputation, local officials felt that 
UMTA was "stonewalling" to avoid approving the 
project. 
Since federal administrative personnel were not inter-
viewed for this research, it is not possible to directly con-
firm this local perception. However, it is clear that some 
of UMTA's hesitancy in accepting the DEIS findings can 
be traced to the process that ODOT and Tri-Met used to 
carry out joint planning for the corridor. Much of what 
passed for UTMA footdragging may have been a reflection 
of both the "abnormality" of the alternatives analysis 
process and their intermittent involvement as a "second-
ary" agency in the local planning effort. 
In the first instance, the alternatives analysis re-
quirements normally employed by UMT A would have 
required that systems-level analysis proceed first. 
Portland actually accomplished its systems-level work, to 
some extent, prior to the initiation of the DEIS in the con-
text of the GTF Report, a DeLeuw Cather study and other 
technical studies completed prior to the Mt. Hood 
withdrawal. Subsequently, ODOT and Tri-Met intermit-
tently mixed systems-level with project-level analyses to 
produce the DEIS. Concomitantly, the political com-
mitments to the improvement of the east-west freeway 
and the of a major transit improvement in 
fl.·1llllm:o111an County were made. These decisions 
systems-level alternatives before the com-
pletion of the DEIS and laid substantial groundwor"k for 
an emerging project. There seemed little question in the 
minds of most Portland officials that some form of major 
capital investment would be made in the corridor. 
On the second point, with ODOT as the lead agency for 
the corridor and Tri-Met in second place, the acceptance 
of the FHW A process as the main planning procedure left 
UMTA in a second fiddle position. It was left out of the 
direct communications process and problem-solving ef-
forts. Consequently, the agency was always playing 
catch-up with the first-line participants at decision 
points. 
Two Phases of Preliminary Engineering 
In July, 1978 approval to initiate Phase I of Preliminary 
Engineering was granted by UMT A. A consultant was 
hired to flesh out the initial dimensions for the project 
and establish the veracity of the design and cost estimates 
identified by the DEIS. Phase I ended in June, 1979. 
Subsequent approval to proceed with Phase II was not 
forthcoming until October, 1979. The winding down and 
then gearing up between the two phases of PE produced a 
delay of several months. The separation of PE from the 
DEIS led to the dilution of both efforts in the view oflocal 
officials. 
Preparing the Final Environmental Impact 
Statement 
Subsequent to the approval of the Preferred Alternatives 
Report, permission to proceed with the FEIS was granted 
by UMT A. The FEIS, concentrating on the LRT /Banfield 
widening project, was initiated in September, 1979 and 
completed in June, 1980. FHWA and UMTA signed the 
FEIS in July, 1980. After the preparation of the FEIS, Tri-
Met held twenty-three neighborhood workshops to fine 
tune the design work in terms of routing and community 
impacts. Final US DOT approval of the Banfield project 
was granted in September, 1980. This final approval 
brought an end to a five-year process of technical plan-
ning and political consensus building. Remaining to be 
completed was the financing of the project at the federal 
and local levels and authorization to proceed with con-
struction. 
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Chapter 5 
The Changing Political Infrastructure of 
Metropolitan Decisionmaking 
SOURCE: Tri-Met Norman Gollub 
As indicated earlier, the decision to proceed with the LRT was much more than a technical review and 
analysis process. While this is not unique to Portland, the 
context of the Portland case required a number of signifi-
cant political changes before the final decision emerged. 
Most notable among these changes was a major restruc-
turing of political assumptions and institutions regarding 
transportation modes and corridors for the metropolitan 
areas. The decision to support the Banfield project is, 
thus, indistinguishable from the shift to transit over 
freeways and the assumptions and plans for regional 
growth and development. Most importantly, however, 
the process and institutional capacity to make such tran-
sitions evolved in a fashion which not only facilitated the 
decisionmaking but left in place a major new political in-
frastructure which would serve the region in the future . 
Much of this change was made possible by the emergence 
of a new regional political elite typified by Mayor 
Goldschmidt and County Commission Chair Don Clark. 
Developing the Technical 
and Political Decision 
Capacity 
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As noted earlier the Governor's Task Force had set the 
stage for the development of the technical and political 
capacity to restructure the transportation system of the 
metropolitan area. The principal institutional element of 
this effort was the restructuring of CRAG by the 
Washington and Oregon legislatures . Creating a man-
datory Council of Governments produced a dues struc-
ture which could support a more effective technical staff. 
While it took time for this technical capability to develop 
at CRAG, interim support was provided by the City of 
Portland and Multnomah County through the efforts of 
Neil Goldschmidt and Mel Gordon. 
Key Actors 
Goldschmidt, in particular, was critical to the develop-
ment of the technical capability in the metropolitan area. 
While Multnomah County contributed staff expertise to 
the planning and development process, it was Gold-
schmidt who recruited the core technical staff that · 
ultimately drove the technical aspects of the process. 
Doug Wright, Don Mazzioti, Ernie Bonner and Ernie 
Munch at specific times played critical roles in the 
development of the technical capability. More important-
ly, it was Wright's understanding of the federal 
withdrawal process which gave Portland the critical 
leverag in man ging th swicch from freeways to transit. 
With ch 1973 pa - age of the State Land Use Planning 
Law, Portland was among the first jurisdictions in the 
metropolitan area to staff up to handle this new mission. 
As a result, the City was in a position to begin the articula-
tion early in the process of the potential linkage between 
transportation/ investments and development, an argu-
ment which later became central to LRT support in East 
Multnomah County and in downtown. 
Not only did Goldschmidt reorganize the City's plan-
ning capability and bring in new staff, he played a critical 
role in restructuring the Tri-M~t Board. At his request in 
March, 1974, Governor McCall replaced the entire Tri-
Met Board. Key among the new appointees were Gerard 
Drummond as Chairman and Steve McCarthy as Board 
member. Drummond was a critical link between the 
traditional highway interests of Glenn Jackson and the 
transit interest of Goldschmidt. Drummond had served 
as legal counsel to Pacific Power and Light for which 
Glenn Jackson served as Chairman of the Board. Further, 
Drummond had been a major figure in the financing of 
Goldschmidt's political campaign for mayor. 
McCarthy was another critical figure . He had been ac-
tive as a lawyer in the fight by STOP to halt the Mt. Hood 
Freeway. His appointment to the Tri-Met Board helped 
strengthen the Board's orientation to a broader transpor-
tation mission for the agency. He was later appointed 
Assistant General Manager. In this role he played a key 
part in the process of moving Tri-Met from a passive par-
ticipant in the process of developing the Banfield DEIS to 
an advocate for LRT. Indeed, during his tenure as Assis-
tant General Manager, Tri-Met made the first major effort 
to live up to its planning capability, replacing the Plan-
ning Director and six other planners in November, 1974. 
Policy Changes at Tri-Met 
This change in the policymaking apparatus of Tri-Met 
nudged the organization, for the first time, beyond the 
routine of simply running and maintaining its existing 
bus system. Bill Hall, who emerged as the Planning Direc-
tor after the staff change, suggested that the Board 
shakeup identified the competing expectations of the 
transit agency. Under the old Board and General Manager 
Admiral Tom King, the agency basically focused on 
rebuilding the system inherited from the previous private 
provider, Ros City Transit. While King has been por-
trayed in mixed terms by local observers as either the 
principal agcm of this mission or an individual who had 
broader vision for the agency but was restrained by the 
Board, it is clear that until the Board changed, Tri-Met was 
not going to adopt an activist role in support of a broader 
future for transit. 
Indeed, it was Goldschmidt's vision of a larger role for 
transit and his leverage politically which led to the even-
tual transition of the agency in the view of the Tri-Met in-
siders of the period. 
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While McCarthy could observe at the beginnings of the 
DEIS pro ss that Tri-Met was not even competent 
enough internally to site a bus shelter, its standing in the 
larger metropolitan community was even shakier. The 
lack of transit leadership, far more than effective bus ser-
vice, led the major political actors in the region to assume 
the mantle of transit advocate, a· peculiar position in the 
presence of a self-standing independent transit agency. 
Indeed ODOT was initially given the lead on the Banfield 
corridor both for its institutional strength and the early 
assumption that a busway would be built. As the process 
unfolded, Tri-Met was unable to play an effective role 
because it was not organizationally capable of making a 
contribution or lacked the political and technical 
credibility to gain attention. An example of this ineffec-
tiveness was Tri-Met's inability to thwart the elimination 
of the LRT option in 1976. While this may have reflected 
Tri-Met's own internal ambivalence to the alternati es 
analysis process at the time, the lack of organizational 
competence to articulate transit requirements and opera-
tional considerations did not enhance its leverage. 
With the new Board, the agency began evolving and the 
additional staff created new opportunities for Tri-Met. In 
addition to McCarthy, the organization hired two in-
dividuals who added substantially to ,its role in the plan-
ning process . Bill Hall became Planning Director, and his 
persuasive capabilities and organizational skills ultimate-
ly gave Tri-Met a greater role in the planning process. In 
addition, Bob.Post and Rick Gustafson, who had survived 
the staff shakeup, and the new planners developed the 
core of a planning department. While Tri-Met could not 
stop the elimination of the LRT option, it could react to it. 
Indeed, as McCarthy and others slowly realized, they 
would be left to operate the ultimate project and needed 
some input to the decision process . Working closely with 
T oin King and Gerard Drummond, McCarthy and Hall 
engaged the services of Wilbur Smith and Associates to 
demonstrate the feasibility of LRT. While the staff did not 
have a substantial technical argument to support their in-
clination for LRT, they did recognize the operating costs 
of continued reliance on buses in the corridor, the im-
plications for the transit mall and the potential long-term 
political liabilities of a busway. Further, they believed that 
the LRT would provide a technological sophistication for 
the agency and produce a construction project compati-
ble with the expressed pressure to build something and 
not lose Interstate Transfer financing monies. Finally, 
there was an inherent fascination in constructing a "Big 
Shiny Thing" as a bold demonstration of the commit-
ment to transit. 
The effort was more than getting back into the technical 
process, however. It required a major change in the orien-
tation of the agency and its public perception, a slowing 
down of the Banfield technical process and taking some 
substantial political risks. In concert with its consultant 
effort, therefore, Tri-Met launched a major campaign of 
organizational development. Relying heavily on an inter-
nal analysis process, the agency developed a 1990 plan 
which laid out not only a more sophisticated service 
system for the region but a redesigned organizational 
philosophy evidencing a much more comprehensive ap-
proach to transit service delivery. The proposed 1990 
goals were: 
• Support regional policies for growth without major 
new investments in highway capacity by developing 
and operating a transit system whi~h provides 
travelers with an attractive alternative to the private 
automobile; 
• Develop and implement a transit financing program to 
support the construction and operation of the system 
through 1990; 
• Improve productivity with capital and operating in-
vestments and sound, innovative management 
policies; 
• Make a major contribution to the improvement of the 
regional environment and the livability of urban 
neighborhoods; 
• Maximize energy conservation and efficiency in the 
design and operation of the transit system; 
• Improve transit mobility for the transportation disad-
vantaged; 
• Encourage growth patterns within the regional land-
use plan which support efficient transit service. 
The following "Policy Choices" from the 1990 Report 
indicate the method in which the alternatives were 
presented to the Board (page II-4 from report} Clearly, 
the complex issues of transit as a major transportation 
mode for the region do not always conform to the "black 
and white" portrayal made here. But, from the perspec-
tive of an agency carving out new "turf' in the metropoli-
tian transportation system, thinking in grand scale terms 
was a necessity. 
Tri-Met Policy Changes 
I. Transportation Service Policy 
Option A 
transit service to attract an 
trips, with the capacity to 
through a network of high-speed corridors 
and feeder (Probable patronage, 220,000-400,000, 
depending on land development trends, auto costs, public 
policies supporting transit, etc.) 
Option B 
Improve service levels as demand increases, according to 
Tri-Met service policies and within current available 
resources. (Probable 1990 patronage, 160,000-200,000, 
depending on land development trends, auto 
operating cost etc.) 
II. Financing Policy 
Option A 
The of transit are a part of the total community's 
transportation costs. Tri-Met will continue to seek finan-
cial support from the general public to meet the communi-
ty's social and environmental goals with transit. 
Option B 
Transit users should bear a minimum level (current stan-
dard is 40 percent) of the total costs of transit; growth in 
service will be primarily a function of farebox revenues. 
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HI. Productivity Policy 
Option A 
It is Tri-Met policy to increase productivity by increasing 
speeds and vehicle through prudent investment. 
Option B 
Improve service levels as demand increases, according to 
Tri-Met service policies and within current available 
resources. 
IV. Environmental Policy 
Option A 
Transit will play the major role in improving the quality of 
the urban environment through transportation decisions, 
by absorbing sufficient travel demand to enable the 
downtown and other community activity centers to grow 
without increased parking, and by developing en-
vironmentally sup~rior modes of operation. 
Option B 
Transit will make improvements in transportation-related 
environmental impacts, but the community must rely on 
technological improvements to make major changes in 
auto and transit vehicle impacts on the environment 
V. Energy Policy 
Option A 
It is Tri-Met policy to aggressively pursue the conservation 
of energy, and to find methods of reducing transit's 
reliance on a single petroleum energy source. 
Option B 
It is Tri-Met policy to aggressively pursue the conservation 
of energy, and to continue to rely on petroleum as the 
primary source of energy for operations. 
vl. Mobility Disadvantaged Policy 
Option A 
It is Tri-Met policy that the transit system will be 
totally usable by the mobility handicapped and elderly by 
1990, and that the transportation disadvantaged will 
receive high priority for service investments. 
Option B 
It is Tri-Met policy to improve service to the transportation 
disadvantaged as funding permits. 
VU. Urban Development Policy 
Option A 
Tri-Met will participate with local jurisdictions and 
agencies in an aggressive 
program to ensure that transit 
It is Tri-Met policy to 
limiting high-quality 
Option B 
demand warrants, 
urban densities 
and following urban growth as it occurs. 
The report also provided a list of policies to opera-
tionalize these goals: 
Transportation Service Policy 
Provide high-quality regional transit service to attract an 
increasing percentage of regional trips, with the corridors 
and feeder lines. (We plan to serve daily 1990 transit 
patronage from 220,000 to 400,000 depending on land 
dev ·lopment trends, auto costs, public policies supporting 
tran ' t . etc .). 
Financing Policy 
The osts of transit are rightfully a part of the total com-
munity's transportation costs. Transit users must continue 
to bear a significant portion of total c t (current standard 
is 40 percent operations department costs); capital and 
operating costs of the system should be highly visible to 
the public and Tri-Met should seek support from the 
general public in determining how to pay for these costs. 
Productivity Policy 
It is Tri-Met's policy to increase productivity. Productivity 
is defined as passenger miles per dollar cost including 
operating and capital costs . 
Environmental Policy 
Transit will play the major role in improving the quality of 
the urban environment through transportation decisions, 
by absorbing sufficient travel demand to enable the 
downtown and other community activity centers to grow 
without increased parking, and by developing en-
vironmentally superior modes of operation. 
Energy Policy 
It is Tri-Met's policy to aggre iv ly pursue the conserva-
tion of energy and to find methods of reducing our region's 
basic reliance on a single petroleum energy source for 
transportation. 
Mobility Disadvantaged Policy 
It is Tri-Met's policy that the transit system will be made 
totally usable by the mobility handicapped and elderly by 
1990, and that the transportation disadvantaged will 
receive high priority for service improvements. 
Urban Development Policy 
Tri-Met will participate with local jurisdictions and 
regional agenci in an ggr ive growth management 
program to ensure that transit capital and service in-
vestments have maximum influence for efficient land use 
to prevent urban sprawl. 
In concluding his recommendations to the Tri-Met 
Board, General Manager King made the following obser-
vations: 
If the Board chooses policy "A," several immediate ac-
tions are appropriate. The Banfield is clearly the first 
priority corridor in the region .. The Banfield Project alter-
natives should be broadened to include an LRT line from 
Gateway to Lents along the I-205 right-of-way. Provision 
was made earlier in I-205 design for space for LRT. This 
alignment would be an additional alignment to the East 
Burnside route now being considered. This action should 
be in the form of a request to the CRAG Board of Directors. 
Decisions on the I-205 busway should be held up pend-
ing the Banfield decision. Sunset and Oregon City corridor 
projects should be accelerated when the Banfield decision ' 
is made. Tri-Met should cooperate with the interagency 
technical staff at CRAG to accomplish a better definition of 
project purpose and scope, and request of local govern-
ments acting through the CRAG Board a clearer indication 
of what is desired prior to Tri-Met/ODOT proceeding 
with the environmental impact statement on those two 
projects. No priority decision between the two is needed 
immediately, but one should be made by the time the Ban-
field decisions are made. These tasks should be ac-
complished within eight to ten months so the region can 
move ahead with constructing the transit system. 
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The impact of the Board 's deci ion on specific corridor 
projects must be qualified by the need to proceed with En-
vironmental Impact Statement procedures in each of those 
proj •cts . The Board's decision is a statement of a conclu-
si n about what is ultimately the best regional transit 
system and a commitment to build an LRT system if it 
results from specific corridor projects. Tri-Met must follow 
the appropriate federally required pro ss and withhold 
specific funding decisions until after the alternatives 
analysis evaluation is made in each corridor. 
While the recommendation by King clearly hinges on 
the final project choice for the Banfield, it is clear that the 
Tri-Met Board when it adopted the goals statement of the 
1990 Report knew that it was not only leading to an 
upgraded transit agency but a po'tential commitment to 
LRT. Indeed, the Tri-Met staff believed that the 1990 
Report process was basically a "window dressing ' means 
of advocating LRT outside the DEIS, from which it was 
precluded without a major transit alternative. 
New Staff at Tri-Met 
Less than a year after the adoption of the 1990 Report in 
June, 1977, the DEIS was completed and the public hear-
ings held. Subsequently, and prior to the local approvals 
for LRT, a major staff shakeup took place at Tri-Met. 
General Manager King retired and was replaced by Peter 
Cass. Cass had no formal background in transit, coming 
to the agency from the public relations domain of the 
private sector. His selection as Manager by the Board 
reflected their commitment to an upgraded management 
system for the agency. Cass proceeded to recruit addi-
tional management staff to further upgrade the agency's 
operational capability. In particular, he was responsible 
for obtaining the services of Paul Bay, Jim Cowen, and 
Don MacDonald. Bay, the agency's new Planning and 
Development Director, had substantial experience with 
the development of the BART system in San Francisco. 
MacDonald had been Project Director on the construc-
tion of the Edmonton rail system. Cowen became Opera-
tions Director. Bay and MacDonald brought substantial 
expertise in rail technology to the agency, experience it 
lacked until that point. Cass also recruited additional 
operations staff, substantially increasing the sophistica-
tion of that part of the agency in preparation for LRT. 
The choice of Cass as General Manager and the recruit-
ment of professional rail staff marked a watershed in Tri-
Met's organizational development. While the adoption of 
the 1990 Report had put the metropolitan area on notice 
that the agency intended a transformation in its manner 
of doing business, it still lacked the staff to give this 
change credibility. Indeed, Goldschmidt, at a Tri-Met 
Board briefing on the 1990 Report in April, 19 77 had 
chastised the agency as being unready to assume respon-
sibility for the operation of such "sophisticated" 
technology. The retirement of King provided the Tri-Met 
Board with an opportunity to make good on its 1990 
commitment. Although Steve McCarthy as Assistant 
General Manager was assumed to have the inside track 
for the appointment, he had burned a number of political 
the fight to reintroduce the LRT to the 
Consequently, a nationwide search was 
1aunc11ea which produced selection. Paradoxical-
ly, the search also identified Don MacDonald as a can-
didate for the position. 
MacDonald had some familiarity with the agency 
already since he had been retained to provide consulting 
services on the LRT alternatives analysis. The Board's 
final selection, however, can be interpreted as a decision 
to radically change the management style of the agency 
and reach outside the transit community for that talent. 
MacDonald's selection also pacified CBT demands for 
greater LRT expertise within the agency. In effect, Cass 
was a classic "change agent" selection. 
Cass, however, recognized the need to substantiate the 
agency's operating capability and credibility. Hence, he 
intentionally sought Bay and MacDonald in that vein. 
Moreover, Cass wanted to reassure himself that the LRT 
was a viable choice for transportation services. Hence, 
shortly after Bay and MacDonald joined the staff an inter-
nal staff review of the LRT concept was launched to reaf-
firm the technical justification for the system. Bay himself 
indicated that he would not have accepted the position 
unless the commitment to the system was "real" and 
unfettered by unrealistic political commitments and 
shoddy technical justifications. Finally, Tri-Met was shift-
ing from an advocacy role to consensus building. It need-
ed technical credibility and stability. 
In retrospect, the events that led up to the reorientation 
of Tri-Met as a transit agency were an unplanned but 
ne1cessarv organizational evolution for the metropolitan 
area. change in the transit agency made the final 
decision to proceed with the LRT credible. Without an 
actively involved, more sophisticated transit agency, the 
system when built might fail to perform as expected. Fur-
ther, the analytical process had been seriously weakened 
by Tri-Met's passive partner role in dealing with the state 
and federal governments. 
The Technical/Political 
Marriage 
The principal technical people throughout the decision 
process were Ernie Munch, Doug Wright, Ted Spence, 
Bob Bothman, Bill Hall and Steve McCarthy. While others 
played critical roles at varying times, Bothman and 
Wright were the technical stage managers for the project. 
Though they served different jurisdictional interests, their 
commonality of concern for an effective regional 
transportation system and personal relationship served 
as catalysts toward working accommodations at squeak 
points along the way. More importantly, however, both of 
them had the support and ear of the two most critical 
political actors for the region, Glenn Jackson and Neil 
Goldschmidt. 
The dimensions of the political/technical interface are 
not fully discernable. While the individuals interviewed 
for this project were all quite candid, fading memories 
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and still touchy political areas may have limited the 
amount of data gathered. several observations are 
possible. The politicians wanted workable options which 
would meet real needs. Technical viability provided 
crucial support for the political initiatives involved and 
protected the politicians at points of public conflict. Both 
Jackson and Goldschmidt were political realists who 
listened to their advisers before committing to projects. 
Most importantly, however, with few exceptions, the 
politicians realized that long-term viability of the decision 
process rested on joint involvement supported by ade-
quate technical analysis. Hence, they permitted and en-
couraged their technical people to work together con-
structively rather than drawing lines of political conflict 
through which technical answers and accommodations 
could not pass. 
Bothman and Wright carried most of the burden in 
developing workable solutions to the problems of the 
Banfield corridor. It was Wright who developed and 
wrote the justification for the withdrawal of the Mt. Hood 
Freeway. Further, he drafted the letter submitted by 
Straub justifying and requesting the withdrawal to US 
DOT. As Len Bergstein, former adviser to Straub, sug-
gested, Wright had close contacts with US DOT officials 
in Washington and was aware of the Interstate substitu-
tion process which set up Portland's options. Portland 
was the first major substitution after Boston which meant 
that US DOT had not much experience to go on. An ag-
gressive, well-informed local technical process was an ef-
fective basis for dealing with the federal agencies. Further, 
the consensus built at the technical level provided a 
critical base for the politicians to arrive at a commitment 
for withdrawal and provided a stimulus for collective 
regional consensus. 
While ODOT had the lead on the DEIS for the Banfield, 
the cooperative technical relationship enabled a joint ef-
fort at troubleshooting the analysis. When the initial 
analysis of technical data indicated that an LRT only to 
Gateway was not feasible, Bothman and Wright were 
responsible for its demise at the CRAG technical commit-
tee level. However, when Multnomah County threatened 
to sue and Tri-Met initiated its effort to reinstate it as an 
alternative, Wright provided critical technical support, 
which Bothman did not actively oppose. Facilitating 
ODOT's support was the pragmatic recognition that no 
transit project alone would solve the congestion prob-
lems of the corridor-ODOT would get a freeway-and 
the linkage of the I-205 freeway to the fate of the Banfield 
corridor. 
While the relationship between Tri-Met and 0 DOT has 
never approximated the closeness of the Portland/ ODOT 
context, it is still workable and less conflict-ridden than 
might be true in other cities. When Wright left the scene 
to become Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Paul Bay 
and Don MacDonald assumed the local liaison role with 
ODOT. There are tensions between the two agencies but 
the behind-the-scenes linkage between them has provid-
ed an outlet for their tempering if not resolution. This has 
been particularly true for the construction phase of the 
project which requires an intimate timing of assigned 
tasks of the two agencies. 
Finally, the role of Gerry Drummond, while less visible, 
was crucial to the decision process. Despite the initial 
staff weaknesses of Tri-Met, Drummond was a central 
participant in the decision process. His linkages to 
Jackson and Goldschmidt provided an access point for 
Tri-Met's input. Further, his political credibility provided 
a means to move things forward, despite Tri-Met's image 
as a weak agency. Indeed, if Drummond approved of an 
approach to an issue the Governor's staff would support 
his position, assuming that he would never take a posi-
tion without the support of Jackson and Goldschmidt. 
In the financing phase of the project, the political and 
technical linkages paved the way for effective Congres-
sional lobbying. The local consensus produced in sup-
port of the project was a major leverage point for the 
metropolitan area. It helped persuade both the state Con-
gressional delegation and the respective federal agencies 
of the sincerity of the regional commitment to the project. 
Wright, in 1980, was able to use his familiarity with the 
federal process to troubleshoot US DOT approval of the 
Portland project. Further, the Goldschmidt/Wright 
linkage to the Oregon Congressional delegation facilitated 
a last-minute, literally handwritten agreement producing 
Congressional authorization for the project. 
The Transformation of 
ODOT 
Concerned by the decisions to withdraw the Mt. Hood 
Freeway and redesign I-205, ODOT had to adjust to a 
new transportation decisionmaking arena. This develop-
ment, however, was facilitated by larger changes taking 
place in the Salem office. Under George Baldwin as 
ODOT Director, the Department had become a Trans-
portation agency in name but still functioned primarily 
with a highway orientation. Straub ultimately replaced 
Baldwin with Robert Burco. While Burco never had real 
involvement in the Banfield issue, he managed to in-
fluence the direction of the Department sufficiently to 
give the Metropolitan Division more latitude in metro-
politan political relationships. Further, he was a strong 
supporter of withdrawals and facilitated support for the 
Portland effort . 
. With this supportive environment, ODOT declined an 
FHW A request for a list of substitute projects in lieu of the 
Mt. Hood Freeway. This position arose out of Portland's 
insistence that they did not have a list of substitutes ready 
and wanted more time to develop them, partly for 
political and part-
ly to avoid the problems of lawsuits developing in 
response to prematurely identified projects. The Mt. 
Hood and I-205 experiences had clearly demonstrated 
lawsuit problems which could stymie construction pro-
jects. something no one wanted to repeat. To facilitate the 
metropolitan and state working relationship with FHW A, 
Straub personally called FHW A Administrator Tieman to 
arrange a meeting among Goldschmidt, Drummond and 
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Jackson on the withdrawaL While specific options had 
not been identified at the time, the support of ODOT in 
working with the Governor's office helped promote a 
smooth withdrawal process. Under Burco's support and 
with the leadership of Goldschmidt, ODOT allowed 
ideas to move forward. 
Traditionally, state highway departments have not 
developed smooth working relationships with 
metropolitan areas. They have generally seen their mis-
sions as statewide in character and solely as construction 
oriented. The changes that took place in the ODOT case 
provide at least a neutral role vis-a-vis the interests of the 
metropolitan area and, by virtue of a few key ODOT ac-
tors, a supportive environment at key points. 
The Federal/Local 
Relationship 
Typically, federal agencies often deal with conflict-ridden 
metropolitan areas. Frequently contending local actors 
attempt to pit FHW A and UMT A against their perceived 
opponents, often simultaneously. This has led to federal 
insistence on a common framework of a comprehensive, 
coordinated and continuous planning process for 
metropolitan transportation investments. Further, the 
development of a local consensus and choice by all local 
jurisdictions is encouraged as a necessary demonstration 
of local commitment. 
The construction of the local consensus was a time-
consuming, complex and difficult process. Existing in-
side and outside the channels of the MPO forum and 
growing as it did from the Governor's Task Force effort to 
strengthen CRAG. it lacked the rigidity produced by a 
we1H~sl,;:m11snea. formalized institutional focus and pro-
cess. As a result, a number of individual and separate ac-
tions were necessary to patch it together and induce 
cooperation, even after agreement on the LRT. There was 
a constant local fear that the consensus would unravel at 
any time, a problem dealt with at several meetings among. 
Jackson, Drummond, and Goldschmidt. Further, the fact 
that Portland took such an entrepreneurial approach to 
federal procedures at all phases of the decision process 
led to a significant degree of confusion and ambiguity. 
The local consensus, however, was the key to federal ap-
proval. While confronting the federal agencies with what 
appeared to be a chaotic process, it nonetheless produced 
a united and persistent front. The consensus held up 
under a number of attempts to split it, particularly during 
the battle for funding later in the project. '"Lubricated" by 
the dollars promised each jurisdiction from Interstate 
withdrawal funds and the consequences of failure, all 
jurisdictions shared an interest in seeing a successful out-
come. Rather than fighting amongst themselves, they 
formed a unified approach to a common problem. Effec-
tively employing any and all tools at their disposal, the 
metropolitan area refused to take "No" for an answer. 
Chapter 6 
Citizen Participation in the 
Decisionmaking Process 
SOURCE R. Bruce Forrester/ Tri-Met 
A key link in building the consensus needed for the Banfield Light Rail Project has been involving 
citizens in the decisionmaking process in its entirety. 
ODOT and Tri-Met have worked with the Citizens Ad-
visory Committee (CAC) to bring about one of the most 
impressive citizen involvement efforts in Portland's re-
cent history. 
Beginning in 1975 with the withdrawal of the Mt. Hood 
Freeway under community pressure, citizen involvement 
has evolved to become a formal link in regional transpor-
tation decisionmaking. The CAC was created in 1976 to 
assist in project evaluation and to present concerns of the 
general public to technical staff. Public involvement has 
progressed through three distinct phases: the alternatives 
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analysis phase, the design and land-use phase, and the 
construction phas.e. 
Alternatives Analysis 
When the Mt. Hood Freeway was withdrawn in early 
1975, CRAG initiated citizen involvement in transporta-
tion decisionmaking in producing the Interim Transpor-
tation Plan (ITP). CRAG identified the three major cor-
ridor alternatives to the Mt. Hood during this time, and 
placed the Banfield corridor in the priority position. 
Some 80 neighborhood meetings and eight public 
hearings were held to discuss regional transportation 
needs for the ITP. Further meetings were held throughout 
1976 and this public input was used in CRAG's Regional 
Land Use Goals and Objectives adopted in September, 
1976. 
Tri-Met then carried the ball in soliciting citizen input 
to determine long-range transportation development for 
the region through 1990. Between 1976 and 1977, some 
120 public meetings were held. This ultimately led to a 
regional public involvement process applied to future 
transportation planning efforts such as the Westside Cor-
ridor. 
The Citizens' Advisory Committee 
In accordance with US DOT requirements for citizen par-
ticipation in the DEIS, a newly reorganized ODOT in late 
1975 created the CAC The CAC had formerly been ac-
tive in the Portland Transit Mall, and was revived as the 
official citizen advisory element in defining regional 
transportation alternatives. 
The first letters soliciting committee members were 
issued October 1975 and were sent to neighborhood 
associations and business organizations. The CAC began 
with 15 members who set out initial goals and objectives 
for their mission as follows: 
• Identify specific impacts and problems; 
• Define important public attitudes and concerns; 
• Suggest improvements and public information feed-
back programs; 
• Suggest additional ways of involving the public in the 
study of alternatives; 
• Assist ODOT and Tri-Met in contact with affected 
groups and individuals; 
• Advise in the development of alternatives; 
• Aid in project development through frequent and 
frank communications with ODOT at an early stage 
regarding the project and planning, continuing ex-
change of all information (with notification of citizens 
about available information) and a continuous process 
of participation and review. 
The mission of the CAC was to assist in achieving a 
high degree of citizen awareness for the DEIS Public Hear-
ing. The major functions of the CAC were: to inform itself 
about transportation alternatives proposed by ODOT 
and Tri-Met, to make recommendations on alternatives 
and to testify at public hearings. Although ODOT was the 
lead agency involved with the CAC, Tri-Met had full 
responsibility to work with the Committee on transit op-
i tions. 
There were some problems with the CAC initially as 
participation was erratic. There was also some difficulty 
in dealing with the increasing complexity of issues in 
regional transportation alternatives as presented by 
ODOT and Tri-Met. To remedy this situation, ODOT 
revamped the Committee in September, 1976 to make it 
more effective. Letters of appeal and requests for nomina-
tion were sent out to a broader range of community 
groups for the second effort. These groups included 
chambers of commerce, city commissions, state 
representatives and numerous special interest groups. 
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The response was good and CAC membership jumped to 
30. By 1978, the official membership had grown to 133 
persons. 
In order to meet the original Public Hearing deadline of 
July, 1977 (later extended to April, 1978) the CAC ac-
celerated its activities and scope in November, 1976 by 
forming six subcommittees. These subcommittees would 
study various aspects of proposed alternatives and then 
report to the Committee at large. The subcommittees 
were: 
Home Owners; 
East County Jurisdictional Representatives; 
Lloyd Area Businesses; 
Hollywood Area Businesses; 
Low-Cost Improvement Alternatives; 
General Interests (areawide impacts, light rail option, 
traffic circulation). 
More members were solicited to fill subcommittees 
throughout 1977 and two more subcommittees were 
added before the final public hearing: 
Downtown Businesses; 
Public Information (to facilitate the 1978 Public Hear-
ing). 
At CAC and subcommittee meetings, ODOT and Tri-
Met staff would present technical reports and progress 
reports for evaluation. The general approach to these 
meetings was one of informal and frank discussion be-
tween project staff and CAC members, an approach 
which seemed to work well. 
Early Accomplishments 
In spite of the initial need for reorganization, the CAC had 
achieved several accomplishments in 1976 which in-
cluded: 
• Appointment of a CAC member to the Banfield 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) as a liaison for 
citizens; 
• Supply of a public meeting chairperson to assist 
ODOT and Tri-Met; 
• Suggestion that ODOT produce an informational slide 
show on transportation system planning and later 
critiquing the program; 
• Preliminary analysis of alternatives which emphasized 
more highway and low-cost improvements, and sug-
gested that the LRT alternative be extended to 
Gresham. 
In 1977 the Public Hearing date was moved forward to 
April 6, 1978 and the CAC intensified both its public in-
volvement program and analysis in individual commit-
tees. Accomplishments during 1977 were as follows: 
• Improving citizen involvement in the Banfield pro-
gram by suggesting better media techniques; 
• An alternative southeast route proposal set forth by the 
Homeowners Committee which ODOT and Tri-Met 
considered but found undesirable; 
• Analysis of the current effectiveness of HOV lanes be-
ing used on the Banfield; 
• Adding a full-width freeway alternative with six lanes 
plus shoulders (adopted by TAC and CRAG); 
• Evaluation of Tri-Met's three systems alternatives: 
TSM strategies, HOV lanes and Busways, and LRT (in 
addition to reviewing the 1990 Transportation 
Systems Analysis Report); 
• Review and agreement on the new ODOT public slide 
presentation; 
• Review of the Tri-Met East Side Operations Report. 
Toward the end of the year, the Public Information sub-
committee was formed to produce system alternatives in-
formation for the first hearing on the DEIS in April. This 
subcommittee worked closely with Tri-Met and ODOT 
to maximize citizen involvement. 
The 1978 DEIS Public Hearing 
With the new DEIS Public Hearing date set for April 6, 
1978, the CAC, ODOT and Tri-Met made an all-out effort 
over the first three months of the year to involve the local 
citizenry. The Citizen Involvement Program used three 
approaches: informing the general public, identifying and 
informing key groups, and public hearings. The public 
informational techniques used throughout the decision-
making process were numerous and can be categorized 
as "media" and "direct" techniques. 
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Media Techniques 
Press releases-Forry-eight were prior to the April 
hearing for informational purposes and to build public in-
terest 
Media briefings-Over 600 newspaper articles appeared 
before the April hearing. 
Radio and television appearances -Over 30 appearances 
before the hearing. 
Public service announcements-Employed just prior to the 
hearing. 
Newspaper supplement-Published in two newspapers 
and handed out at public meetings to build public 
awareness. 
Direct Techniques 
Slide Show-The first was produced to explain and justify 
the alternatives analysis approach to homeowners and the 
media, the second on the light rail alternative. 
Newsletter- "The Transitway News" was begun in 1976 
and is still published to maintain contact with 2,000-plus 
people on the mailing list. 
Display Ads-Quarter-page ads were placed in three 
newspapers just prior to the hearing. 
Display Booths-Set up in malls and banks to distribute 
flyers, maps and brochures. Tri-Met in addition set up an 
"Ask Me" Bus on the Transit Mall downtown. 
Project Office-An ODOT office was set up in the project 
area to distribute general information, the DEIS, and to 
answer citizen questions. 
BANFIELD TRANSITWAY PUBLIC HEARINGS 
Testimony of Individuals 
Number Percent 
Alternative #l - No Build 15 6% 
Alternative #2 • Low Cost Improvements 10 4% 
Alternative #3 - HOV Lanes (20 were anti-LRT) 29 11% 
Alternative #4 - Busways (4 were anti-LRT) 8 3% 
Alternative #5 - LRT (14 favored LRT plus other 128 50% 
options or had qualifications) 
More than one Alternative 4 23 
Anti-#5 • LRT 21 8% 
Pro-freeways only 7 3% 
No preference I anti -options I different options 36 14% 
Total 258 101% 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
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Telephone Survey-Two surv ys of 384 people each were 
sp n red by ODOT in the study atea. The surveys served 
as both a feedback mechanism and as a way of increasing 
interviewee understanding of the alternatives being con-
sidered. 
Public Meetings-To inform the public about meetings , an 
interested parties list was built from interest groups, 
prepaid return post cards, and prior public meetings sign-
up sheets. 
Public Speakers Bureau-For a year prior to the hearing, 
Tri-Met provided a Speakers Bureau to make public 
presentations. Tri-Met's strategy was to target ympathetic 
community groups for participation. 
Committee Meetings-Much committee work was done by 
Tri-Met with civic organizations such as the: Ci ty Club and 
chambers of commerce which led t organizational 
recommendations for the public hearings. 
DEIS-The DEIS, which was made v tlable ope month 
prior to the public heanng, d ' cw. cd in detail all alter-
natives being considered. 
Finally, the DEIS Public Hearing itself was used as a 
forum for citizens to express their preferences for 
transportation alternatives and concerns over improve-
ment impacts. The April 6, 1978 meeting was held in two 
sessions where nearly 300 citizens and ~roups submitted 
comments influencing the ODOT selection of the com-
bined highway widening and light rail alternative. Nine 
major areas of comment recorded in the DEIS and later 
addressed in the FEIS are as follows : 
• Selection of the Banfield as a Regional Transitway; 
• LRT project costs/ ridership potential; 
• New alternatives/variations on DEIS alternatives; 
• Traffic/ pedestrian circulation; 
• Reliability/safety of LRT; 
• Use of existing tracking; 
• Adverse proximity impacts ; 
• Energy; 
• Impacts on development patterns. 
Following the DEIS Public Hearing, additional public 
hearings were held by all of the local public entities in-
volved. The key event, however, was the CAC's vote in 
support of the Burnside LRT. The first entity to do so, its 
action added credibility to subsequent decisions. In 
August, 1978, Tri-Met made public its recommendation 
for an LRT alignment in the Banfield/Burnside Corridor 
and on September 20, 1978 held a hearing to receive 
public comment. The Tri-Met Board of Directors ap-
proved the alignment which was subsequently adopted 
by the Gresham City Council. By December, 1978, agree-
ment had been reached on all but the downtown section 
of the LRT alignment, including resolutions of approval 
adopted by the City of Portland, CRAG and ODOT. 
During the final LRT alignment approval stage from Oc-
tober 2 through November 15, 1978 the Preliminary FEIS 
was distributed for review to local jurisdictions. During 
the next few months a series of six Downtown Forums 
were sponsored by Tri-Met to reach agreement on the 
downtown alignment, eventually resulting in the cross-
mall alignment. On January 5, 1979, the FEIS and the 
selected alternative was submitted to US DOT, thus end-
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ing the alternatives analysis phase of the Environmental 
Impact Statement. 
CAC Contributions 
The three-year mission of the CAC reached its climax in 
the 1978 DEIS Public Hearing. Thus, the CAC played an 
essential role in the first stage of the transportation deci-
sionmaking process-alternatives analysis . The CAC ob-
tained two major objectives : providing alternatives 
evaluation and transportation system recommendations 
to ODOT and Tri-Met, and informing and representing 
the general public. Major CAC contributions according to 
an ODOT analysis of citizen participation in the Banfield 
Transitway are as follows : 
• Establishing goals and objectives early in project 
development; 
• The public awareness slide shows; 
• The full-width freeway alternative; 
• Inclusion of the low-cost alternative; 
• Changing eastside bus service from a radial to a grid 
system for increased efficiency and better coordination 
with the future light rail system. 
The CAC has been successful in defining local concerns 
and in identifying special problems and sensitive areas. It 
has taken on the massive task of educating itself on both 
technical and broader issues of the Banfield Project. Most 
importantly, evaluations and recommendations made by 
the CAC have been useful to ODOT and Tri-Met in their 
decisionmaking. 
The CAC has done much toward making the transpor-
tation planning process responsive to community con-
cerns. Extensive effort has been made to contact special 
interest parties and to educate and inform the general 
public. The CAC has been instrumental in encouraging 
meaningful citizen input into the first vital stage of the 
Banfield Project-alternatives analysis and selection. 
Design and Land Use 
The second phase of citizen involvement covered a 
period of four years beginning in late 1978 and continu-
ing through mid-1982. Emphasis at this time was given 
to FEIS approval, engineering, and funding, topics largely 
out of the realm of citizen input. The design and land-use 
aspects of the light rail became the focus of citizen par-
ticipation during this period. 
After the DEIS hearing in April of 1978, smaller sub-
committees (some of which still contained former CAC 
members) constituted the citizen involvement element. 
Since the freeway expansion was a known and certain 
quantity, ODOT turned its attention to preliminary 
engineering studies and construction after FEIS approval. 
Planning for the new and more controversial light rail fell 
to Tri-Met, which continued and still maintains a Banfield 
Citizen Involvement Program. 
While US DOT approval was pending, Tri-Met held a 
series of public meetings from January through April, 
1979 in areas which would be directly affected by light 
rail impacts. Preliminary design plans for routeways and 
stations were aired and many potential impacts surfaced 
in these discussions which were helpful to Tri-Met deci-
sionmaking. Tri-Met then continued its geographically 
specific focus in east Multnomah County throughout the 
rest of the year and sustained its broader public informa-
tion effort as well. These broader efforts included County 
and Neighborhood Fair displays, presentations to various 
community groups, radio and television presentations, 
and the continued publication of "The Transitway 
News." Such broad public outreach techniques are still 
ongoing. 
The Banfield became an official construction project in 
1980, and during the next two years public input was 
heavily solicited from impacted areas in the corridor. An 
Overall Citizens' Advisory Committee was set up by Tri-
Met as a forum for affected area residents to air their land-
use and design concerns. These meetings were open to 
the public and broadcast on the radio. A major concern of 
the Upper Burnside and Holladay communities was the 
project effect on neighborhoods in already developed 
areas. In response to this concern, Tri-Met encouraged 
the formation of a local comprehensive planning and 
zoning policy to encourage development where ap-
propriate within the corridor. 
Aerial view of Burnside Street under construction 
SOURCE: Don Zavin/ Courtesy Fred Glick Assoc. 
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The design element of the light rail project had been 
subjected to scrutiny by various public entities . A formal 
design committee of five people advised on aesthetic and 
comfort decisions related to stations and light rail 
vehicles. This committee was composed of architects, 
business people, and an Arts Board member. In addition 
to the advisory committee, various public and civic 
boards had a say in design review including the City of 
Portland, the Yamhill Historic District, the Old Town-
Skidmore Historic District, etc. 
With the beginning of construction on the Banfield in 
1982, attention was changed again from a broader to a 
narrower focus. Design and land-use issues had largely 
been resolved, and now individually affected property 
owners became the citizen participation focus . 
Construction 
From mid-1982 to the present, Tri-Met has continued to 
involve and consult citizens throughout the construction 
phase. Meetings with Burnside neighborhood groups, 
various merchant associations, and local service clubs are 
an ongoing process. 
The broader public relations front is also sustained. In 
1983, this included public school presentations and a 
"Construction Art" exhibit. The most impressive citizen 
outreach, how ver, has been the Banfield Transitway 
Community Relations Program. This Tri-Met program 
employs a special staff team which works with 
neighborhood groups and one-on-one with individual 
property owners to reach agreement on changes made by 
construction easements. The program is staffed with 
seven people: a manager and six public relations 
specialists. Most of the staff is dedicated to community 
relations with one person providing public information, 
press contacts, and organization of community-wide 
forums and special events. The field office, which also 
contains engineering staff, is located on Burnside Avenue 
within the Project Corridor for easy citizen access. 
Goals of the 1984 Fiscal Year Program included: 
• Building the image of the Banfield Project; 
• Keeping the general public informed about project and 
construction programs; 
• An "Early Warning System" for upcoming construc-
tion events; 
• Developing resolution provisions for property 
disputes; 
• Implementing activities in a manner sensmve to 
residents and businesses ; 
• Instilling pride and advocacy for the project in Tri-Met 
Transitway employees. 
The Community Relations Program involvement pro-
cess includes meetings in small (10 block section) groups 
and with individuals and businesses in impacted areas. 
There are over 400 individually affected property 
owners. Those with property affected by light rail con-
struction are able to review detailed de ign plans with 
Tri-Met before construction regarding issues of grading, 
sidewalk and driveway reconstruction, and the removal 
and replacement of trees and shrubs in the right-of-way. 
Complete agreement is reached with property owners 
before any construction takes place. 
Unique to the Tri-Met program is the "Early Warning 
System," a 48-hour pre-notification procedure for notify-
ing residents of utility shutoffs and new traffic routings. 
Special notice is given to busine.s es for any planned 
disruption of access. Notification is given using door 
hangers and phone calls. A hotline and 24-hour answer-
ing service have also been installed at the project office. 
The construction phase has been met by Tri-Met with a 
good deal of forethought as to the impact of various tran-
sitway construction actions. As a final note on attention 
to detail, clean-up operations are monitored by the com-
munity relations staff. 
Conclusions 
Citizen participation has been both extensive and con-
structive throughout the entire Banfield decisionmaking 
process. Approaches used by ODOT and Tri-Met have 
attempted to address various "publics" from the broadest 
notion of the citizenry to individually affected property 
owners. Communicating with and gaining support from 
interest groups has been a major technique of citizen in-
volvement. Existing community-based organizations 
were utilized as sub-community forums, and in specially 
impacted areas, new committees and organizations were 
set up with Tri-Met's help to address their special needs. 
Keeping the broader public interested and aware of the 
Banfield process and project has been an ongoing effort 
• .., '° 
~ r. 
Individual site plans were prepared for each of the properties fronting on Burnside Street as part of the community relations program 
SOURCE: Fred Glick Associates 
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spanning all three phas of decisionmaking. Agency 
responsibility for citizen involvement has changed, 
however. ODOT was heavily involved in the alternatiyes 
analysis phase as the lead agency, but turned its attendon 
largely to engmeering and construction after the Public · 
Hearing in April, 1978. 
Tri-Met worked in a cooperative effort with ODOT and 
the CAC in the alternatives analysis phase, and then took 
the lead in citizen involvement through the design and 
construction phases. Emphasis has changed from general 
public awareness in the first phase to the affected corridor 
in the second phase and lastly to individual citizens. This 
change in emphasis reflects a dynamic, evolutionary 
citizen involvement process that has been responsive to 
changing situations as the Banfield project moved for-
ward. The future role of citizens when the LRT is com-
pleted is projected to take the form of committee involve-
ment in evaluation and review of the new system. 
41 

Chapter 7 
Financing Light Rail 
Senator Haifield speaking at the Light Rail vehicle dedication ceremony 
SOURCE Tri-Met 
A s suggested earlier, the initial financing for the LRT grew out of the Mt. Hood withdrawal. It also bears 
repeating that while these funds provided an initial pot of 
money for transportation investments, they were linked 
to corridors rather than a specific project. As a result, the 
withdrawal fund provided a "bank account" against 
which many transportation projects could draw. While 
the availability of these funds was questioned initially 
and subject to significant political manipulation when 
finally called upon, they represented a convenient 
backstop for decisionmaking. There was always a 
perceived source outside local financing for the costs of 
whatever project was chosen. 
Initial Withdrawal 
The early phases of the Interstate withdrawal fund alloca-
tion were accomplished without firm estimates of project 
costs or identification of sources for local matching funds, 
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particularly for the Banfield corridor. Moreover, prior to 
the passage of the 1976 Federal Aid Highway Act, funds 
available under withdrawal action were limited either to 
remapped interstate highway miles or transit-related pro-
jects such as rail or busways. As indicated earlier, the 
passage of this act, particularly Section 103(e)4, permit-
ted use of these monies for highway projects unrelated to 
transit. The Act also provided for quarterly escalation of 
the available entitlement based on the Interstate Con-
struction Cost Index. The timing of the Mt. Hood 
withdrawal provided for its effectuation under the new 
legislation and opened up several options for the region. 
The responsibility for choosing among options fell to the 
CRAG Board of Directors under the Chairmanship of Neil 
Goldschmidt. 
The planning staffs of the affected jurisdictions in the 
region had previously worked on establishing major cor-
ridor priorities and projects for the region. The Banfield, 
Sunset and Oregon City corridors received primary atten-
tion, as did transit service improvements in southeast 
Ponland. Under the flexibility of the 1976 amendments 
and at the urging of Governor Straub, CRAG chose to 
establish new priorities, creating for this purpose an In-
terstate Transfer Committee (ITC) to recommend pro-
cessing, programming and priorities. The ITC was initial-
ly chaired by Rick Gustafson a former Tri-Met senior 
planner and, at the time, state legislator. 
Soliciting projects in July, 1976, the CRAG Board 
established the following priorities: 
• Southeast Portland/Multnomah County Projects; 
• Transit projects for the Banfield, Sunset and Oregon 
City corridors; 
• Other major and minor projects. 
In soliciting projects from local jurisdictions, CRAG 
warned that ODOT should not be counted on for local 
match dollars. In August, 197 6 the Board established, 
through Resolution 760801, the following policies and 
factors for choosing projects. The project should: 
• Positively impact Southeast Ponland and East 
Multnomah County; 
• Maximize available dollars; 
• Positively affect transit operations; 
• Lend itself to early implementation; 
• Solve interjurisdictional problems; 
• Favor fuel conservation; 
• Protect and preserve neighborhoods; 
• Improve access to employment; 
• Remain consistent with the ITP; 
• Improve safety; 
• Reduce congestion. 
After receiving and evaluating project requests, the ITC 
and CRAG Board established five categories of projects 
reflecting the following concerns: 
• Alternative means to the Mt Hood Freeway for serving 
southeast travel demand; 
• Investing in public transportation facilities as iden-
tified by the Governor's Task Force and the ITP; 
• Equitably distributing the remaining funds throughout 
the region in order to solve transportation problems of 
a regional scope. 
The following table summarizes the categories and 
funds authorized by the CRAG Board on September 1, 
1977: 
Table 1 
Category I Regional Transitway Projects 
•Banfield Transitway $ 69,446,000 
•Oregon CityTransitway 56,000,000 
•Sunset Transitway 26,875,000 
•Tri-Met Technical Study 
Total $152,749,000 
Category II - Southeast Projects 
•Powell Boulevard, River to I-205 11,008,000 
•Southeast TSM 
Total 16,005,000 
Category III -
OtherMajorandMinorProjects $ 23,702,000 
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Category IV -
East Multnomah County TSM $ 5,000,000 
Category V Regional TSM 
(For projects not in SE Portland or 
east Multnomah County) _$ ___ _ 
Total $202,456,000 
Unauthorized funds 544,000 
Total Estimated Amount Transferred 
(1976 dollars) $203,000,000 
By June 30, 1977, a total of $2,451,582 had been 
obligated by FHWA and UMTA as follows: 
Category I 
Category II 
Category III 
Table 2 
$ 1,058,630 
1,308,522 
$ 2,451,582 
Source: Interstate Transfer prepared by Ernie 
Munch for Bureau of Structural Engineering, City 
of Portland, December 18, 1981, page 5. 
The deliberations of the ITC and authorizations of the 
CRAG Board were based on an estimate of $203 million 
in total funds as a result of the transfer (May, 1976), and 
1976 cost estimates. However, in September, 1977, 
FHW A released information indicating that actual 
amounts transferred during 1976 amounted to only $191 
million, which had inflated to approximately $203 in 
1977 dollars. Causing a minor flurry at CRAG, this $12 
million discrepancy was reconciled by redefining project 
estimates in 1977 dollars, thus spreading it equally 
among all projects. Establishing a baseline for accounting 
purposes, this technique also created a $3 million con-
tingency fund. Working with these figures, if project costs 
were less than estimated the difference was credited to 
the contingency fund which was redistributed in 1978 to 
various projects within categories II-IV. 
Based on this process of allocation, the Banfield project 
was originally given $69.4 million in Interstate transfer 
funds. This amount was later escalated from contingen-
cies to $69.9 million. In 1978, the DEIS estimated the 
Banfield costs at $159 million, including related highway 
improvements in the Banfield freeway (Page 203, DEIS). 
The decisionmakers assumed that the additional funds 
would be forthcoming in a Section 3 capital grant, 
although no effort was made to solicit funds at the time. 
The project cost estimates, however, became cast in 
political stone, an event which raised substantial funding 
problems later in the process. 
The 1-505 Withdrawal 
In November, 1978, Goldschmidt again instigated a 
withdrawal process, this time for the proposed I-505 or 
Industrial Freeway in northwest Portland. The context for 
this decision was tumultuous. The LRT had been selected 
locally by the affected units of government, the 
Metropolitan Service District (METRO-a new regional 
government) had been created by the voters to replace 
CRAG, a new governor had just been elected and the 
1-505 Withdrawal 
$165 
Alternative to I-505 
$6 .3 
$13 ·~ NW Portland Projects 
·3.. 
. - . - . • • - - . - . -
: <: $:.15 
$21 
$2.3 
$50 ~ City of Portland Projects 
$8 8 
Banfield T ransitway 
Three Regional Projects 
$.165 I-5_05 W.thdiawal~·Prograrn 
-.·.· . ·.·.·-·.- .. -.-.-.-.-.: ... ·.·.· .·. ·.·.·.·.·.·.-:; .. _ .~: . : . ~:-:::-:::-:- ; -:-;-: -: - :- :-:- : - · .:. :: -. - .: .. _ · :-~- - -. · . · . · . · :· . <· >:·: -: .: -:- : -: .:-: -:- · -· .:. 
, ·. ::+i+ Federal 
State 
Local 
Summary 
Federal State 
1-505 $165 million $14 .3 million 
Alternative to 1-505 $46 million $6 .3 million 
NW Portland Frojects $13 million 
City of Portland Projects $50 million 
Banfield T ransitway $15 million 
Three Regional Projects $21 miilion $3 .7 million 
Replacing FAP & F AU Projects 
Transferred Out of Region $20 million $2.6 million 
1-505 Withdrawal Program $ 16 5 million S 12.6 million 
The I-505 withdrawal paved the way to putting together the project local match 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
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$14 .3 
$12.6 $12.0 
All figures are in 
millions of 1979 dollars 
Local Total 
179.3 milllion 
$52 .3 million 
$2 .3 million $1&.3 million 
$8 ,8 million $58.8 million 
$15 .0 million 
$24 .7 million 
$0 .9 million $23 .5 million 
S 12 .0 million $189.6 million 
source of local matching funds remained unidentified. 
With the technical process completed, the political pro-
cess of identifying and securing project funds required 
adept handling and leadership. Under Goldschmidt's 
direction, the City of Portland assumed this role. Swift ac-
tion was particularly important since Goldschmidt's per-
sonal control of the regional decisionmaking forum, 
CRAG, would expire on December 31, 1978 with the 
creation of METRO. In this context, the linkage of political 
and technical actors became very important, producing a 
swift and effective strategy for funding the project. 
In comparison to the Mt. Hood experience, the I-505 
withdrawal request made to the Governor was sig-
nificantly different. A clear understanding as to the 
distribution of Interstate transfer funds was achieved be-
tween all participants early in the transfer process, and 
before the official approval was given by US DOT (Inter-
state Transfer, p. 12). CRAG expressed its understanding 
of the local agreements in December, 1978 (Resolution 
No. BD 781213), supporting the withdrawal. Identifying 
an expected $165 million in transfer funds, it reserved 
approximately $46 million for construction of an alter-
native to I-505. This amount was later reduced to $23 
million when a portion of the project was funded through 
Interstate highway funds. In all cases, ODOT agreed to 
pay the local match. Another $13 million was reserved 
for transportation improvements in northwest Portland. 
The remaining funds were allocated to: 
Banfield Transitway 
Three regional highway projects 
Regional transit and highway 
projects within Portland 
Substitution for Federal Aid Urban 
and Federal Aid Primary Funds 
otherwise available to the 
$15 million 
$21 million 
$50million 
metropolitan area $20 million 
Of the estimated $165 million made available from the 
withdrawal, $14 2 million was allocated to these projects 
and another $21 million used for the 1-405 extension. 
In addition to this allocation, a related "deal" was cut 
involving the FAUS and FAP funds. In allocating $34.5 
million in I-505 funds to projects that would have other-
wise been funded with FAUS and FAP monies, the 
was offering a trade for state funding of the local tsarlt1e!ld 
match, $16.1 million. Further, with a cumulative total of 
million in Mt. Hood and I-505 funds and a potential 
million in an UMTA capital grant for the Banfield, the 
region was faced with more grant funds than it could easi-
1 y match. Since the Interstate transfer funds could not be 
legally transferred out of the metropolitan area, an 
estimated $27 million (in 1979 dollars) of FAUS funds 
were shifted to F AP projects outside the metropolitan 
area and an estimated $7.5 million in Portland FAP proj-
ects were funded with I-505 funds. ODOT also agreed to 
pay 9 percent (3 percent above the normal 6 percent) of 
the required local match on the FAUS replacement funds, 
reducing the local obligation for matching transfer funds 
to only 6 percent. This was equivalent to the 6 percent 
local match requirement that would have been provided 
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by local jurisdictions on FAUS funds. Hence, a minimum 
of FAUS and F AP funds would be spent by Portland in 
the ensuing eight-year period. The difference between the 
$ 20 million reserved for replacing these funds and the 
estimated $34.5 million foregone was anticipated to 
come from the automatic inflation of Interstate transfer 
entitlements. In the absence of entitlement escalation, 
Portland would draw upon the $50 million reserved. 
Goldschmidt's Role 
Included within the CRAG resolution distributing the 
I-505 funds was a redistribution of Mt. Hood monies 
originally promised to the Oregon City corridor. 
Tri-Met's systems planning work for the corridor had in-
dicated that a package of transit and highway im-
provements would be more desirable in the short run 
than a fixed guideway improvement and that additional 
funds would be needed for the Sunset corridor transit-
way. Also contributirtg to this redistribution were higher-
than-expected cost estimates for the Oregon City bypass. 
By December, 1978, the Oregon City reserve haq inflated 
to $77 million. CRAG redistributed these funds as 
follows: 
Regional transit and traffic 
improvements for the 
Mcloughlin corridor 
Sunset corridor transitway 
.H1ghw<1v212 
Regional reserve for 
outside of Portland 
$25 million 
$23 million 
$ 5 million 
$24 million 
The Involvement of Metro 
Subsequent to these decisions, CRAG was replaced by 
METRO as the regional governing body and MPO. During 
the year that intervened between the I-505 withdrawal 
request and its official acceptance by US DOT, METRO 
made several "perfecting" decisions regarding the alloca-
tion of the funds. 
For bookkeeping purposes, $14.5 million was transferred 
from the City of Portland reserve to balance the FAUS/FAP 
reserve at $34.5 million, with the proviso that any escala-
tion of these funds would accrue to the benefit of 
Portland's reserve; 
Fourteen million dollars in Mt. Hood funds were "tem-
porarily" transferred to FAUS/FAP to insure con-
struction would continue on these projects during the wait 
for I-505 withdrawal approval with the understanding that 
the funds would be repaid as soon as possible from the ap-
proved I-505 monies; 
A $1.8 million regional systems fund was 
established for METRO through a assessment of 
all 1-505 project categories and the unobligated Mt. Hood 
fund, as well as two new categories within the respective 
withdrawal accounts to fund the reserve with all escalation 
of funds accruing to the regional reserve. 
US DOT's final approval of the 1-505 withdrawal ar-
rived in December, 1979, indicating a transfer amount of 
$160.4 million. The difference between the estimated 
withdrawal funds and actual amount attained was spread 
across all categories, so that each shared equally in the 
reduction. 
One more decision affecting the Banfield corridor was 
made by METRO in Fall, 1980. At that time, it became ap-
parent that matching funds for the Highway 212 project 
would not be available and that three other Clackamas 
County projects would exceed their original estimated 
cost. Hence, the $5 million originally set aside for 
Highway 212 was reallocated to other Clackamas County 
projects and the Banfield Freeway. The Banfield received 
$2.4 million of these funds. 
Two final points concerning withdrawal funding set a 
context for the financing of the Banfield project. First, to 
date, with yet unexplained reasons, FHW A has obligated 
funds for all projects in the metropolitan area from the Mt. 
Hood withdrawal funds, including those designed to be 
funded from 1-505 funds. This drawdown of Mt. Hood 
monies regardless of withdrawal linkage has frustrated 
the region to an extent because it meant that fund flows 
affect the Banfield project allocations and other Mt. Hood 
categories first, creating a potential competition for those 
funds from I-505 projects. This is important because the 
Mt. Hood funds are contract funds which must be pro-
vided by the federal government. This is not true ofl-505 
monies. Secondly, Interstate withdrawal funds are ap-
propriated annually by Congress. Hence, unlike regular 
highway funds annually apportioned by formula from 
the Highway Trust Fund, substitution projects are far 
more susceptible to the vagaries of the political funding 
process. Funher, those funds annually appropriated are 
shared among all eligible jurisdictions. This makes it very 
difficult for large-scale projects to assemble sufficient 
funding in any one year to assure timely construction 
progress. Both of these issues have plagued the Banfield 
project and led to the final local request for a "Full Fund-
ing Agreement" for the transit element rather than staged 
funding as is more typical of withdrawal projects. 
Beyond Withdrawals 
The discussion of the Portland process of freeway 
withdrawals has set a backdrop for the discussion of the 
process of actually receiving federal monies and related 
aspects of funding the Banfield. The process of allocating 
the funds obtained in this manner set a pattern that has 
carried through the entire project. Initially orchestrated 
by Neil Goldschmidt through the efforts of Doug Wright 
and Bob Bothman, the identification of projects in the 
other main transit corridors for the region and related 
highway construction is generally credited locally as a 
master stroke of political consensus building. While 140 
projects were ultimately identified for funding in this 
manner, the initial decisions really centered on making 
sure that all the affected jurisdictions in the region had a 
stake in the eventual outcome of the Banfield project. As 
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Dick Feeney of Tri-Met has observed, the presence of the 
transfer funds really got the state and metropolitan area 
into the LRT approach. The flexibility of these funds 
allowed their allocation among several different projects 
to satisfy all highway and transit interest perspectives and 
avoided the development of a win-lose perspective by the 
other counties in the region. It also facilitated the ability of 
the region to approach the state for the local matching 
money through the transfer of FAUS and F AP funds. 
UMTA's involvement to this point had been low key 
and facilitating. The identification of the LRT project 
meant that the region was eligible for Section 3 funding 
under the Urban Mass Transportation Act. The $85.7 
million in funds anticipated from this source conformed 
with UMTA's stated interest in augmenting transfer 
monies. As a result there were no serious flaws in the 
metropolitan area's strategic financial thinking. The com-
bination of Interstate transfer funds and Section 3 money 
provided a package with something for everyone. 
Securing the Money 
Financing the project became much more trying, 
however, when it came time to move beyond the think-
ing stage to the actual solicitation of funds. Problems 
emerged at three levels: the local, state and federal. At the 
state level, the issue was the appropriateness of sub-
stituting state funding for what was otherwise perceived 
as a local obligation. At the federal level, the metropolitan 
area faced two distinct issues: the scarcity of federal funds 
for capital projects before January, 1981, and the subse-
quent Reagan policy on "No New Rail Starts." Locally, 
authorization for funding was confounded by competing 
projects, fund escalation/deescalation and the complexi-
ty of the "bookkeeping" on project authorizations. 
The process of soliciting state matching funds began in 
Fall, 1978. When the decision to select the LRT was 
made, Tri-Met was not in an enviable financial position. 
While it had the power to issue bonds to finance capital 
projects, it had never gone to the market for this purpose. 
Without a substantial financial track record, the agency 
felt that it would pay a premium for any bonds issued. 
Moreover, the approximately $20 million in necessary 
matching funds could not come from other revenue 
sources open to the agency. It simply could not raise the 
money. Working with Goldschmidt and other local of-
ficials, a strategy was developed to convince then 
Governor-elect Atiyeh to include the requisite funds in 
his first budget proposal to the legislature in 1979. Using 
the connections already well established with Glenn 
Jackson and other political officials and the trade of FAUS 
and F AP monies described above, Atiyeh was convinced 
to include the matching funds in his budget. 
Feeney as lobbyist for Tri-Met and Mark Kelley, City 
Lobbyist for Portland, spent the legislative session per-
suading legislators to adopt the package. The metro-
politan area's willingness to shift other federal highway 
funds downstate was persuasive ammunition for the 
task. However, two major issues surfaced to make their 
efforts difficult. First was the issue of whether federal 
funds were assured l the r ·gion . Second was the align-
, ment of the tracks in the downtown area. Since Or on 
had yet to receive m ~or fL\ndin from the Interstate 
transfer monies th · w ub lantial legislative uncer-
tainty concerning the reliability of funding. To overcome 
th · con ms G lds hmidt requ red that a federal 
repre m.ative m et ' 1th rhc legislature. An UMTA of-
ficial visited Salem, spending an entire day with the State 
Scnac H field d the tough questions concerning the 
security of both Interstate transfer funds and UMT A Sec-
tion 3 grant monies, giving strong assurances that the 
funds would be available . While not acting as a lobbyist 
or advocate for the project, his supportive role helped 
assure state funding. 
The downtown alignment ere ted substantial concern 
for the Portland legislative delegation. Central to this issue 
was the recently completed Transit Mall. The process of 
resolving the alignment in the downtown area consumed 
over a full year of the Portland Planning Bureau 's time. 
The City wanted an along-the-Mall alignment which 
would effectively serve the full length of the Central 
Business District. Tri-Met, however, in the face of the 
original political commitment to the $160 million project 
costs, had chosen an across-Mall alignment. This was due 
to cost escalation from inflation and project add-ons, 
avoidance of rebuilding over 50 percent of the Mall and 
conflicts with buses running along the Mall streets. This 
local conflict had spread to the legislative delegation. 
Moreover, the delegation was very troubled by the poten-
tial tearing up of the recently completed Mall streets for 
construction of the LRT. Assured that the LRT would go 
across the Mall, the Portland delegation ultimately voted 
for state provision of the matching money. A resolution 
passed by the Portland City Council, however, endorsed 
the cross-Mall alignment but was ambiguous, allowing 
the controversy to continue for several years . 
A far more troubling problem arose from an unan-
ticipated source. At the time the proposal for state provi-
sion of the matching funds was moving through the state 
legislature, Oregon Congressman Robert Duncan was 
Chair of the House Appropriations Transportation Sub-
Committee. Duncan stridently objected to the proposal, 
disliking the leveraging of federal funds through state 
moni . He insisted that Tri-Met provide a portion of the 
local match as a demonstration of its commitment to the 
project and proof of its intent to successfully see it 
through to conclusion. This was resented by 
Goldschmidt and other local officials who had worked 
hard at building the local political consensus and 
establishing a funding plan. While the state had accepted 
the responsibility for the matching monies, Duncan 
threatened to refuse support on a Congressional ap-
propriation for UMTA funds until Tri-Met agreed to par-
ticipate financially. 
After many arguments involving Feeney and 
Goldschmidt on one side and Duncan on the other, Tri-
Met agreed to capitulate. Working with Drummond and 
Jackson, Duncan was persuaded to accept a partial provi-
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sion of local matching funds from Tri-Met in the amount 
of $4 million with the remainder ($16 million) to come 
from the fund established by the state legislature. 
Tri-Met's share later escalated to $13 .2 million as total 
project costs increased. The legislature 's generosity had 
its limits. The $16 million appropriation carried the pro-
viso that no additional funds would be made available. 
Yet, interest accruing to the State from the $16 million has 
been made available to the project through the creation of 
a Light Rail Construction Fund. The fund ultimately grew 
to $25 million with the Legislature's approval of the local 
match one week after the Portland City Council sel •cted 
the cross-Mall LRT alignment. The local funding package 
was completed in June, 1979. 
Changing Federal Financing Commitments 
With the local match in hand and Duncan brought into 
the process with Tri-Met's commitment of funds , atten-
tion shifted to securing the required federal dollars. The 
mutual financing plan required both the availability ofln-
terstate transfer funds through Congressional appropria-
tion and $85.7 million in Section 3 capital monies. 
The process of negotiating the UMT A Letter oflntent for 
Section 3 monies commenced in 1980. Peter Benjamin, 
of UMTA, visited Portland to discuss the required steps in 
obtaining Section 3 funds. He asked some hard questions 
linking back to the technical issues raised earlier in the 
decision process, and returned to Washington to initiate 
the Letter of Intent. Subsequently, Ted Lutz , UMTA Ad-
ministrator, visited Portland evidencing a support to the 
financing of the package. A draft of the Letter of Intent was 
agreed to, providing for $85.7 million in Section 3 funds 
which included a negotiated 12 percent escalation rate for 
inflation. The remainder of the 1979-80 estimated costs 
were to come from transfer monies with an initial escala-
tion rate of 8 percent and an assumed later rate of 12 per-
cent. 
While these negotiations proceeded, the local area was 
not sure that the process would terminate favorably . 
Despite Goldschmidt's presence as Secretary of Trans-
portation, metropolitan officials were not sure that they 
could effectively thread the federal process . Most 
threatening in this regard was the question of whether 
UMT A had the budgetary authority to issue the Letter of 
Intent which required Congressional authorization. This 
authorization was included in the proposed Surface 
Transportation Act of 1980. 
The legislation, however, was being held up by pro-
tracted Congressional debates over operating assistance 
formulas and Section 504 requirements for providing ser-
vice to the handicapped and elderly. Duncan had been 
active in the latter area working closely with Represen-
tative James Howard, Chairman of the House Public 
Works Committee. Together, they had succeeded in at-
taching a rider to the US DOT appropriations bill permit-
ting local discretion in the provision of services to the 
handicapped and elderly. While this passed, it produced 
significant internal Congressional conflict which affected 
the passage of the Surface Transportation Act. In the 
absence of authorizing legi l;;Hion , U fT A ould n tissue 
the Letter ofintent. In the meantime, the presidential elec-
tions of 1980 produced a Reagan victory. While the 
R ga n transition team accepted the oper.uing a j-rance 
pro vi tons of the pro po -ed Act , the proc "S of p s 1 n the 
1 "gl lalion was slo\ ly grinding to a halt in anticipation of 
the end of the session and a new Administration and 
Congress. The locals began to fear the demise of both the 
legislation and the project. 
Duncan continued to push for both p ag of the 
legislation and local efforts to lobby for 1 assag~ . 
However, by this time he as a lame duck having lost his 
bid for re-election. The Portland area turned to Senators 
Bob Packwood and Mark Hatfield for assistance. Despite 
their aid, the legislation failed to pass leaving only the op-
tion of attaching authorization for the Letter of Intent to 
the appropriations bill for US DOT, which was still pend-
ing in rhe Senate. By accepting a Senate amendment that 
th t: L ·u r of Intent be issu ·d, Dun n managed to get 
aurhonzation included in th • final appropriations 
measure. Duncan then c-.alled G ldschmidc and skcd 
him to issue the Letter. Goldschmidt refused, claiming 
that he lacked authorization to do so . Duncan referred to 
the recently passed Congressional rider and pointed out 
that the appropriations measure required him as Secre-
tary to combine and accumulate unobligated funds from 
various sources and, hen .. pr vided the authorization to 
i ue the Letter. Without any a ~sistance from UMTA, the 
Office of the Secretary identified the requisite funds and 
authorized issuance of the Letter of Intent on December 
20, 1980. 
While the Letter of Intent had b i.; •n i ~ ued, it did not 
guarantee ·funding. Arrival of the new Administration 
opened up a radically different ball game. A Letter of In-
tent prov.ides authorization to proceed with construction 
and a promise of future federal funding The me Lr p lium 
ar ' h wever, did n t h v um ient lo al moni' 
available to make a meaningful start on construction 
without federal appropriations for the project. Further, 
the new Administration immediately promulgated a 
policy of no new rail starts and proposed a budget for 
UMT A with this in mind. 
\Vhile the procurement of vehicles had been initiated 
early in 1980, UMTA had not authoriz d the contract to 
be let and no other construction had commenced on the 
project. In effect, the Banfield project was in limbo con-
cerning its status as a "new" start. The Administration in-
sisted that the Banfield was a new start and therefore 
would not support appropriations for the ~ project. This 
threw the Portland effort to secure funding backto square 
one, and led to the development of a new political 
strategy. 
The local political consensus became more important. 
Feeney created a task force of local technical officials that 
met frequently to discuss the status of events and hatch 
strategy. The key thrust of this effort was to maintain a 
united front and convince the Administration to reassess 
its policy stance. Responsibility for leading the effort 
rested with Rick Gustafson, Executive Officer of METRO; 
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together with Portland's Mayor, Frank Ivancie ; Fred 
Klaboe, Director of ODOT; and Tri-Met's Gerard Drum-
mond. They turned for assist n c lO Oreg n's Repr ·n-
tative AuCoin and Senator Hatfield Au oin h d J m d 
the House Appropriations Commllt . -ub- mmiu 
on Transportation and Hatft •Id had be om haimrnn of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee. The existence of 
the Letter of Intent produced a lot of confusion in the first 
couple of months of 1981 . 
AuCoin was supportive 1hr ugh ut lhc pro es~ . in-
cluding his sponsorship of $8 9 m11l1on in ' n n 3 
money in a 1981 Supplemental Appropriation measure 
pending before the House. The leverage behind this effort 
was an UMT A need for Supplemental Funds in order to 
maintain a steady flow of cash to projects then under on -
struct i n I-101, ever, inclusion of the $8.9 million in rhc 
final vrr-io n ot rhe measure would have been construed 
as an appropriation for a new rail start. 
On the Senate side, Hatfield was confromcd b, a dilem-
ma. As a Republican he was a key man for che Ad-
ministration on the Appr pri li n_ Commille Yet, as 
Susan Long, a Hatfield staffer on the Appropriations 
Committee, observed: while he felt committed to sup-
porting the President, he also believed there was a federal 
obligation to Oregon. The stalemate on the House side 
shifted attention to the Senate. In Long' view, the 
character of the project as a dual transit/ highway effort 
and the strength of the local commitment provided an in-
centive to Hatfield. The Portland officials maintained that 
without the regionwide highway mon y included in the 
Interstate transfer appropriation request their local con-
sensus would deteriorate, including support from Salem 
which was receiving Interstate transfer monies for a 
highway project. Hence, the appropriation for the Inter-
state transfer funds was critical, and Hatfield felc obliged 
to d li er on the · funds to support local offi cial and m-
t re ts . 
To maintain the local support for funding, F en >' u. ed 
the Transportation Group of local officials. The r :,}< fav 
ing the group was to orchestrate local represen tlon 
before Congress to make s ure that the local consensus 
held up and overcame the resistance of UMT A and Office 
of Mangement and Budget (OMB) to the inclusion of Sec-
tion 3 money. Working with Hatfield, the group lobbied 
intensely with the Oregon dele ati n and to gath r Olh r 
support in Congr ss. Former Repr -en1.auv Duncan was 
hired a a lobbyi c in Washington to work ' ich l cal 
representatives on testimony and lining up support. The 
group decided to make the Governor their official 
spokesman and represernative , demanding that all com-
munication concerning the final fiscal arrangement be 
.channeled through his office. Finally, the group provided 
critical support to Hatfield in his dealing with the Admin-
istration. 
The focus on the 1981-82 Appropriations me, -ure 
proved to be an asset tQ the Portland effort According to 
Long, most members of Congress were not excited about 
the problem of transit and new starts since the great ma-
jority of them did not have that type of project in their 
districts. The linkage to road funds, however, made Hat-
field's job easier since most Congressmen are quite 
familiar with the political impacts of obtaining road 
funds. Consequently, when Atiyeh, representing the 
Transportation Group, cogently put the problem to Hat-
field concerning the difficulty of proceeding without Sec-
tion 3 monies, Hatfield was receptive to reopening the 
negotiations with DOT 
Finally, METRO suggested an idea to Tri-Met for 
answering UMTA's objections to Section 3 money for the 
project The Administration had originally adopted the 
no rail start policy to avoid substantial appropriation re-
quests for capital outlays in the 1982 budget and in 
subsequent budget years. The gist of the proposal was 
that Tri-Met would accept funding of the project from 
Interstate transfer funds if US DOT would permit the 
reallocation of $ 7 6 .8 million original million 
less the $8.9 million AuCoin appropriated) originally 
promised to the Westside corridor to the Banfield project. 
In return, Portland would accept a cashflow ·~···~···,.., 
US DOT would substitute a Letter of Intent 
Westside in the amount reallocated to the Banfield which 
would be used for non-rail transit projects. The Letter of 
Intent for $76.8 million would protect local road projects 
and the cash flow arrangement would minimize initial 
demands on appropriations, spreading them out over 
several years as the project proceeded through construc-
tion. It created a dollar-for-dollar trade in which there was 
no loss or additional expense to any project in either cor-
ridor. 
Long and Administrator Teele arrived at a working 
agreement on this approach which was proposed to 
Secretary Lewis. Lewis and Hatfield then went to the 
Senate Appropriations Committee in April, 1981 where 
Lewis would unveil the proposal. This committee effort 
avoided the appropriation of funds for new rail starts and 
provided necessary funding for the Banfield construction 
effort. 
It all came down to the passage of the FY 1981 Sup-
plemental Appropriation Bill. AuCoin agreed to abandon 
his request for year-to-year funding for the project if there 
was a Full Funding Agreement, and the Westside was 
held harmless through a Letter of Intent to replace the 
funds transferred to the Banfield. Hatfield supported the 
arrangement. Further, he supported passage in the Senate 
of the supplemental appropriation with $8.9 million in 
Section 3 money and $5.7 million in Interstate transfer 
funds for the LRT. 
Earmarking of transfer funds for Portland seemed i:o 
bring the parties to a final agreement. Teele had Portland 
assurances that a cashflow and transfer funding approach 
(with the exception of the $8.9 million which made it 
through Congress) for the project was acceptable. In 
return, AuCoin and Hatfield asked Teele to honor the 
original Letter of Intent granting authorization to proceed 
but with a different funding scheme and a new Letter of 
Intent for the Westside. The final Bill was signed 
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December 1981 bringing to a close the direct Congres-
sional phase of the project. 
Subsequently, UMTA visited Portland to negotiate the 
new Letter of Intent and Full Funding Agreement. Long 
had conferred with Teele followed by several meetings 
among Teele, Duncan and Long to prod the process 
along. While progress was being made, there was still a 
pending threat to local road projects. UMTA was reluc-
tant to fund more related road work from its allocation of 
the funds than it had to, and wanted FHWA to assume 
responsibility for the funding. While the local people felt 
the project was all related, it made a difference to the 
Washington agencies as to whose budget was being tap-
ped. If they were successful in reallocating the road work 
to the FHWA side, this would have meant that the Ban-
field widening would compete against other regional 
highway projects for each annual appropriation. More-
over, UMTA seemed to prefer designating as little of the 
project as transit as possible, putting a greater level of 
responsibility on FWHA for funding and oversight. 
UMTA drafted a Full Funding Agreement which 
reflected these concerns. While some within Tri-Met 
were willing to accept this, it would have created substan-
tial problems for the state. Moreover, the legislation 
directing issuance of the agreement had described the 
project as a transit project. Hence, Tri-Met rejected the 
proposal, leaving it to Bay and Bothman to work out an 
acceptable allocation of road versus transit work An ar-
rangement was proposed to UMTA which stipulated that 
only $26.6 million in road work would be accomplished 
under the highway portion of the transfer funds and that 
this would be the last appropriation of road money from 
the FHWA share of the project. UMTA still refused, 
however, to let the whole project be called a transit proj-
ect and wanted FHWA to provide $11 million annually. 
This produced some concern for ODOT, since the lack of 
future Interstate transfer funds might allow transit to suck 
the transfer pot dry. Hence, they objected to this pro-
posal. 
In January, 1982 an agreement was concluded with 
UMTA that promised that there would be no more than 
$26.6 million in highway money for the project and that 
UMTA would treat the balance of the project as a transit 
project. However, the draft Full Funding Agreement did 
not fully reflect this consensus. It stipulated $ 206 million 
for the LRT portion of the effort, but made no mention of 
$103 million for roads and the Banfield widening effort. 
Tri-Met again contacted Long. She was persuaded to call 
Teele to get an agreement. She told Teele that Portland 
could not proceed without the UMTA monies for the 
highway project elements and could not wait any longer. 
The final agreement from Teele then arrived in Portland 
on March 1982 when he attended the ground-
breaking ceremonies for the Ruby Junction Maintenance 
Facility. 
Metropolitan Bookkeeping 
The final element of the financing story is simply the ac-
counting dimension. With the presence of several dif-
ferent funding sources, inflating and deflating federal 
funds and multiple commitments of funds, the tracking of 
financial commitments and revenues has proven ex-
tremely difficult. The thread of opportunistic financing 
which flows throughout the local political pro-
vided some of the most troublesome local issues. 
Contextually, responsibility for allocating financing 
from federal funds lies with several agencies. FHW A 
bears responsibility for federal highway monies appor-
tioned from the regular Interstate, Primary and Urban 
programs. Within the metropolitan region, ODOT 
spends these funds after coordination with METRO. 
UMT A bears responsibility for transit funding under the 
Section 3 program. This is also coordinated through 
METRO. Interstate transfer funds can be the responsibili-
ty of either agency depending upon the legislative ap-
propriation or substitute project designation. And, again, 
these funds are locally coordinated through METRO. 
Linking any of these funds to a specific project requires a 
federally approved regional transportation plan 
(prepared by METRO) and a priority decision 
(coordinated through METRO's Joint Planning and Ad-
visory Committee). As the federally approved MPO, 
METRO oversees the annual use of federal funds and 
must authorize the allocation and expenditure of funds 
for given projects. Since there is always a waiting list for 
funds, METRO maintains an ongoing priority list of eligi-
ble projects. The priority of these projects can be affected 
by a number of factors including technical readiness to 
proceed, local matching fund availability, political factors 
and the need for additional funding on projects under 
construction. The dollar commitment to the Banfield has 
made METRO's coordinating role particularly com-
plicated. It has had the responsibility of coordinating the 
preferences and wants of all local participants and 
monitoring the availability of federal funds to insure that 
all commitments for projects throughout the region have 
been met. 
In this context the Banfield's funding ups and downs 
have constantly threatened the political consensus of the 
region. A shift in funding from one federal program to 
another raises the potential of jeopardizing other projects 
in the region. Hence, METRO has constantly sought to 
adjudicate the regional funding proposals to maintain the 
integrity of commitments. Concomitantly, federal infla-
tion/ deflation elements have also jeopardized fiscal 
stability. During the period 1976-1982 Interstate transfer 
entitlements fluctuated with the cost to complete 
estimates for the withdrawn segments. During much of 
the period inflation was very high, producing significant 
new potential revenues for metropolitan areas. So long as 
the trend was always inflation, the issue was how to 
allocate the new monies when Congress appropriated 
them. In the early l 980's the recession sent the trend in 
the other direction, reducing available monies for urban 
areas. In Portland this put significant pressure on METRO 
and all local officials since the central commitment to 
complete the Banfield meant that the finapcial flexibility 
lay with other small projects in the region, namely local 
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highway projects which had been used as consensus-
building inducements. Tracing the full range of "account-
ing" issues associated with the Banfield is a complex 
chore. Fortunately, Andrew Cotugno of METRO has suc-
cessfully completed this task. His briefing memo is at-
tached as Appendix F and is summarized below. 
Initially, CRAG allocated approximately $69.6 million 
in Mt. Hood money and $15 million ofl-505 funds to the 
Banfield project. This $84.6-million-dollar fund had, by 
mid-1980, inflated and been added to to create a $12 7 .6 
million authorization of Interstate transfer funds for the 
Banfield. In.late 1980, during the negotiations for the first 
Full Funding Agreement the assumed project funding 
picture was: 
Highway Funds: 
(e)( 4 )-Highway 
Transit Funds: 
(e)( 4 )-Transit 
Section 3 
Total 
Total w/Match 
Assumed 
1980 Cost 
& Funding 
$ 66.Sm 
60.2 
60.9 
$ 187.9m 
$225.Sm 
"Assumed" 
Escalation 
@12% 
$16.Sm 
25.8 
24.8 
$67.lm 
Proposed 
Funding 
$ 83.3m 
86.0 
$255.0m 
$306.3m 
Key to this initial funding program was a heavy reliance 
on escalation and inflation assumptions. The initial 
federal commitment was to a $306.3 million project in-
cluding inflation. All of the (e)( 4) money was "assumed" 
to inflate from 1980 to 1985 by $4 2.3 million. The initial 
Section 3 proposal of $85.7 million including $24.8 
million in inflation. 
By the issuance of the Letter of Intent on December 22, 
1980, the (e)(4) entitlement had escalated by $4.4 
million. This brought the total federal (e)( 4) commitment 
to $259 million (including assumed inflation). 
The no-new-rail-starts policy produced the revised 
funding proposals discussed earlier and shifted the initial 
funding to the following: 
Highway Funds: 
Revised 
1980 Cost 
&Funding 
"Assumed" 
Escalation 
@12% 
Revised 
Funding 
Program 
(e)(4)-Highway $ 27,000,000 $ 1,500,000 $ 28,500,000 
Transit Funds: 
(e)( 4 )-Transit 
Section 3 
39,800,000 15,000,000 
60,200,000 25,800,000 
60,900,000 
54,800,000 
86,000,000 
85,700,000 
Total $187,900,000 $67,100,000 $256,363,000 
Total w/match $225,500,000 $306,300,000 
The changes were based on a shift of highway (e)(4) 
funding to transit funding (on the basis that LRT con-
struction caused a portion of the highway relocation). 
This produced no change in total cost or project scope. It 
did result in more of the project being folded into the Full 
Funding Contract, carrying the "assumed" inflation 
along with it. Additionally, the 1980 Banfield Letter ofln-
tent was traded for (e)( 4) funds allocated to other regional 
projects, mostly Westside Corridor funds. As part of this, 
the $8. 9 million of Section 3 monies sponsored by Au-
Coin were appropriated for the Banfield and $76.8 
million were "re-issued" to the Westside Corridor in a 
new Letter of Intent. An inflation reserve of $25 million 
was set aside to allow the funds promised the Westside to 
"escalate" as if they were still (e)( 4) monies. This reseive 
was part of the $76.8 million for the Westside. 
During negotiations for the Full Funding Agreement, 
UMTA increased the (e)(4) funds for the project by $4.4 
million to account for inflation. This increase affected the 
assumed inflation, not the locally authorized amount for 
the project. This latter point is particularly significant. 
While the Full Funding Agreement authorized a federal 
commitment of $268 million from all federal sources, the 
local authorization from METRO at that point was only 
$187.5 million. The $80 million discrepancy was a pro-
duct of the assumed escalation in funds initially 
established in the first Letter of Intent that had not 
materialized. Central to this discrepancy was the 
available (e)( 4) funds. Since they had not met the escala-
tion expectations of local officials, fully funding the Ban-
field from this source would mean taking monies from 
other projects to which (e)( 4) funds had been promised. 
Some of the discrepancy was eliminated by convincing 
Congress to approve transfer of the inflation reseive from 
the Westside non-rail projects to the Banfield. Approx-
imately $20.1 million was thus made available to the 
Banfield. This shift did not increase the federal commit-
ment, it simply shifted relatively unattached funds from 
other parts of the metropolitan area to the Banfield effort. 
At the same time Congress approved an additional $5 
million grant to Tri-Met for downtown improvements 
related to LRT. In particular, the loop tum-around includ-
efi mall-like improvements on only one side of Morrison 
a'.nd Yamhill streets throughout the heart of downtown. 
The downtown merchants felt that such improvements 
on both sides of the street would greatly enhance 
business. Hence, they agreed to the formation of a local 
improvement district which raised the $1.1 million in 
matching funds for the grant approved by Congress. In 
both Congressional actions, Senator Hatfield and 
Representative AuCoin played important roles. 
The difference between the total federal and local com-
mitments still existed, however. Congress had indicated 
in 1982 an intent to fund this discrepancy with Section 3 
funds if Interstate transfer authorizations were not 
available locally. The intent, however, was just an un-
funded promise. The passage of the Surface Transporta-
tion Act of 1982 finally resolved the issue of the funding 
source. The Act eliminated the escalation provision of the 
Downtown merchants created a local improvement district to help pay for downtown improvements such as these cobblestones being installed 
between the LRT tracks 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
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Interstate transfer funds, rolling all entitlements back to 
I 980. This eliminated all hope of realizing any of the 
assumed escalation. Congress appropriated $44.25 
million in new Section 3 funds to finance the difference 
between the federal Full Funding Agreement authoriza-
tion and the local authorization. With the $20. I million 
already made available from the inflation reserve this 
brought local and federal commitments into balance. 
With a firm federal commitment to fund the costs of the 
project, the only remaining issue is the appropriation of 
sufficient funds to finance the project on schedule. If suffi-
cient federal funds are not available in fiscal year I 985 to 
finance construction, Tri-Met intends to use some of its 
Section 9 funds to finish construction. These would be 
replaced by Section 3 appropriations when they become 
available. 
The final funding picture is: 
Local Allocation and Federal Funding Commitment: 
Highway(e)(4) $ 26,584,501 
Transit(e)(4) 146,870,375 
Section 3 
Original 
Inflation Reserve 
CBD 
New Start 
Section 9 
Total 
Total w /Match 
8,900,000 
20,150,000 
5,000,000 
42,698,353 
6,160,000 
$256,363,229 
$307,700,000 
Unused portion of Full Funding Contract (New Start 
Section 3+ Match) - $20,008,624. 
WORK34. 
Major spending categories 
EHICLES 8.2% 
OPERATIONS 
FACILITY 3.8'!1> 
Clearly, the local area benefited substantially from its 
creative use of multiple federal funding programs. It is 
also clear, however, that much of the funding bind was 
created locally. By assuming greater escalation than 
ultimately proved to be true, the Interstate transfer funds 
were overcommitted locally. It remained for a successful 
metropolitan effort to secure additional federal monies to 
eliminate the problem. Federal policy shifts and political 
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commitments also influenced the process by constantly 
altering the rules of the financing mechanism. From a 
comprehensive perspective, the entire financing process 
reflected both the inherently political process of satisfying 
all participants and the general opportunistic behavior of 
local officials in exploring both technical and political 
avenues for funds. 
Banfield funding source 
UMT A FEDERAL 
75% 

Chapter 8 
Related Activities, Actions 
and Anxieties 
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A major planning issue on Burnside Street was how 
SOURCE Zimmer· Gunsul · Frasca Partnership 
Rail into existing single family communities 
There are a number of ancillary considerations that af-fected the process of metropolitan de1c1siortm:ak1ng 
for the LRT. Of these, the most important have been 
relationship between land-use planning and transit, the 
use of joint development, the impact of the Transit Mall 
on the downtown alignment decision and the Westside 
corridor. With the exception of the downtown a111mrne11t 
decision, each of these issues or concerns has set 
the general context within which the LRT decision was 
made. The downtown decision is unique only in that it 
alone was more of a threat to the process rather than an 
opportunity to be exploited. In general, the entire LRT 
decision process, including the Mt. Hood withdrawal, 
can be seen as more land-use rather than transit based. 
Transit and the City 
The context of the Mt. Hood withdrawal as an inherent 
land-use decision concerning the future of the Portland 
CBD and the impact of highways on the metropolitan 
area provided a convenient vehicle for raising the visibili-
ty of the general land-use planning issues facing the 
metropolitan area. Senate Bill 100, establishing the State's 
land-use planning process, came into existence in 1973 
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at the high point of the Mt Hood controversy. While full 
operationalization of the land-use planning process did 
not occur immediately, it did serve as a framework for 
developing metropolitan transportation alternatives. This 
reinforced much of the analysis concerning corridor 
selection, mode preference, station locations, track loca-
tions, and development, not only as a mobility alternative 
to the highway system but also as a major force """'·f-'"·'"' 
the future of the metropolitan area. 
Portland has been an early leader in this effort, under-
taking a number of studies which have materially affected 
its approach to transit. Chief among these have been the 
City's Downtown Plan, Arterial Streets Classification 
Study and the Downtown Parking and Circulation Plan. 
All three share a commitment to improving the 
downtown as a major metropolitan resource and center 
of urban life. 
Downtown Plan 
The Downtown Plan, adopted in 1972 before the crea-
tion of the state's land-use planning process, established 
both the general commitment to the revitalization of the 
CBD and the specific initiative which led to the develop-
ment of the Transit Mall. The Plan provides a statement of 
and objectives intended to serve as a framework for 
DOWNTOWN PLAN CONCEPT 
~ RETAIL CORE 
MAJOR OFFICE 
CORRIDOR 
:@ MEDIUM DENSIT Y 
~ OFFICES 
... 
MAJOR \/EHICLE 
ACCESS 
•••• MASS TRANSIT 
&Jill~ MAJOR OPEN SPACE 
The downtown plan for Portland focuses transit along the retail and office corridors 
SOURCE: Portland Bureau of Planning 
making land-use decisions. Its goals emphasize the 
enhancement of downtown a the retail, office, cultural 
and entertainment center of the metropolitan area. Call-
ing for the provision of open space and use of the 
Willamette River as a community focus , it also seeks to 
increase the number of residential units in the downtown 
area. From a transportation perspective, the Plan seeks an 
emphasis on balanced transportation mode uses which 
will support other downtown goals. Also emphasized are 
more efficient use of right-of-way and vehicles, and a 
reduction in reliance on the automobile and increased 
use of transit. In terms of the latter, the Plan puts a high 
priority on the development of a mass transit system 
which is fast , economical, convenient, comfortable, quiet 
and non-polluting. The Transit Mall became a major im-
plementation of this goal as a centerpiece for improved 
transit and pedestrian use of the CBD. 
Arterial Streets 
Prior to the adoption of the City's comprehensive plan, 
the Arterial Streets Classification Study served as the 
prinicipal transportation policy instrument. Begun in 
April, 1974, it was adopted by the City Council in June, 
1977. The Study guided investments in transportation 
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improvements and provided a framework for solving 
transportation problems as they arose. It also served as a 
means for guiding private development as it occurred ad-
jacent to arterial streets within the city. 
City streets were grouped in two class ifications, traffic 
streets and transit streets. Separate facilities were 
designated for trips of different speeds, volumes and 
length. The classification process provided a model for 
high-speed, through traffic that would discourage use of 
neighborhood streets and direct local traffic away from 
expressways. Also addressing pedestrian, bicycle and 
trucking classifications for streets, the Study strove to 
provide a framework for improved efficiency of the 
overall transportation system and the livability of 
Portland neighborhoods . Inherently a land-use planning 
instrument, the policy as adopted called for planned use 
of land around transit stations to reinforce existing 
development and enhance station access . A one-fourth-
mile radius around transit stations became the focus of 
increased employme~t and housing development. 
Parking and Circulation Policy 
Downtown parking and circulation have been increas-
ingly important issues in the development of transit alter-
natives. The Downtown Plan required a method for sup-
porting its goals in terms of increased transit usage and 
targeted auto access. Adopted in February, 1975, the 
Downtown Parking and Circulation Policy provided a 
means for implem ming this part of the overall 
downtown goals. The Plan provides guidelines for the 
development of efficient, adequate and convenient park-
ing which supports and encourages desired land uses, 
zoning and downtown policies. In particular the follow-
ing policies received emphasis: 
A base case using the regionally adopted Interim 
Transportation Plan population and employment projec-
tions for 1980 in which no shifts in development were at-
tributed to the LRT; 
A revised land-use case which reflected the presence of 
LRT and a progressive program of transit-supportive 
policies to focus development around transit stations in 
order to maximize the benefits from a fixed-route transit 
system. 
Both cases were somewhat "ideal" in character. 
However, the opportunity to portray their relative im-
pacts provided ammunition for affecting the outcome of 
the analysis for the corridor. Further, the report reflected 
Tri-Met's entrepreneurial thin~ing in terms of its effort to 
support the LRT alternatives and take advantage of the 
land-use planning process. As the report's summary in-
dicates: 
The impacts of imposing LRT on each land-use case are 
chronicled in the second section, drawing from national 
experience and materials provided to Tri-Met by 
Multnomah County and the City of Portland. A choice for 
LRT becomes a choice for more intensive development in 
the corridor, independent of government policies , in that 
some speculative development around stations will occur 
with or without affirmative action by local jurisdictions to 
shape it. 
A number of conclusions are reached within the main 
body of the report which, when viewed together, support 
the basic contention embodied here. Simply stated, given a 
decision to build light rail, a complementary package of 
positive and deliberative policies to shape and direct 
development patterns will be necessary to guarantee 
development which is consistent with the transportation 
investment. To realize this end, a broad-based, public-
private parmership built on intergovernmental coopera-
tion and a reassessment o.f existing development trends on 
the East Side is required (p. 1-2). 
While the report acknowledged that the required land-
use assumptions to account for the LRT investment 
would not have to be significantly different from the 
"recognizable norm," it did assert that the relationship 
between land use and transit required an affirmative 
recognition by the affected jurisdictions. 
The case being made is that the introduction of major 
new transportation assumptions requires new land-use 
assumptions. The two are too inextricably linked to do 
otherwise. The revised land-use case presented here ad-
dresses the need for coordinated land-use and transporta-
tion planning and investments to realize the best possible 
result. 
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A variety of crcactv implementation mechanisms, in-
cluding Transporuu..ion Corridor Development Coopera-
tion, are potentially available to encourage the level of 
development de ired. Along wirh mcem.ives for develop-
ment in station ar , some dismccnuvcs ro development 
outside the corridor would be n ry (p. 3). 
The report identified the following impacts of the re-
vised land-use case: 
• The conversion of a considerable portion of the cor-
ridor's vacant land and some lower value structures to 
higher intensity uses (multiple family, commercial, 
office); 
• A rapid conversion to higher density uses within the 
corridor; 
• A shift of multiple-family development into the LRT 
corridor; 
• A reduction in the growth rate outside the corridor; 
• The need for significantly improved urban services 
within the corridor; 
• A general positive impact on property values ; 
• A total reduction in energy utilization from develop-
ment in an energy-efficient area; 
• A reduction in automobile use and ownership; 
• A reduction in public costs associated with both 
development and environmental pollution. 
Building on the already existent push toward in-
tegrating land-use and transportation planning, this effort 
confirmed the desirability of a large transit investment in 
terms of leveraged development potential. The assumed 
payoff of this approach was used to justify the LRT in the 
DEIS and FEIS. The DEIS observes: 
All project alternati · , with the exception of the No-
Build and Low-Cost Improvement options, generally con-
form with local plans and policies regarding land use and 
transportation. The Light Rail Transit alternatives on either 
Burnside Street (5-1) or Division Street (5-2) offer the 
greatest potential for secondary land-use changes which 
concentrate population and employment in East Mult-
nomah County in support of a more efficient public transit 
network. This stems from the extension of a fixed rail ser-
vice into Gresham and ociated development potentials 
around the transit stations (p. 8-9). 
The FEIS echoed these initial assessments: 
In particular, the project is consistent with major 
regional goals of: ( 1) improving the flow of goods and ser-
vices and strengthening the local economy, (2) increasing 
the viability of the Portland central business district and 
enhancing its role as a regional center, and (3) concen-
trating growth where it can be better served by all public 
services, including transit. 
Access will be improved along the entire Banfield Tran-
sitway Project Corridor; therefore, it will provide a focus 
for more efficient and orderly regional growth (p. 6). 
While the FEIS did not anticipate major land-use shifts 
in Portland proper, it did anticipate major changes in 
development patterns in East Multnomah County where 
a shift to higher densities for multi-family, office and 
commercial developments was forecast. Indeed, early in 
the LRT decision process the County combined its ad-
vocacy of the project with its land-use planning process . 
An early leader in the development of comprehensive 
land-use plans, the County adopted its plan with Burn-
side identified as a major transit corridor. This supported 
the Tri-Met process. 
With this groundwork in place, the land-use relation-
ships for the LRT served as a major catalyst for a joint 
development planning process. The exploration of alter-
native mechanisms for implementing the approach was 
funded by several UMT A grants, beyond those directly 
attributable to the alternatives analysis process . 
Specifically, UMTA provided funds for the following 
studies: 
• Transit Corridor Development Cooperation Feasibility 
Study, August, 1978 through October,1979, $65,000; 
• Banfield Market Impact Analysis , August, 1979 
through June, 1980, $50,000; 
• Transit Station Area Planning Program, November, 
1979 through June, 1982 funded from monies in LRT 
grant (Interstate transfer), $1.2 million ; 
• Non-Profit Cooperation for joint Development, 
September, 1982 through mid-1983. 
Transit Station Area Planning 
The intent of these efforts was clearly to operationalize 
established joint development expectations. Most 
noteworthy was the Transit Station Area Planning Pro-
gram (TSAP) which established the most likely areas for 
immediate and long-term development. As a result of this 
effort, one station was moved on Holladay Street at the re-
quest of the Lloyd Corporation, a major land owner, 
situating it adjacent to the site of a planned office tower. 
The result will be higher ridership on the system and new 
development integrated with the LRT. Further ac-
complishments of the TSAP effort are detailed in the 
following extract from its Final Report: 
The transit station area planning program (TSAP) was 
established to capitalize on the potential for development 
induced by the $225 million light rail project. Between Oc-
tober, 1980 and March, 1982 TSAP focused on the Ban-
field LRT Corridor to identify how the light rail line would 
affect the development, redevelopment, or conservation of 
neighborhoods along the route . The major results of TSAP 
can be summarized in three are : 
1. The public sector has defined its objectives for 
development around the stations, prepared plans con-
sistent with the market forecast , and is putting those 
plans in place. The major objective of TSAP, to ascer-
tain the development around the LRT stops, has been 
established, plans prepared, zoning codes modified, 
and all this is being put into place to guide develop-
ment. 
2. The development community is now generally op-
timistic about the development impact oflight rail. The 
Lloyd Corporation and the Gresham Boosters are two 
examples. As a direct outgrowth of TSAP, the Lloyd 
Corporation has taken a number of specific actions to 
capture the development opportunities they see in 
Light Rail. Lloyd Corporation's next major office 
building is planned to be adjacent to an LRT stop for 
which they successfully sought the relocation. Finally, 
they may invest up to $500,000 to create a strong con-
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nection between their retail mall and the Hollad y Park 
LRT stop. In Gresham, the Boo:,.t rs art'. ign ificantly in-
creasing their dues to hire a full-time manage r to imple-
ment the new Gresham Central A re Plan prepared as 
part of TSAP. 
3. Public sector investment decisions have been made to 
reinforce the LRT. The genesis of the decisions to seek 
State funding and install dry sewers with LRT construc-
tion, to locate a convention center at the Coliseum, to 
upgrade the level of improvements along the down-
town LRT alignment, and to create a private, non-profit 
development corporation to promote joint develop-
ment along the Banfield Corridor, all emanated from 
TSAP. 
City of Gresham 
The City of Gresham is taking advantage of the Banfield 
LRT to redevelop and reorient its downtown The 
Gresham stations provide some of the most dramatic 
opportunities outside the downtown core in Portland. 
Gresham has more vacant land in its core than the rest 
of the entire corridor combined, and importantly, the 
market to support its development. Gresham produced 
a new plan and development standards for its 600-acre 
corridor area as part of TSAP. 
The plan envisions an intensification of office and 
multiple family residential around the LRT stops, while 
reinforcing the city's historic retail core. With the pro-
cess of totally re-evaluating the central area completely, 
the Gresham Boosters are mobilizing to implement the 
plan. The Boosters have significantly increased their 
dues to hire a full-time manager to implement the new 
central area plan. Central arw developmeni wi ll be 
guided by new development standards and th~e new 
land-use categories developed in the TSAP pr ess to 
reinforce the link between LRT and the existing 
Gresham Corridor. 
Planning for transit station areas and Gresham's ur-
ban renewal program were integnncd in July. 1981. 
The City formed a redevelopmem mm ion a key 
implementation tool to guide the revitalization of 
Gresham's core . The Ren \\al Ag ·n y was subsequent-
ly referred to the voters and defeated . 
Multnomah County 
In east Multnomah County the majority of the develop-
ment around LRT stops will be medium-density 
residential. ln fact, market demand exists for 20% of all 
residential development t of the Willamette River in 
the county to occur in a fiv -minute walk of light rail. 
Through the TSAP pro . Multnomah County has 
taken a number of specific steps to guide development 
around the LRT stops on Burnside. The first step was to 
amend the County's Comprehensive Plan to raise the 
minimum for high-density residential development to 
20 units per acre instead of 8 per acre for some station 
areas. With interim controls in place, the County began 
the task of preparing new zoning and development 
standards for the areas around LRT stops. 
On Burnside Street light rail passes through low-
intensity suburban development. The challenge in 
creating a new zoning code was to guide development 
in such a way that it would create a "sense of place" at 
the LRT stops, and allow a scale and intensity of 
development that could be compatible with the ex-
isting single-family neighborhoods. The new zoning 
code and development standard are now being re-
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Banfield Light Rail line will have the greatest effect on development at the two ends of the line, in downtown Portland and the Lloyd Center 
and at its terminus in Gresham 
SOURCE: Economic Research Associates 
60 
viewed by County to their implementa-
ti on. 
The only major constraint to develop-
lack of sanitary of 1 982 the 
En1er.ger1cy Board appropriated $3 million to con-
struct dry sewers under Burnside Street at the same 
time that the light rail is constructed-a savings of over 
four to five million dollars from installing sewers after 
LRT is operating. Without TSAP, sewers would not 
have been provided with rail. The initial design 
work, identification benefits, and the forum 
affected pardes together emanated from 
City of Portland 
In the City of Portland TSAP planning efforts have 
focused on the areas where light rail will have the 
the three Holladay Street stations, 
Hnllv·wnrni and the downtown. 
Hollywood Development Program builds on the 
opportunities afforded by light rail and more than $2 
million in federal road funds that have been earmarked 
forthe district higher den-
sity development the ex-
isting business district and residential areas; and en-
courage new development to capitalize on the public 
investment in transit. The Portland Commis-
sion has endorsed the Hollywood Development Pro-
gram in and passed it on to the Portland 
Development for implementation. 
Along Holladay Street, TSAP staff have been working 
closely with the major landowner, the Lloyd Corpora-
tion, to simplify zoning along the LRT corridor. The 
outgrowth of this effort was the corridor 
to community/commercial, the 
supportive zoning classification. As a 
of this process, the Lloyd Corporation has a 
number of specific steps to capitalize on the develop-
ment opportunities they see in light rail. The Lloyd 
Corporation successfully the relocation of an 
LRT stop to 8th and Holladay The next group of 
Lloyd Corporation office buildings are now planned on 
Holladay Street adjacent to the relocated LRT stop-a 
shift from their historic orientation to Mulmomah 
Boulevard. the City of Portland and the Lloyd 
together to create a strong 
pedestrian connection Lloyd Center and 
Holladay Park station. To accomplish this objective, 
Lloyd Corporation may spend up to a half million 
dollars of their own money. 
In downtown Portland the light rail is to 
have significant development impacts, particularly 
along First A venue where it will enhance retail and of-
fice activity. Minor revisions to the Downtown Plan 
have been made to accommodate LRT. In downtown 
Portland, the major TSAP effort was the Downtown 
Pedestrian Streets Program. A joint decision by the City 
of Portland, Tri-Met and the downtown business com-
munity to provide Transit Mall level improvements 
along the LRT alignment in the downtown resulted. 
Sigriificantly, the local match for these improvements 
will be paid for by the business community through a 
local improvement district. 
Development Potential at Light Rail Stations 
The Banfield Light Rail Transit line will have a positive 
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effect on development. To understand the magni.tuc1e 
of new development Economic Re::;ea:rcn 
As:;oc1att~S (ERA) of San Francisco was retained to com-
detailed market forecasts for each of the 26 sta-
devel1001ne1nt potential 
three First 
in downtown Portland. The light rail 
~ Ul-;:>L>Vll, enhances the development 
this part of downtown Portland. Demand 
to 2.6 million feet of office space, 
hotel rooms, to 440,000 square 
space, and 550 to 700 residential units ad-
jacent three light rail stations. 
In east Mulmomah County ERA sees a 
force supporting an intensifica{ion of residential uses. 
The best potential for residential development along 
the Banfield LRT line is the Gresham central business 
district ERA forecasts 2,000 to 2,300 multi-family 
units could be constructed within the vicinity of the 
Gresham LRT stations. In addition, ERA sees ample 
market support in the Gresham central business 
district for a one-million-square-foot shopping center 
and 400,000 to 700,000 square feet of office space. 
Development Community Reaction to Light Rail 
Based on interviews with senior members of Portland's 
development community. ERA found that: 
• LRT is beginning to influence land investment and 
speculation decisions. Real estate brokers are advis-
ing their clients to purchase property along the Ban-
field line in anticipation of higher values. 
• Developers active in downtown Portland believe 
that LRT will enhance retail activity in the vicinity of 
the three First A venue stations. Many also saw that 
the rail system will strengthen the link between 
Center and downtown Portland. 
• Developers tended to agree that the Banfield line will 
have the most beneficial influence in the Gresham 
core. of vacant land and the ability to 
plan a new town center are often cited as reasons. 
• The Burnside stations were viewed as having 
primarily residential development potential with 
some convenience retail included. 
Urban Renewal and Land 
Exploration of other alternatives was conditioned by the 
unique context of Oregon to development leveraging by 
the public sector. Urban renewal districts have been fre-
quently used by Oregon local governments for managing 
and financing development. However, voters have in-
creasingly found them to be unacceptable instruments for 
tax increment financing. In several Portland suburbs they 
have generated substantial political conflict, leading in 
one case to the elimination of a city manager form of 
government and to continuing unrest in other localities. 
Voters in Gresham and Portland rejected the creation of 
Urban Renewal Agencies at the polls. This has left the 
non-profit corporation for negotiating cost sharing for 
development as the principal potential mechanism for 
guiding the development process. To this end, a non-
profit corporation has been created with responsibility 
for negotiating the development around some of the LRT 
stations. It does not have the authority to force land-use 
decisions, being limited to the potential established in ex-
isting land-use plans. Rather, it must act as a catalyst 
working with affected jurisdictions and potential 
developers to permit development potential to be 
realized. 
The Transit Mall and the 
Downtown Decision 
While the Downtown Plan clearly establishes an expecta-
tion of greater transit usage in lieu of continued reliance 
on the auto, the physical character of the CBD, the 
presence of the Transit Mall and the effect of the policies 
intended to promote transit in the downtown have all 
created a limiting factor in the type of transit that can be 
used. This limitation is both short-term and long-term in 
nature. In the immediate period after Mall completion, 
related transportation improvements had to compensate 
for its existence, i.e., "You can't tear up the Mall, we just 
finished building it!" Over the longer haul, the commit-
ment made to downtown and the future of the CBD 
became a major transportation "given." Both of these 
issues surfaced in the process of deciding on the 
downtown alignment. 
Under the initial leadership at CRAG, a study was per-
formed in 1971 to ascertain its feasibility . The Transit 
Mall was also considered in 1972 as part of the 
Downtown Plan. In 1975, responsibility for the develop-
ment of final plans and oversight of construction was 
given to Tri-Met under agreement with CRAG and the 
City of Portland. Design and construction proceeded dur-
ing the period 1975-1978 with the Mall becoming opera-
tional in 1978. Costing slightly more than $14 million 
and occupying an eleven-block length of two downtown 
streets (5th and 6th Avenues), the Mall was Tri-Met's first 
major transit improvement project. It also represented 
the city's major centerpiece in the revitalization of the 
downtown business core. 
From a transportation perspective, the Transit Mall was 
intended to improve downtown transit efficiency by 
creating an auto restricted zone dedicated primarily to 
transit use. This effort would increase the flow of buses 
through the downtown and provide greater commuter 
use of the system. The maximum bus capacity at the peak 
hour through the Mall is approximately 260 buses. For 
the Banfield corridor planners this became a major con-
straint in their analysis of alternatives. The busway alter-
native for the Banfield would have produced in excess of 
500 buses per peak hour in 1990. The increases would 
have required subversion of the Mall as the transit focal 
point in downtown. Moreover, the attractiveness of 
downtown would have been negatively impacted by 
greater bus noise and exhaust emissions. While the 
busway would have been effective as a major trip carrier 
for the corridor and as a collector in East County, it would 
have produced severe consequences for the CBD. Sup-
port for the busway began to wane when these impacts 
surfaced. 
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With the reinclusion of the LRT to Gresham in the 
planning process, an alternative to the busway's impact 
on the Mall was possible. The LRT, however, produced 
other consequences for the downtown which were 
almost as insurmountable. From a cost and minimal-
construction-impact perspective, an alignment for the 
LRT along the Transit Mall was undesirable. Tri-Met 
preferred a cross-Mall path to stay within its budget con-
straints . This also avoided major reconstruction of Mall 
streets for the trackage. Hence, they proposed an align-
ment along First Avenue coming into downtown with a 
crossing of the Mall along Morrison and Yamhill streets. 
This preference also eliminated the operational problem 
of running buses and the LRT along the Mall. With LRT 
running along the Mall and 80 percent of all transit ri.ders 
still on buses, there would have been substantial reduc-
tions in operational efficiency. 
For the Portland Planning Bureau, however, this align-
ment initially posed several major problems : 
• It would have conflicted with the downtown circula-
tion plan by placing heavier transit loadings on streets 
identified as local access and auto-oriented; 
• Transit access would not focus on the Mall as had been 
intended by its construction although Tri-Met main-
tained that 80 percent of transit ridership would still be 
carried by Mall buses; 
• Efforts at encouraging development would have been 
confounded by a transit alignment in a "temporary" 
location; 
• The cross-Mall alignment would have significant 
positive and negative impacts on the Yamhill Historic 
District; 
Transit Mall 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
• Future additions to the LRT system for the Sunset and 
Oregon City corridors would require an along-the-Mall 
alignment in the view of some politicians. 
The Bureau ultimately recommended a cross-Mall 
alignment after negotiation with Tri-Met. 
be along the Mall. The City Planning Bureau supported 
this approach. It was also supported by the bus iness 
community located along the Mall. Portland had agreed to 
the cross-Mall alignment during the planning process for 
the Mall, at a time when the future of the LRT alternative 
Downtown alignment decision was one of the most difficult. This view shows Light Rail on the Mall and on the Cross-Mall alignment. 
SOURCE: Zimmer · Gunsul · Frasca Partnership 
The conflict between these two options required 
almost a year to resolve and was complicated by the in-
volvement of the legislature and residual public 
dissatisfaction over the construction of the Transit Mall. 
The Portland delegation in the State legislature supported 
the cross-Mall concept to avoid tearing up the recent con-
struction. This political support, tied to the local match-
ing share in the legislative deliberations, may have 
ultimately resolved the issue in favor of the cross-Mall ap-
proach. However, local tensions between Tri-Met and the 
City over the alignment still persist. These stem from the 
problems created in the downtown during the construc-
tion phase of the Mall. Several major access and construc-
tion liabilities existed during this period. Tri-Met had not 
moved quickly and efficiently to resolve them. A City 
Council member had even urged Goldschimdt to use his 
influence to force Tri-Met to resolve these construction 
and maintenance problems and to shape up its approach 
to transit development. 
From a technical perspective a number of studies had 
been done which all indicated that the alignment should 
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was ambiguous at best. At the time the downtown LRT 
alignment actually came before the City in 1978, the City 
planning staff supported the along-the-Mall approach . In 
their view, the only obstacles were the additional cost, 
which the City would not have to bear directly, and the 
political opposition to tearing up the Mall, which would 
fall mostly on Tri-Met. 
The planning staff made a recommendation to the 
Council in support of LRT along the Mall. This recom-
mendation was forwarded to the Council and a first hear-
ing held. At that point, Council action came to a halt while 
the City and Tri-Met negotiated. Ernie Munch, formerly of 
the City Planning Bureau, maintains that once it appeared 
that the City was alone on the issue and that the 
legislature wanted the cross-Mall alignment, a com-
promise had to be reached. While exact clarification as to 
why the City relented was not discovered, it appears that 
the Mayor after having led the process through much of 
its history did not want the City to be the lone obstacle to 
the selection of a project. Hence, the Planning Bureau 
changed its recommendation and a carefully worded 
Light Rail alignment and station locations in downtown Portland 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
resolution was drafted that downplayed the cross-Mall 
alignment as a through corridor, accepting the Tri-Met 
proposal, and establishing a positon that the second cor-
ridor constructed as an LRT segment would lead to an 
along-the-Mall alignment. With this adopted, the cross-
Mall alignment was accepted as an interim measure for an 
overall LRT system configuration. 
During the local process of resolving the downtown 
alignment, UMTA had been an observer. From their 
perspective, the alignment in the downtown and its im-
pact on the Mall apparently were not critical issues. As 
Munch put it, so long as there was a good connection to 
the downtown (the LRT did not stop at Union Station at 
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the extreme north end of the CBD) they would be 
satisfied. There was, however, one aspect of the 
downtown alignment which did provoke federal in-:-
volvement-the potential impact on the Yamhill and 
Skidmore Old Town Historic Districts. 
Historic Districts 
To bring the LRT along First Avenue to connect with 
Yamhill and Morrison streets required traversing both 
downtown historic areas. While the tracks themselves 
will not create significant impact, the overhead electrifica-
tion would not ·conform to the character of the two 
districts. Moreover, the LRT would act as a "moving 
wall," effectively splitting the districts in half. The FEIS 
addressed this issue, noting that the area had previously 
been traversed by Portland's electric trolley system. Yet, 
mitigation of the overhead wires did require extra design 
effort and the "wall" problem required limitation on ser-
vice headways. Resolution of both problems needed the 
agreement of the Advisory Council on Historic Preserva-
tion. The Council, because of its veto power, was in a 
position to extract a large price from Tri-Met. Tri-Met 
built its case on a trade-off between these aesthetic in-
fringements and increased transit service impacts. It 
ultimately signed an agreement which limited service in 
the districts, creating a "political" capacity constraint. 
Also, since the LRT will disrupt auto traffic on First Street, 
the agreement provided an opportunity to close it and 
create a transit/pedestrian mall along the LRT pathway. 
The agreement further stipulated the provision of 
"Historic Trolley" service and appropriate street 
amenities consistent with the historic district character. 
By their existence, the two districts created a "no-win" 
choice of either tearing down the buildings or redesigning 
the street. 
Westside Corridor 
The Westside corridor runs from downtown Portland 
along US 26 through the city's southwest hills to Beaver-
ton and beyond. The corridor had been designated as a 
likely place for transit improvement in the Governor's 
Task Force Report and had been under active considera-
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Alignment of the proposed Westside Light Rail Project 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
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tion and analysis by CRAG/METRO during the assess-
ment of alternatives for the Banfield. While not directly 
part of the overall Banfield projecc, the W tstd till has 
impacted it. An original recipient of funds from the Mt. 
Hood withdrawal, the Westside had been a competing 
corridor for funding throughout the local decisionmaking 
process. The fact that funds were available, however, 
turned out to be fortuitous. As referenced above, the Full 
Funding Agreement for the Banfield ultimately hinged on 
an agreement to tap only Interstate transfer funds, 
reallocating $ 7 6 million in Westside funds to the Banfield 
funding package. Without fungibility in the regional 
allocation of Interstate withdrawal monies, this option 
would not have been possible. 
The second major linkage to the Westside grows out of 
its designation as another corridor for LRT use. The 
recommendation calls for LRT in the long run preceded 
by an interim, improved bus transit project. The latter has 
become necessary as a result of the Banfield funding ar-
rangement. While the Westside project was issued a Let-
ter of Intent for the replacement of funds for those 
switched to the Banfield, the Letter stipulates that the 
monies cannot be used for rail projects. Hence, in accep-
ting a way out of the Banfield financial problem, the 
region has linked itself into a Westside project, which, in 
the short run, may foreclose the LRT option. Resolving 
this conundrum hinges on either obtaining Congres-
sional and/ or Executive permission to fund a rail start or 
securing private-sector funding. Both options are being 
pursued actively by Tri-Met. 
WESTSIDE LIGHT RAIL 
Summary 
The broader context of transportation planning for the 
metropolitan area has been tied to the Banfield project. 
For the most part, this has shown up as a process 
of adaptation and adjustment in terms of integrating the 
LRT into the broader range of issues facing the region. It 
has, however, been a effect in that the Banfield 
has also established a set of parameters around 
which other improvements have been 
of transportation decision-
making which led to LRT has grown beyond the mat-
ter of a single project and reflects the broader concepts 
and problems of transportation investments facing an 
evolving metropolitan area. 
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Chapter 9 
Building the Banfield 
Track installation in Gresham 
SOl RCE: Tri-Met 
Building the Banfield project is proving to be no less complex than the decisionmaking process. Several 
factors have tended to add substantial frustration and . 
nme to the process. Principal among these intrusions 
have been the engineering design process (including 
preliminary engineering), the relationships with federal 
age ncies, the staging and character of the construction 
process, accommodation of scope adjustments (par-
ticularly in relation to local jurisdictions) and the rela-
tionship of ODOT and Tri-Met in the construction 
management process. 
Project Design 
Federal approval of the Banfield project took place prior 
to the initiation of final design. The Preliminary Engineer-
ing had been completed, but as noted below, was not suf-
ficiently detailed to permit a smooth start-up of final 
design. The principal benchmark for the scope of the 
project is the Full Funding Agreement which defines its 
major elements. Yet, the level of detail is such that some 
specific systems and many final design decisions re-
mained to be made . A reading of the Agreement indicates 
the basic configuration of the project, the location of its 
basic components and the base budget for the work to be 
completed. Moving from this point to construction has 
and is proving to be a time-consuming task made more 
difficult because of the working relationship between the 
two principal construction agenci , Tri-Met and ODOT. 
A cooperative agreement between these agencies spells 
out their respective construction and design tasks but 
does not deal with every element of the construction 
management process. Consequently, the coordination of 
their respective tasks has suffered and at least nine 
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months has already been added to the construction 
timetable. Resolution of these troubles is ongoing but 
time consuming, leading to strained relations between 
the agencies . 
Almost 90 percent of the final project scope was 
established in 1977 with the completion of Tri-Met's 
feasibility study of LRT. Further, refinement of this work 
was provided by the preliminary engineering process 
which was completed in December, 1980. In January, 
1980, however, a good deal remained to be done. The 
preliminary engineering had been plagued by both 
technical and administrative problems. The mere fact 
that it was done in two phases was sufficient to add some 
complexity. These difficulties were exacerbated by a 
forced wait of three months between phases produced by 
UMTA bid award requirements and funding restraints. 
The start-up/ shut-down process between the first and 
second phases also cost time and effort since the con-
sultants had to review much of the work done in the first 
phase. Further, as Don MacDonald argues, the UMTA in-
sistence that the alternatives analysis phase cover all alter-
natives considered for the corridor diluted the 
background work for the engineering effort. Consequent-
ly, in the view of some Tri-Met officials , the quality of the 
PE work was weaker than it might have been since the 
data on which it was based was not sufficiently deta iled. 
The first phase of PE was initiated injuly, 1978 by Par-
sons, Brinkerhoff, Quade and Douglas (PBQD) and 
culminated in August, 1979. Second phase PE, also per-
formed by PBQD, began in October, 1979 and ended in 
December, 1980. MacDonald estimated that out of the 
total 2 7 months in the PE process, at least nine of them 
were lost time. Partial responsibility for this time loss may 
be attributable to UMTA. PBQD also contributed, how-
ever, since it had successfully bid on three major rail proj-
ects simultaneously. This success taxed its staff 
capabilities. As a result, completely different group of 
engineers performed the second PE work. 
A further complicating factor was the requisite citizen 
consultation effort. For five months during the second 
phase of Tri-Met held a series of workshops with af-
fected neighborhoods to iron out project impacts and 
make adjustments in the final alignment and location of 
facilities. While no one at Tri-Met regrets the citizen ef-
fort-indeed they welcomed and encouraged it to 
mitigate citizen conflicts-the process did consume time 
and effort. A total of twenty-three neighborhood 
workshops were ultimately held, each producing 
greater citizen awareness of the project and identifying 
areas for potential design modification. 
In retrospect, the PE process was far more cumbersome 
and time consuming than it might have been. One ele-
ment of this problem was the federal approval process 
which added time and complexity to an already difficult 
two-phase process. Yet, it was not the specifics of the 
federal requirements that proved difficult so much as the 
simple fact that there was one more step in the review and 
approval process. Moreover, necessary citizen review 
added further hurdles to the effort. In this regard, 
however, the additional time seems worthwhile in terms 
ofless turbulence in the construction process. The City of 
Portland's foot dragging on the downtown alignment 
decision also added schedule and budget problems. 
While the PE was insufficient from a technical perspec-
tive, in the view of some Tri-Met officials, it did serve as a 
minimally adequate base to initiate final design. Mac-
Donald, however, would have pref erred a less complex, 
more advanced level of PE work 
Project Management 
The hybrid nature of the project has had significant im-
pacts on the management of its construction. Primary 
organizational responsibility is lodged with Tri-Met 
However, this responsibility is shared with ODOT in the 
context of highway reconstruction. Under a cooperative 
agreement signed between the two agencies and the Full 
Funding Agreement, ODOT has responsibility under 
sub-contract to Tri-Met for the design and construction of 
the following project elements: 
• Ramp access and main span modernization of the Steel 
Bridge across the Willamette River including elec-
trification and LRT traffic controls; 
• Holladay Street ramp to provide access to Sullivan's 
Gulch; 
• Relocation of the Banfield between 16th Avenue and 
87th Avenue including preparation of the LRT 
trackway grade; 
• The Gateway Station ramp to lift the LRT across the 
I-205 Freeway to the station; 
• An underpass at N.E. Glisan Street; 
• Grading, drainage, walls and noise barriers between 
Gateway and East Burnside Street. 
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Right-of-way acquisition is also being performed by 
ODOT. Title to property will be vested in ODOT during 
construction with the provision that all property directly 
connected with the LRT portion of the project will be 
transferred to Tri-Met at the initiation of operation. 
Tri-Met has responsibility for all other elements of the 
project's construction and operation. Contract pro-
cedures for the Tri-Met portion are UMTA's. For freeway 
work and all other responsibilities of ODOT, FHWA pro-
cedures are being followed. 
The parceling out of these responsibilities was based in 
part on historical reasons and partly on technical issues. 
The shared technical responsibility of the two agencies 
throughout the decisionmaking phase of the project 
established the groundwork for a similar sharing of 
responsibility during construction. Moreover, the 
agreements struck between Glennjackson, the respective 
governors and the local agencies also affected this 
organizational relationship. From a technical perspective, 
Tri-Met faced a significant effort in gearing up to construct 
the LRT element. ODOT's reputation as a successful 
highway construction agent made it a "natural" for the 
freeway portion. Hence, there seemed to be a clear split 
along modal lines. This relationship, however, has ranged 
from extreme cooperation to mutual antagonism over 
time, a less than perfect arrangement. 
The internal process of organizing for construction was 
different for both agencies. ODOT with its wealth of con-
struction experience simply fell back on past practice. 
The design work is being performed by ODOT engineers 
in Salem. Tri-Met on the other hand had to gear up from 
scratch. There were several options open to the organiza-
tion. It could have chosen to contract out the overall proj-
ect to an independent consultant, to ODOT, or manage 
its portion of the project in-house. It chose the latter for 
several reasons. 
Most important to Tri-Met was a need to carry through 
on its implicit commitment to organizational develop-
ment. After having asserted itself as a viable partner in the 
regional transportation program, it needed to further 
prove the agency's organizational capabilities through the 
successful construction of the LRT. By bringing the proj-
ect to completion on time and on budget, it would 
demonstrate its ability and put to rest any residual feel-
ings of inability on its part. 
Secondly, while the Full Funding Agreement had 
assured the availability of financing, the weakness of the 
PE effort, the uncertainties of construction costs and the 
need to curtail pressure for project add-ons posed real 
threats to the overall budget. To maintain control of costs 
and insure timely notice of possible financial problems, 
the agency chose to maintain direct control of construc-
tion. Even its sub-contracting relationship with ODOT 
was further sanctified in the Full Funding Agreement in 
the specification of their respective responsibilities. 
Third, Tri-Met staff had gone out of their way to involve 
the agency's Board in all project phases. In accepting the 
1990 Report and committing the organization to a more 
activist regional transportation role, the Board had gone 
out on limb. To Board and protect it from 
unanticipated problems, the management team felt it 
necessary to retain the power represented in direct 
management. 
Finally, the technical difficulty of constructing a major 
rail project was itself a sufficient challenge for the 
organizational staff. With the exception of Don Mac-
Donald and Paul none of the staff had participated in 
a construction project of this scope. The LRT thus provid-
ed substantial for professional experience 
and development. It also that when the system was 
finally operational, the would be intimately 
familiar with all of its components and better able to res-
pond to operating problems. 
This choice to manage in-house was not without some 
costs. In part it meant staffing up to provide requisite ex-
perience. The first major steps in this direction had 
already been made in the hiring of MacDonald and Bay. 
Yet, to some extent, Tri-Met did not start this recruitment 
early enough. In 1975 and 1976 the Portland area 
was almost unique in the contemplation of a new rail 
start. At that time professionals with rail experience were 
already limited in number. Yet, by 1980 the scarcity of 
talent was even greater. Coupled with the early (1976-80) 
emphasis of getting through the alternatives analysis 
phase, there was not sufficient attention given to the 
recruitment of qualified staff. Tri-Met was ultimately able 
to acquire needed personnel but marketplace delays in 
recruitment played a major role in the progress of design 
staffing and management. This meant less continuity of 
staff through PE and more effort in bringing people up to 
speed on the project. 
The second problem was one of timing. Staffing was 
proceeding simultaneously with the final decisionmaking 
process. Consequently, a good deal of executive time was 
diverted from construction management and recruitment 
to the final stages of project particularly during 
the period 1980-1982. troubleshooting federal 
procurement requirements during vehicle acquisition 
and design of the Ruby junction Maintenance Facility fur-
ther diluted top management time and effort. Procure-
ment continues to consume time and effort throughout 
construction due to the size of the project. Although Tri-
Met has authority from UMTA to let contracts than 
$1 million, few if any contracts are this small. Conse-
quently, the decision to retain management control has 
added substantially to the Tri-Met workload. 
Final Design 
LRT final design began with systems engineering in April, 
1981. This process lasted for approximately three 
months. Civil engineering was initiated in July, 1981 and 
was completed in early 1984. The consultant for final 
design is Bechtel. The engineering has been complicated 
by two separate problems, the Full Funding Agreement 
(FF A) and the weak PE. It has been enhanced, however, 
by the proven technology chosen for the LRT. Additional 
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complications also arose from federal requirements on 
the selection of the design consultant. 
The PE weaknesses required substantial remedial effort 
by Bechtel. Further, there has been substantial tension 
over portions of the project, most the CBD align-
ment in Portland. This postponed of the final 
design activity. Political wrangling Portland and 
Tri-Met arose over responsibility for the associated costs 
of construction (primarily street improvements), changes 
in planned routing at both ends of the line (the loop turn-
around in Portland and the Gresham terminus exten-
sion), local developer demands for the provision of 
historic trolley service in the Portland persistent 
demands for project add-ons eliminated earlier in the 
decision process for budgetary reasons and litigation over 
the issue of utility line relocations. 
Most importantly, final design was initiated during the 
negotiations for the Full Funding Agreement. This 
diverted substantial executive attention from oversight of 
the design process to the financing issue. MacDonald 
feels that over half of his time as project manager during 
the period of June, 1981 through March, 1982 was 
devoted to the FF A. Similar time demands were placed 
on Paul Bay and Bob Sandman, ODOT's project manager. 
On the other hand, project design has been facilitated 
by the choice of a proven rather than experimental 
technology for the project. Less prone to experimentation 
with unproven add-ons or uncertainties regarding start-
up, such a system is a known quantity to its designers and 
builders. The result is greater confidence in its ultimate 
operational success and installation. 
In sum, the FF A did not nail down the project 
sufficient definitive detaiL Consequently, major 
changes were initiated during the design phase producing 
a civil engineering process twice as costly as estimated in 
the PE. Principally responsible were underestimated 
costs and shifts in project scope. This added six to ten 
months to the civil engineering process, most notably on 
the downtown alignment and Burnside A venue. These 
difficulties were further exacerbated by local political 
demands and considerations. The bulk of these delays, 
however, were generated locally rather than by federal re-
quirements. Local officials believe that UMTA and 
FHW A were occasionally slow to respond where their in-
volvement was However, they also openly 
acknowledge the culpability for most design and 
construction delays. As one Tri-Met official put it, "It's 
easier to hit the bullseye if you draw the target after the ar-
row has hit." The and construction process might 
have proceeded more smoothly without federal involve-
ment but the multijurisdictional local context of the proj-
ect would probably have still created delays. For exam-
ple, Don MacDonald's experience with the Edmonton 
LRT indicates that construction of such a system pro-
ceeds more smoothly where the line is contained solely 
within a single city and local engineers are free to call their 
own shots. 
Vehicle Procurement 
Vehicle procurement actually initiated the construction 
phase of the LRT project. The first physical act of con-
struction was the initiation of the Ruby junction 
Maintenance Facility contract in April, 1982. However, 
Tri-Met had initiated procurement of the LRT cars 27 
months earlier to take advantage of potential cost savings 
and insure timely delivery of the vehicles. The timing 
issue was important since Tri-Met needed to prepare the 
maintenance facility for storing the first vehicles shipped 
and construct a test track for their acceptance testing. 
Under the existing contract, the first vehicle arrived in 
Portland in April, 1984, approximately eight months 
after the scheduled completion of the maintenance facili-
ty and the anticipated completion date of the first seg-
ment of track work. Tri-Met also needed the lead time to 
provide ample training opportunities for the train 
operators. The last vehicle is scheduled to arrive a few 
months before the opening of the system in 1986. 
Tri-Met chose to use a two-step procurement process 
for vehicle acquisition. The first phase of the process 
covered development of vehicle specifications by Tri-
Met, the solicitation of technical proposals from firms and 
Tri-Met Light Rail vehicle at the Ruby junction Maintenance Facility 
SOURCE Tri-Met 
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the subsequent screening of these proposals. The second 
phase involved the solicitation of bids from qualified 
firms , bid opening and contract award. The prequalifica-
tion of bidders through the solicitation of technical pro-
posals permitted Tri-Met to insure that the final propo als 
would adequately meet system requirements and 
simplify final selection. To facilitate the process, Tri-Met 
persuaded UMT A to allow a sole source consulting agree-
ment with Klauder and Associates for the development of 
vehicle specifications and screening of bidder technical 
proposals . While Tri-Met perceived that UMTA was not 
totally supportive of the extended procurement process 
and the sole source agreement with Klauder, they believe 
that the extra effort and time involved (approximately 
six-eight months over traditional single-step procure-
ment processes) was worth it. Indeed, the contract price 
of $775,521 is far below the original estimates of vehicle 
cost. 
The bid process was not without some problems, 
however. After opening the bid proposals, Tri-Met had 
120 days lO select th su c ssful bidder and award the 
contract. Since the total procurement exceeded its pro-
curement authority under the federal program, UMT A 
approval was required. This approval was not forthcom-
ing until the I 19th day after the bids were opened. Tri-
Met perceived that UMT A was dragging its feet on the 
award . Indeed this may be true since the negotiations on 
the Full Funding Agreement were proceeding at the same 
time and the federal agency may have been attempting to 
avoid biasing its final negotiations with Tri-Met over the 
agreement. However, another important issue may have 
been the "Buy America" provisions of the UMTA legisla-
tion. Under provisions then in effect, final bid awards 
went to American firms unless cost savings in excess of 
ten percent could be shown for awards to foreign bidders. 
The proces of making cost aving determinations was 
complex since portions of procurements and equipment 
could be determined to be foreign or domestic in nature. 
With only one domestic ~anufacturer of rail vehicles, 
there is substantial pressure on UMTA to insure that they 
get a fair opportunity to competitively bid. 
In the absence of UMTA's significant efforts in this 
regard, legal action can result with substantial cost and 
time implications for bid awards. Hence, UMTA seems to 
be cautious with such awards, perhaps overly so in the 
minds of some of its grantees. 
Construction Process 
The context of the construction management process for 
the Banfield is an important element in understanding its 
unique character. Most importantly, construction is the 
shared responsibility of Tri-Met and ODOT, organiza-
tions with significantly different construction experience. 
Secondly, the project crosses the boundaries of several 
jurisdictions, requiring individual permit reviews and ap-
provals. Third, the hybrid character of freeway and LRT 
construction has produced added complexity in the stag-
ing of construction contracts. Finally, building the LRT in 
the streets of an urbanized area has been very difficult. 
The FFA and cooperative agreements between Tri-Met 
and ODOT spell out their mutual relationship but not the 
operational character of contracts and bid awards. These 
have been established through design and administrative 
negotiation between local agencies and with federal agen-
cies. However, FHW A and UMT A have different con-
struction requirements reflecting their modal orientations 
and histories, and this has influenced local procedures. 
Tri-Met has not had the same relationship with UMTA 
and FHWA. 
In a broader context these differences in organizational 
relationships are a product of the history of highway and 
transit agencies. After years of building highways , ODOT 
and FHW A are well staffed with engineering talent. 
Moreover, the shared construction experience of the two 
agencies has led to a well developed modus operandi be-
tween them. UMTA and Tri-Met, however, have a com-
mon construction experience only with the Portland 
Tearing up Morrison Street in downtown Portland to make room for Light Rail 
SOURCE Tri-Met 
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Transit MalL Neither agency is particularly well staffi d 
with engineers, ahhough in Tri-Met's case this has 
changed as rhe agency has staffed up for the construction 
of the LRT. Consequently, the process of detailing and 
specifying construction activities has been more 
piecemeal and less holistic in context. In summary terms, 
FHW A and ODOT have more procedural detail. Conse-
quently, each step of the proc ss must be followed cor-
rectly. It takes more time but is also more certain. For 
UMTA and Tri-Met the process itself plus the construc-
tion contracting and procedures must be established. 
Hence, there is more flexibility but less certainty. 
Tri-Met's perception of this relationship is that UMTA 
has been slow on occasion with approvals but has not 
done anything to slow up construction progress. 
The relationship between ODOT and Tri-Met has not 
been smooth. Significant tensions have developed in the 
reciprocal responsibilities they have with each other. At 
times Tri-Met has been slow to produce data and design 
information necessary to ODOT's preparation of final 
design materials. In return, ODOT's management of its 
construction contracts has frustrated Tri-Met officials. 
Additionally, Tri-Met has been affected by other jurisdic-
tions' permit and approval processes differently. In the 
latter instance, construction of LRT trackage on Portland 
streets and the attendant impact on individual property 
owners has exposed the agency to significant time delays. 
Multnomah County, the City of Portland and Gresham, 
while not r · ponsible for any portion of construction, 
have the ability to influence its progress rhrough permits, 
plan approvals and land-use planning decisions. 
While each of these entities was party to the decision to 
build the LRT, none has been overly concerned with the 
expeditiousness of construction. They have no direct 
financial participation or commitment to the construc-
tion deadlines established by Tri-Met. Further, there is no 
external event, e.g., World's Fair, which provides an in-
ducement to their responsive participation. As a result, 
Tri-Met has had to work with each jurisdiction on a case-
by-case basis to overcome delays and lagging local ap-
provals . ODOT, on the other hand, has not had this local 
approval process to deal with since its construction proj-
ect is located almost entitely in an existing highway right-
of-way. Immune from local reviews, ODOT engineers 
have simply done design work in the Salem office at their 
own pace. This pace, however, has not always been at the 
same level of urgency felt by Tri-Met. 
Tri-Met's embarkation on the LRT project involves not 
only the success of an individual project but the entire 
image of the organization within the metropolitan region. 
It promises a more effective regional transit system, not 
just a smooth construction process. As a result, the 
organization feels not only the pressure of successful con-
struction management but also the public pressure to 
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Ruby junction Maintenance fa, rill w1i.L·1 11t1 rrucrron 
SOURCE: Tri-Met 
make good on its promises. ODOT, on the och r ha c.l. is 
comp! ·ting a project which is con b1 ent wnh l n nnal 
mis-LOn and past practice . Moreovc.r. che fr e\: ay widen-
ing nd other improvements will ·limina11; congt: uon 
and improve auto travel. Hence, ()OOT's har f 1he 
project will pro<lu ·L' immediate tangible r ul 
trast to LRT's r mi ·ed b n ·fi ts. 
Implementation of the 
Construction Process to Date 
The construction contracting pr ce -s has been complex 
be au 1,: of che hybrid chara tcr of the 'ntire project. 
Pha. ing of highway and LR work and the timing of in-
dh 1dual contracts have been com plex both from 
t bmcal and interorganiz tional p rsp lives . Tri-M ·[ 
h - been able to initiate con [ruction on the maintenance 
faci lity and Burnside trackage east of I-205. From I-205 
west, however, LRT construction work must await the 
complcnon of the highway portion f the projt' c. Th 
Portland CBD element of the LRT was held up by C(I l 
considerations and the negotiations between the City and 
Tri-Met over project scope and financial responsibility for 
related construction (str~et improvements and ap-
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purt nan e to the LRT) further, Tri-M ·t J [erred "< rk 
on the cl wntown ali m nc · - a h dg" .:igam: r c t 1nfL1-
uon. Bid awards for the outlying project work have been 
substantially below cost estimates. However, cost 
es timates for the CBD porti n of the \ rk h v s laced 
from $7 million !O $21 mill1 n. I -Mee i <lUCmp1ing to 
.av suffi i nt [u c.L- =>rn ~ rly c n • cts l cov r · sts 
downtown. 
utside of the relation hip between Tri-Met and 
ODOT there h· v bt:e.n fe major con truction is u · 
Rt h t-of-way acquisition anc.l utility r I c. Ii n cost have 
ha some impact on constru tion progr ss ut not to lh · 
point of major time delays In the case of the former, a -
quisition of permanent and remporary ' :::> ments long 
Burnside Street has proven cumber m . Initially, Tri-
Met wa-. ·low in identifyin nl'. <l pare 1 to be acquir ·d 
by OD T. FH\V ' nghr-of-way r gula tions required 
complete acquisitlon b ~fore construction work could 
begin . To facihwrc irnti tt on of construction on Burnside, 
re ponsibility for v rs • ing the right-of-way acquisition 
w administr.uivcly hifted to UMTA. despite in-
mplece a<- uis ition . Thi fa ilit.at d construction but 
created a l · "udy · pa<..kag than \vould be the c e 
under the more routinized FHWA proc 
Utility relocation has b · n a far more ignificant i _ ue, 
primarily from a co t perspective. Tri-Met could not get 
an accurate reading from UMT A concerning the eligibility 
of utility relocation costs. The basis for this seemed to be 
UMT A lack of familiarity with utility work and absence of 
detailed regulations on such matters. Hence, Tri-Met had 
to negotiate with UMTA over the matter. Ultimately, Tri-
Met, to minimize project costs, attempted to force utility 
agencies to relocate their lines and pay the associated 
costs. The utilities challenged this in court which ruled in 
favor of Tri-Met. 
Typically, Davis-Bacon labor provisions have been a 
major issue for construction projects funded with federal 
funds. As yet, these issues have not affected either the 
highway or LRT construction efforts. One of the highway 
contractors is using non-union labor and has been 
picketed by the unions. This has not, however, led to any 
formal Davis-Bacon or Fair Labor Standards actions. 
Since the highway widening and straightening involves 
modifications to an existing freeway, there have been ma-
jor dislocations of current traffic flows. The Banfield 
Freeway experienced three total closures during con-
struction for bridge demolition and intermittent lane 
closures for portions of the construction process. During 
the construction period, it is estimated that approximate-
ly 20,000 autos will be diverted daily from the Banfield to 
alternative routes, primarily city streets. In addition, the 
reconstruction of several freeway overpasses and on/ off 
ramps will produce substantial changes in travel patterns 
and additional congestion at these points. 
Preparation for LRT 
Operations 
Completion of the Ruby Junction Maintenance Facility 
permitted Tri-Met to begin preparation for operation of 
the LRT. Tri-Met has begun the staff gear-up and pro-
cedures for LRT operations. Driver training is in the initial 
stages of development as are maintenance procedures 
and programs. Certification and Acceptance procedures 
for LRT cars and related equipment have recently been 
developed. The first cars were shipped to the US DOT 
Pueblo, Colorado test track for "bum-in," with subse-
quent testing in Portland. Tri-Met completed its opera-
tions planning in mid-1984 to permit full scale develop-
ment of its operations system late in the same year. 
Summary 
The construction process for the LRT has been marred 
more by the relationships between local agencies than by 
overt failures or intrusions by UMTA or FHW A. Local in-
ability to develop a smooth working relationship over 
governmental permits and approvals has troubled but 
not overly delayed construction progress. Phasing of LRT 
and highway construction has added an additional six 
months to the construction period. The hybrid character 
of the overall project has made the construction process 
more difficult but primarily because of local in-
terorganizational and intergovernmental relationships 
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rather than significant technical difficulties. Where 
technical difficulties have arisen, they have been the 
product of weak preliminary engineering and local 
political pressures for scope modifications rather than 
federal efforts to regulate the construction process. 
Chapter 10 
Findings and Conclusions 
DOWNTOWN TRANSITWAYS 
petail o_f Light Rail improvements in the downtown along Yamhill Street and at the Skidmore Fountain in Old Town 
SOURCE: Zimmer · Gunsul · Frasca Partnership 
The Banfield Decision Process 
The decision to build LRT in the Banfield corridor was more than just a matter of choosing between alter-
native projects. It represented the culmination of other 
forces and issues affecting transportation throughout the 
metropolitan area. Specifically, the Banfield decision was 
affected by the following: 
• A major reshaping of the metropolitan area in terms of 
land-use, business and lifestyle considerations; 
• The choice of transit as a tool for shaping the 
metropolitan area; 
• A major structural and political change in the 
metropolitan decisionmaking process for transporta-
tion investments; 
• The exploitation and use of a new funding approach to 
transportation financing; 
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• The building of a new political consensus among 
multiple governmental jurisdictions; 
• The incremental evolution of federal, state and local 
policy objectives; 
• The organizational development of major transporta-
tion agencies ; 
• The fundamental politics of public works programs; 
• The unique role of critical individuals; 
• Fortuitous events. 
The Revolution in Metropolitan 
Transportation Philosophy 
From its outset the process of developing a transportation 
project for the Banfield corridor was linked to a "revolu-
tionary" restructuring of transportation planning in the 
Portland metropolitan area. The withdrawal of the Mt. 
Hood Freeway established the financial and analytical 
options but w nly ympl mati · of th und dying 
problems facing the region. The political legacy of this 
withdra\l.tal lingers since many of the freeway's sup-
port r re on ly grud mg proponents of the LRT. Unless 
the LRT noticeably succeeds in accomplishing its objec-
tives, the commitment to the transit ystem could crum-
ble. 
By developing transit options fo r Portland, Gold-
schmidt provided a direction for the rethinking of the 
transportation planning and decisionmaking process. 
Given the lack of particular project-level objectives, his 
effort opened the door for the ensuing process . \Vi 1hout 
the pre ~ure to provide an alternative project t rh Mt 
Hood to insure the capture of federal monies, lhe subse-
quent .events may not have occurred in the same wa 
Facilitated by the absence of commitments to competing 
project objectives, decisionmakin v framed ar und 
options. As alternatives emerged rh p rri ipan v.ere in 
a position of opportunity rather than opposition. 
Financial flexibility minimized costs to the r pective 
jurisdictions. Hence, the only potential loser w re the 
prior supporters of the Mt. Hood. They, howcv r, were 
politically hamstrung by public opposition to the 
freeway. This public opposition may not hav be >n 
universal or well informed, but it serv ' d the intercsl of 
the proponents of transportation alternatives Jn the 
vacuum created by the withdrawal, n "W directions re 
po_ ible ch t might not h v be ·n [, ible at Jny oth ' r 
time Thac ch y cam· t pas w a product of leader ~hip 
provided by a number of individuals , poli ll -~, 1 
pragmatism and a willingness to explore opportunities. 
Yet, it is also clear th L while many individuals con-
tri but d no on had a grand game plan which led the pro-
cc -s from stare to finish . Instead, a slow aggr · · tion of 
supp rt and onsensus-building produced n outcome 
not a fore ne conclusion. This outcome, how ver, was 
not without significant ri k · 1ciated with untried pro-
cedures and programs. 
ImplJCitly, the federal grant process provid » a lntcture 
for gran tee development and choice of alternatives . Yet, it 
is usually imposed on a situation of drawn local battle 
lines or predetennin • h i · ·· Put another way, by the 
time a metropolitan ar a · read y to proceed through the 
alternatives anal si::- pro ~ for either FHW A or UMTA, 
its project obje ri c ma ady be well established. 
The Portland ca e ' ,, uniqLU: not in the fact that its 
political and technical repn: •n Liv _ were any better 
than other urban areas, but that they were able to enter 
the federal process prior to a project commitment, make 
use of it for the purpose of identifyin a workable ap-
proach, develop the nee ary decisionmaking consen-
sus, modify it where nece sa ry and consequently develop 
a workable answer. While the resulting project may not 
have met all of the technical tests applied by the federal 
agt.:ncies or fully conformed to the letter and spirit of their 
regulations, it does represent a commitment re. ·h d 
through rather than prior to the federal process . 
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Organizational Change and the 
Political/Technical Linkage 
Clear! , che i megration of the technical and political pro-
cess underlying the Banfield decision affected the final 
product. It may not have been fully justifiable from either 
persp tiv · but it \ as a c ptable and understood by the 
institutional participan s Mor er. ch ci1 invested in 
building and maintaining this linkage resulted in a far 
more important outcome, an enduring base of support for 
the project. The technicians and administrative staff were 
as adroit politically as the politicians were t chnically. 
There were few surprises to create public embarra ~ment 
or frustration. This technical/political linkag lso 
created a workable m ns for problem solving. This has 
extended to other transportation projects in the region, 
most notably the W es ts ide corridor. 
From an institutional p rspective, the Banfield has con-
tributed to the developm nt and enhancement of two of 
the region's major orgamzations, Tri-Met and METRO. In 
the latter cas , th •ff of the Governor's Ta k Force 
contributed more than a justification for transll h y im-
proved the regional forum for making the nee ary d d -
sions. METRO has not led the process. Without the 
regional forum it provided, however, a far more cumber-
some and complex pproach to local detisionmakin 
would have been ne e. ry . Used or abused by che par-
ticipants , the MP has become a common mcettng 
ground for the resolution of policy and pr; gram di f-
ferences . Without it, and its technical capabilicy , that 
sufficient justification to question whether lh · pr · 
would have ~ und th t! n c ry m hani ms for in-
teg ting the dive e JLinsd1cuonal int rest 
For Tri-Met, the result has been its emergence as the 
transit advocate for the region. Its participation as a 
ive bs rv r in th· ·a l pha.s of th , l nning pro-
cc m y not h e serv r nsit interes ts \.\ell But, as 
Gerry Drummond, Tri-Met's Bo;.Jrd Chairman has 
observed, now that the commitment to transit is 
established, a major project is underway and the original 
political 1 der hip ha~ di p ·rs ·d, Tri-Met is in the posi-
tion of being ch · nll'tro hcan I der in the transportation 
development pro s . The building of the administrative 
capacity of the organization, the rethinking of its 
organizational m · ·sicm and the upgrading of its public 
image have mad· che ag ·ncy a recognized national leader 
in the transit industry. It has c m long way fr m b ing 
"unable to site a bus shelter. " 
Organizational change also produced a greater state role 
in metropolitan transportation issues . ODOT is still a 
traditional state highwa ' ency in some respects, but its 
involvement in the t an portation planning procc for 
Portland affected its evolution toward a broader transpor-
tation philosophy. This has not resolved all of the ten-
sions between Tri-Met as a metropolitan transit agency 
and ODOT as a statewide transportation agency but 
l < rly it has tempered and hastened the recognition that 
the two agencies share a future of common interest. 
ODOT's creation of a metropolitan division facilitated the 
technical and political link:iges and supports the concept 
of joint problem solving. Additionally, three governors 
have played an important mediator/facilitator role in 
aiding the metropolitan area through technical support 
and financial assistance. A deeply-seated, ant:ag()m~mc 
relationship between ODOT and Tri-Met 
prevented this cooperation from achieving the 
fectivencss that it has attained. 
The Absence of a Single Dominant 
Political Leader 
The absence of a dominant, charismatic political leader 
throughout the decisionmaking process have 
facilitated the ultimate decision. Goldschmidt a 
central role early on in setting the stage for the process to 
unfold, but he alone did not drive the process. He was 
supported and/ or complemented by Glenn Jackson, 
Gerry Drummond, Mel Gordon and Don Clark. Each in-
dividual facilitated the development of the local political 
consensus but for different reasons and at different times. 
The respective governors provided critical state support 
but did not lead the process. The absence of a single 
leader was feasible because the individuals involved 
respected each other and recognized the need to 
cooperate. Further, there was a mutual interest, for either 
pragmatic or philosphical reasons, in seeing the process 
move forward productively. Because of the involvement 
of all these individuals, the project not identified 
solely with any one interest or It truly 
became a regional project, reasons not 
always linked to the specifics of the Banfield, because of 
the Interstate funding process. Moreover, it is ques-
tionable whether any one individual could have main-
tained leadership of the process over its ten-year span. 
Delays in Decisionmaking 
Although the metropolitan area developed a final com-
mitment to the Banfield project through a relatively open, 
cooperative process, there were two decisions which pro-
duced substantial tension: the commitment to proceed 
with the I-205 construction and the downtown align-
ment. The I-205 decision grew out of the need to obtain 
Glenn for the Mt Hood withdrawal. 
This support was not without its costs, however. The 
County's insistence on the LRT option and ODOT's com-
mitment to freeway improvements meant that these alter-
natives took on an independent existence and could not 
be ruled out simply for technical reasons. The need to 
constantly work with these commitments added time to 
the process. 
The downtown alignment decision also added time to 
the decision process. The protection of the Transit Mall's 
operating efficiency and Portland's commitment to the 
preservation of downtown both became obstacles to a 
smooth technical process. While these concerns grew out 
of a commitment to transit, they also took on the 
character of analytical limitations to the evaluation of 
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alternatives. More importantly, the alignment decision 
rose to a level of political concern which involved the 
state of the conflict was critically 
important to the ultimate success of the project and the 
maintenance of the local political consensus. 
There were other less troublesome local decisions. but 
the maintenance of the local consensus became a para-
mount goal. The resolution of "squeak points" was possi-
ble because of the commonly felt need to get some project 
agreed to, the commitment to tap the Interstate transfer 
monies and the flexibility of the funding scheme. The 
recognition that all of the participating jurisdictions 
would stand to lose funds for their local high way and 
transit projects without agreement to a Banfield project 
was a potent glue. The absence of a prior commitment on 
the part of all but Multnomah County facilitated and 
hindered the process throughout its course. Without 
deeply seated commitments to contending projects, the 
participants could work constructively toward a project 
ultimately acceptable to all involved. Yet, the absence of a 
preferred project until relatively late in the process also 
meant that the participants were generally working 
toward an ambiguously specified goal. Such efforts take 
time beyond the federal process for obtaining financial 
assistance. Hence, in retrospect, it could be observed that 
the Banfield process took surprisingly less time than 
might be expected. The saving factor may have been the 
fortuitous simultaneity of both local and federal delays. 
The Federal Role in Decisionmaking Delays 
Discussions concerning the appropriateness of federal re-
quirements implicitly assume that they alone are 
sible for delays in the implementation of federal 1-'"·"r.'"''·'-' 
through intergovernmental mechanisms, i.e., "u'"''"'ru1-
aid. Explicitly, the case is made that federal 
are an undue intrusion and add unne1ces,::imrr ccJm.nll:x11:v 
to the transportation de,:1s1lonm;,:tk110.g iPff1Cc·s.s 
state decisionmakers. The Reagan 
made sustained effort to minimize if not eliminate 
federal regulations wherever possible to reduce this 
burden. The Administration's long-term goal is to return 
domestic policy and financial responsibility to the states 
and, concomitantly, to local governments. In those in-
stances where a complete devolution is accomplished, 
the burden of federal regµlations may become a moot 
issue. Such a complete devolution has not yet taken 
Although a realignment and a new 
,n;u>rllr".lu federal regulations 
continue to persist in a form. Hence, the 
problem of regulation must be approached on two levels: 
1) in what areas should the federal government continue 
to regulate and to what end, and 2) what improvements 
can be made in the federal regulatory approach which can 
fine tune the administrative process, thus alleviating un-
necessary paperwork and expediting decisionmaking. 
Ultimately, the answers to both questions rests on fun-
damental public accountability. In any intergovernmen-
tal context, there are by definition multiple public ac-
countabilities for all governmental participants. It is this 
much as the specifics of the relationship that 
gives rise to the majority of problems surfacing in such a 
relationship. 
None of our respondents questioned the need for 
federal regulations. The basis and the need for 
regulations was understood and recognized as the federal 
government's legitimate effort to ensure accountability 
for the expenditure of federal funds. Moreover, as long as 
the specifics of the federal requirements are known in ad-
vance and, hence, are predictable, they can be planned for 
and dealt with more or less expeditiously. Thus, there is 
no inherent delay attributable to federal requirements 
beyond those established by prior design. Known time 
delays and procedural requirements can be accom-
modated. 
Regulatory requirements become troublesome, 
however, for three principal reasons: 
• Critical time problems inherent in an individual 
project~ 
• When they contravene the substantive interests and 
program objectives of an individual or multiple par-
ticipants; 
• When they are perceived as time consuming toward 
no ascertainable payoff or benefit to the regulated or 
regulator. 
The regulated party may not always clearly articulate its 
objection to regulation on any of these grounds. Indeed, it 
may confuse them, complain vociferously on one ground 
for the purpose of circumventing a requirement founded 
in one of the other two or may be engaging in an activity 
which simply falls between the cracks of existent regula-
tions. Particularly in the latter situation, new and different 
projects and processes raise issues and problems which 
confound the intent or prior knowledge of even the 
wisest of regulation drafters. The problem of regulation is 
not just simply a matter of an undesirable regulation.just 
as importantly, the perceptual and practical context of a 
regulation's application determines its acceptability to af-
fected parties. 
Federal "Footdragging" 
In the Banfield case, the major local problem with federal 
regulations was more in application than content. Most of 
our respondents felt that there was far too much un-
predictability in the application of regulations and 
technical requirements. We found a consistent percep-
tion that US DOT staff used technical requirements and 
extended review periods to avoid making timely deci-
sions or to stave off approvals. It was felt that the basis for 
this action stemmed from the political pressure under 
which both US DOT as a whole and UMT A in particular 
functioned in terms of available financing. In the early 
'70s UMTA had sufficient funds available to meet de-
mand. However, as the decade drew to a close the de-
mand grew, outstripping UMTA's ability to provide 
funds. In the absence of a clearly articulated set of war-
rants to determine which projects should be funded, 
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UMTA from an outsider's perspective, to have 
of deferring decisions and approvals as 
a means ~~ .. ~ .. ~ .. ''""the demand and supply relation-
ship of available 
The validity of this perception seems sound. Yet, we do 
not have the information here to verify it. Moreover, in 
the absence of interviews with federal staff and political· 
officials, we are not able to explain other, below the sur-
face, factors. It is, however, a widely held piece of "con-
ventional wisdom" with local officials and cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. 
The UMTA/FHWA Administrative Role 
The of the Banfield funding process and the 
nature the project left it between the cracks of two 
federal funding programs. Both UMTA and FHW A had a 
project to deal with that did not fit their funding 
guidelines directly. Consequently, they often had to 
redesign or custom fit federal regulations to the condi-
tions presented by the Portland approach. 
The process of decisionmaking consumes time. During 
the time involved administrative agencies, policies, 
regulations and people change. These changes not only 
make it difficult to plan strategies for dealing with federal 
requirements but often appear at critical junctures in the 
process or create sometimes incomprehensible 
Catch-22's. 
It is difficult without direct federal input to classify the 
ensuing federal-local relationship as conflictual. The set-
ting described above readily lends itself to this perception 
on the part of local decisionmakers. The initial phases of 
the federal review process, up to the point of project ap-
proval, were perceived by local people as conflict laden. 
Some of this is attributable to the "different" approach 
taken by local agencies in the alternatives analysis pro-
cess and to the overall project. As noted earlier, Portland 
was doing something unique. Another causal factor was 
the fact that the project fell between two federal agencies 
which were being forced to integrate their diverse 
regulatory requirements by a grantee which refused to 
take "No" for an answer. The local perspective, despite 
these qualifying factors, is that federal officials were not 
always the most supportive or willing partners in the pro-
cess. 
This was even more important after the project was ap-
proved by US DOT. The perception of non-cooperation 
has carried over to the funding and construction aspects 
of the project. Changing federal policies have affected 
relations with local officials, which may have slowed 
progr~ss. 
Specific Regulatory Impacts 
Perceived federal "footdragging" produced problems in 
other phases of the project. Tri-Met experienced con-
siderable gaps in consultant design and assistance direct-
ly as a result of tardy federal approval of consultant selec-
tion. Gaps occurred between the two segments of 
Preliminary Engineering and between Preliminary 
Engineering and Final Engineering because of delays in 
federal approvals. According to Don MacDonald, Tri-Met 
was effectively without consultants for one-third of the 
PE effort and for one year between PE and FE because of 
stanup mobilization and lack of federal approval. This 
produced a lack of continuity and a weaker design effort. 
More specific problems with federal regulations sur-
faced in the alternatives analysis and procurement 
aspects of the project. On the alternatives analysis side, 
the federal requirement to treat all projects equally 
diluted the final alternatives from a local perspective. 
Although the requirement to examine a range of alter-
natives was not perceived as unreasonable, there was an 
expressed preference for eliminating some alternatives as 
the technical analysis demonstrated their unsuitability. 
Carrying all alternatives through to the completion of the 
analysis diluted the energy aimed at the most promising 
options. For the preferred alternative in the Banfield cor-
ridor this produced an approximation of project costs 
and consequences. In retrospect, a level of analysis com-
parable to preliminary engineering on two or three alter-
natives may have produced a better technical choice. 
The Buy American requirements, while not con-
tributing to a concrete delay, did draw out the procure-
ment process to the last day of the bid award procedure in 
two cases and close to the expiration date in another. The 
vehicle bid was awarded on the I 19th day, as was the rail 
contract. The track material contract was awarded on the 
75th day. It is principally in relative comparison that 
these bid awards appear delaying. Where American 
materials were procured, bid awards were made more 
quickly. For example, the rail tie contract was awarded in 
eight days and the maintenance facility contract in three 
days. 
Implications 
Transportation Planning and Intergovernmental Decision-
making Projects on the scale of the Banfield require flexibility 
in order to anive at an effective decisionmaking process and 
project selection. Flexibility, however, is often difficult to 
achieve in a consnuctive fashion for projects of this 
magnitude because of the consequences. Major rail and 
highway projects inevitably seem to pose problems arising 
from unique on-site conditions, changing context and 
potential opportunities. When flexibility was attained in the 
Banfield case, it often had to be forced, in the perception of 
local officials, on the federal government. Portland officials 
confronted this problem on several levels, including policy 
and regulatory requirements and federal procedures. In each 
instance, considerable local political and technical effort was 
necessary to establish a means for what Portland wanted 
within the federal process. The "rightness" of this local effort 
notwithstanding, this meant custom tailoring federal re-
quirements to a local case. The degree to which this is possi-
ble for the federal government is problematic. It raises 
substantial issues with consequences both for the account-
ability to federal policy standards and in terms of other 
potential grantees which might lay claim to similar treatment 
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based on precedent. Hence, federal efforts to accommodate 
flexibility are not taken lightly or without justifiable concern 
in terms of their impacts, despite the intrinsic correctness 
and desirability of their substance. 
In the spirit of cooperation and intergovernmental part-
nership, the federal government should make every effort to. 
accommodate local initiatives. Yet, while local officials 
believe that their proposals merit such attention, it is just as 
important to recognize that they may be pushing their 
federal counterparts to the limit of discretionary authority or 
exposing them to policy consequences which may prove 
counterproductive from a national perspective. Couple this 
with local efforts to change federal policy requirements 
where they do not mesh with local preferences, and a situa-
tion is created which goes beyond a mere matter of 
regulatory descretion and flexibility. The extent to which 
such issues can be incorporated within the policy and 
regulatory requirements of all parties involved in such rela-
tionships is a difficult problem to resolve. Further, the pro-
cess of intergovernmental cooperation and joint problem 
solving is more than a simple regulatory process, a factor 
which may not be adequately addressed by federal, state or 
local requirements or the actors involved. 
The Project Focus of Transportation Planning 
Illustrative of this problem of intergovernmental cooperation 
are the federal planning requirements. While couched in 
terms of a continuous comprehensive and coordinated pro-
cess covering three distinct time frames (TSM, Five-Year 
TIPS and long-range plans), they really emphasize a project 
focus. Hence, if a merropolitan area has established a work-
ing consensus and process for local decisionmaking which 
produces the products expected by federal agencies, there is 
a substantial likelihood that a cooperative relationship will 
exist. This underlying consensus, however, may only be 
"skin deep," developed solely to take advantage of federal 
funding and without significant commitments to a long-
term working relationship focused on mutually acceptable 
goals. Moreover, in situations where contending local fac-
tions refuse to accept the outcome of the planning process 
there is considerable room for confounding the outcome 
through political action and end runs around it. The 
Portland case illustrates another dilemma for federal process 
expectations in its novelty. Without a project or product 
focus, it is difficult for federal agencies to work with 
merropolitan areas involved in a major reorientation of 
policy goals and decisionmaking processes. There is simply 
very little of a tangible character for the federal agencies to 
grab onto and assess. This makes it difficult to ascertain what 
cooperation should focus on. For federal agents wishing to 
avoid being embroiled in local political decisions, the easiest 
answer is to wait and see what emerges. From a local 
perspective, dragging the federal actors into the process may 
be done in the name of cooperation but without recognition 
that these agents lack the ability to resolve local conflict or 
wish to avoid the often zero-sum character oflocal decision-
making. just as likely, the federal government makes a good 
"boogeyman" for explaining the need to make local deci-
sions in a particular manner. 
The Value of "Bio k Grant' Aexibilicy 
Ultimately, the our omi.: of the fi der.U-local relationship in 
the Banfield p r ess in "fuv rable" fu.sh1on may be at-
tributable to th withdrawal proo and th finan ing op-
tions it provid - D pit some ~ deraJ dlSSaasfa aons \ ·th 
the project, it is still an invesnnent in transit and highw y 
impro emenl<; which is the fundamental raison d'etre of the 
program. The funds might have been "better" m ted 
elsewhere but in the ab nee o[ detailed national meria for 
invesnnent this judgment is difficult to make. What 15 more 
readily apparent is that the project will enhance transit and 
auto transportation in Portland, an outcome consistent with 
fed ral obj liv . The value of th Int rstate withdrawal 
pro s 15, hen e, nor olely in more effectively achieving 
federal g als but more imponanr..Iy in th fushion lhal it 
nhanced l~-tl abiliti lO n~ach locally a ceprable d ru1ons 
Unlik traditional tegoncal grants for highway r mas 
rran It proj ts, the wnhdrawal fund we • d fi r a wid 
vanec.y of projects, pamcul.arly afcer the pas ge or rh 
deraJ Highway Act f 1976 ThtS fungib1hry w critically 
important at two points of the process. Tc laid n important 
groundwork for an effective local pohnc.al co nsus not 
only for the Banfield but for metropolit rra portation im-
provements n<l goals Sec ndly, the flexibihry of th monies 
provided th re n with Lhe abiliry to respond e.IJi ctively to 
the Adm m· traa n' d ·~ to avoid new rail starts by in-
ternally reall tin funds to construct the project solely 
\vi.th Int tar mom . either of th t: lts achie ·d 
\\lithout co rs_ Ye th Qexibiliry of the process c n ry to 
traditi nal cat rical funding procedures provid xi prions 
an fore d local rethinking of prionn - wuh ut xcending 
th de · i nm kjn , ad infinitum Th value this 
me han · m l nds beyond this local/federal flexibility in 
finan ing how v r. It d m n cr.i . d pite th fi d ral-local 
c nfl1 ·r which ve nse l !.he ne ·d for ekin new alter-
nativ -. i.h a il1ry of a I ·- r -mcov funding f, rmat co pro-
mote rcauv problem solving and mesh di parate policy 
objecri lt · th · kind of outcome to be hoped for within a 
broadly lru d r fed ra1 \ ir.hin which local 
de 1 nmakers mu t opera1 
ment of local goals. 
Lessons for Transportation and Intergovern-
mental Relations 
During a period of rethinking of federal-local-state relation-
ship - in trans rtati n, th Banfield ca.s provides some 
u ful insighl.S to th dire ti n c11 pro · ~ should take. 
O early a1J parti would be se d by the de el pment of 
relationship which minimized the succ o otdraggmg 
and stonewalling a means to attam c bJ rives. Moreover, a 
mutual re ogn1tion of limits both in rerrns of substantive 
transpon:au n ob e rives and in lt:rms of endrunning th 
relationship is needed. W here the Banfield proc was 
most effective was: in terms of each side making its objec-
tives known clearly; the dev ·lopment of an effective consen-
sus concerning this objectiv n each side; and the develop-
ment of communications and a problem-solving approach 
exploring options within established frameworks rather 
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than diverting energt L changin the rul r ouwaidng 
the other side ln the absen e of a definid e set of ed ral 
decision criteria and locally d ri "d pri rities, this may be 
the most desirable outcome. 
The pseudo-block grant mechanism developed through 
the Interstate withdrawal program puts a premium on 
several attitudinal and programmatic approaches to 
transportation de i.sionmaking in an inte vemmental 
system. First, it requires a broad frame of reference within 
which the respective federal, r.ate and local agencies must 
mutually establish and share their objectives , nd goals. It 
minimizes the need to examine in miniscule detail each ac-
tion by the r pectiv p ni , relying instead on a commit-
ment t a constructive process of murual agre m nt and 
problem solving. By tablishing br ad param ters fi r p-
tional c urses of a<.:aon. it allows th ·cnvc pani 1pams 
to adj 1 to the realides of giv n siruations nd n g a.ate 
workable solutions le forces rec gnia no indiV1dual poltcy 
and program limir.a11 rtS w1t.h uc mt l) ong or forang a -
commodation to the programmaa and regulat ry re-
quirements of another entity. Withm the financial resour 
available, this approach permits xploration of attainable 
op tions without precluding opportunities and innovation. 
Achtevement of th nds, how ~er, requi that the 
respective parties adopt an attitude of good faith. re ognize 
as legitimate the policy mandate and regulatory re-
quirements of each other and establish a pro - f com-
muni ti n whi h prom tes leamm and un<l rscandin 
rather than sunply an x han e of paperwork nd ph n 
cal.ls th experience ' ith block ams pnor t th Reagan 
Admimsrration h sh wn. ther hav b · ·n snuao rtS 
where lo n L have exploited the flexibility for narrow 
f-incc r and fed ·ral efforts t "recate nze" re-
quin.:m 'n 10 eith r protect accoumabilny or m t th b-
j ccion f inter IS outside the process. H nc . mm a 
transportation perspective, an effccavc framework of m-
u.:rgo mm ntal d isionmaking r qui m re than regul.<: -
tions and guid ·Un . It requires ignificant commitment to 
effe av pro lcm - lvmg n mutual · pect. 
Too much co peration, how"\'er. Iso po a dan <.: r to 
effective decisionmaking. The political/technical marriage of 
the Banfield pr es p roduced a project which met short-
term political tests (!nd technical pro edur . The techni-
cians and polio lan h nestly and sincerely b lieve that the 
project will work. lS o-t effective and will be the c nr rpi" 
of Portland's transit future. In retrospect, however, the deci-
sion proces took pl e in an volving tt:thm comcxt. The 
expect.a f Lh 7 s cone min rransu' bility l solve 
land- , en• i runemal and en rgy probl · we very 
high hcsc expectations ha c be.en temper d with gr ter 
recognition that impacts, such as in the BART and Portland 
Transit Mall cases, have not been as expe tc . Sirmlarly, the 
asi mod Is i r mmsit demand fi recasting duri ng the early 
and mid 70s wcr not as soph Uc.at d as th s we have to-
day. Thus, to some extent, th r w· an !em m of fa ith in 
the ultimate selection and effr uv n f th LRT. Co Lant 
refinement of our modeling pr c' · ~ nd pr ·edur will 
produce better technical fore~IS. Their ucc -·, however, 
is only measured by an operating system, long after the op-
portunity to re m i past. Only a o t.ant rilical ewlua-
tion of objectives nd ptio ~ n mmimiz th · p< cenoal for 
error. If Portland erred , the pm bl ·m may be m1.. L Th · LRT 
will operate at the most effic1e111 lcvel rhar ir.s perarin gen-
cy can achieve. Its measure f ~ucces~ will n t be c in 
terms of the claims and forecasLS of 1976, bur in 1.h hght of 
what it does today or in the future. If it does not do 
everything it might or can, additional investments to 
preserve its image as an effective instrument will be made. 
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Appendix A 
Project Alignment 
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Appendix B 
Travel Demand Forecasts 
Travel Demand Forecasting Process 
Socioeconomic Data Highway Network 
A111¥1 • nips 10 
Nerwort ·:, URO~ , 
N 0 TE 1 Shaded OAOI ore tnose procestH ... ntc.n "mer were 
acc.amol.ished by O'fner aoenetH (000T), or not 
c;ompMtted du• to t 1m1111 Of' cost constraintw. 
Transit Network 
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In terms of the DEIS, which represented a merger of Phase I 
and Phase II Alternatives Analysis , the following data 
bases were used: socio-economic, travel behavior and 
transportation systems. The socio-economic data base 
consisted of variables for population, retail employment, 
non-retail employment and income strata. These 
parameters were estimated by CRAG for two time 
periods, 1976 and 1990. The Base year population 
(1,090, 700) income and employment were estimated us-
ing CRAG data . The transportation system data base con-
sisted of highway and transit system network informa-
tion. Both the 1976 and 1990 highway networks were 
coded and processed by ODOT staff. The configuration 
of the 1990 highway network was assumed to remain the 
same for all future year transit alternative networks. 
The technical process involved compressing the 
ODOT interzonal travel times (skim trees) from a 
738-zone system to a 194-zone system for input to the 
modal split model. Three basic input parameters were 
determined for assessing alternative transit networks: 
headways, vehicle speed/ travel times and link distances. 
For the base year network, headways were interpreted 
from existing schedules. Headways for the future year 
networks were initially based on desired level-of-service 
concepts but later refined on the basis of projected travel 
demand. Vehicle speeds for the base year transit network 
were derived from schedules and the 1976 Operations 
and Scheduling Survey. Zonal accessibility data were 
measured from aerial surveys, auto travel times and vehi-
cle occupancies. Travel behavior data were determined 
for transit from driver counts of boarding passengers and 
the 1976 Operations and Schedull.ng Survey. The pre-
ferred origin-destination study approach was not possi-
ble at the time. 
At the time the analyses were being performed, the 
region lacked a calibrated modal split model and the data 
to develop one. Rather than attempt to modify and 
validate one of the earlier models, the ODOT staff de-
cided to employ another, "off-the-shelf," modal split 
model, the UTPS Default Model. The model was adopted 
because of its ability to simultaneously perform trip 
distribution and modal split calculations and for its better 
replication of human decisionmaking than conventional 
sequential travel demand forecasting processes. The 
model was validated using a modal split developed for 
another urban region (see Travel Demand Forecasting 
Process figure). Applied using Portland specific data for 
the base year (1976) and model "estimates of transit 
trips" was checked against observed passenger counts. 
Discrepancies between observed and estimated data 
were noted and adjustments to the model were made on a 
trial and error basis until outputs matched observed data. 
Model adjustments were accomplished by first modify-
ing input parameters. The 1976 socio-economic and 
basic network data were held constant as the control data. 
However, certain policy inputs, such as weighting factors 
for out-of-vehicle times and penalties for out-of-direction 
movements, were adjusted to the values given earlier. 
Also, the exponent weighting factor-theta-was initially 
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adjusted to provide better "tailoring" of the model to 
Portland conditions. 
Appendix C 
Chronology of Project Alternatives 
A 1990 Public Transportation Master Plan, 1973: 
Reserved lanes for express buses on surface streets. 
B Governor's Task Force, January 1975 
Express Bus Service: Two-lane busway from CBD to 
1-205, north/ south on 1-205, east on 1-84 to Troutdale or 
on major arterials to Gresham. 
Option A: East from 1-205 on one/two-lane busway 
along south side of Burnside to Gresham. 
Option B: East from 1-205 on one/ two-lane busway 
in median of Burnside to Gresham. 
LRT: Two tracks from CBD to 1-205, one track from 1-205 
to Gresham to Troutdale. 
Option A: One or two tracks south along 1-205 to 
Burnside, one or two tracks east along 
south side of Burnside to Gresham. 
Option B: One or two tracks south along 1-205 to 
Burnside, one or two tracks in median of 
Burnside to Gresham. 
C Interim Transportation Plan, June 1975 
Option A: Two grade-separated exclusive lanes for 
buses and HOV from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Option B: One-lane separate reversible busway 
next to Banfield from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Option C: One- or two-lane busway in median of 
rebuilt Banfield from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Option D: Any of the above, plus redesign of Ban-
field to six lanes east of 39th Avenue to 
1-205. 
Option E: LRT two tracks along Banfield from 1-5 to 
1-205, south along 1-205 to Burnside or 
Division, east to Gresham via one of 
these streets. 
Option F: Alternate use of conventional diesel 
buses, minibuses, transbuses or a com-
bination of these three. 
D CRAG, based on input from its lnteragency Coor-
dinating Committee and Technical Advisory Com-
mittee, November 1975. 
Diesel Buses 
Option A: Separated two-lane busway with sta-
tions. 
Option B: Separated two-lane/two-way busway 
with terminal stations only. 
Option C: Separated one-lane busway with stations. 
Option D: Separated one-lane reversible busway 
with terminal stations only. 
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Option E: Counterflow freeway lanes for buses, no 
stations. 
Option F: Reversible (moveable) two freeway lanes. 
Option G: Low capital improvement, improve city 
streets. 
Option H: One lane reserved for buses. 
HOV Lanes 
Option A: Separated two-lane/two-way HOV lane 
with stations. 
Option B: Separated two-lane/two-way HOV lane 
with terminal stations only. 
Option C: Separated one-lane reversible HOV lane 
with terminal station only. 
Option D: Reversible (moveable) two freeway lanes 
for HOV. 
Option E: Two preferential freeway lanes for HOV. 
Option F: Separated two-lane reversible HOV lane 
with stations. 
LRT 
Option A: Separated two tracks with stations. 
Option B: Separated one track with terminal sta-
tions only. 
Trolleybus 
Option A: Separated two-lane/two-way busway 
with stations. 
Option B: Separated two-lane/ two-way busway 
with terminal stations only. 
Option C: Separated one-lane reversible busway 
with stations. 
Option D: Separated one-lane reversible busway 
with terminal stations only. 
Option E: One freeway lane reversed busway. 
Option F: Busway separated two-lane/two-way. 
E CRAG after urging from FHWA, 1975 
Option A: HOV separated two-lane / two-way 
freeway median. 
Option B: HOV two preferential freeway lanes. 
Option C: LRT separated two tracks. 
Option D: No Build. 
Option E: Do Nothing. 
F CRAG reevaluation after passage of Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1976, June 1976 
Option A: Low-cost improvement (transit-
oriented), (Transportation System Man-
agement). 
Option B: Exis1in HOV Jan . ' tended through 
LI y C m r co BD and to I-205 . 
Option C: HOV prefercnrial lanes. HOV two p refer-
ential lan ·s. plus 1x auto lanes with 
shoulders. 
Option D: Busway-separa ted , two-lane/ tw -way 
including six lane freeway from 1-5 to 
1-205. 
G CRAG Citizens Advisory Commit.tee, October 1976 
· Option A: Busway-separated, two-lane/tw o-way 
including six lane freeway from 1-5 to 
1-205. 
Option B: Additional TSM alternative to improve 
Banfield to a minimum six lane freeway 
from 1-5 to 1-205. 
H CRAG based on Tri-Met Consultants ' report, 
February 1977 
Option A: LRT to Gresham, two tracks to 1-205 
from CBD, track south on 1-205 to Burn-
side, eas t on Burnside in median align-
ment. 
Option B: Six lanes on Banfield with turnouts, no 
shoulders from 1-5 to 1-205. 
I CRAG based on ICC/ TAC/ CAC input, April 1977 
Option A: Six standard freeway lanes, plus 
shoulders on Banfield. 
J FHWA/ UMTA request to CRAG, August 1977 
Option A: Separated median busway, plus six lanes 
of freeway from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Option B: LRT along Banfield to I-205, south on 
1-205 to Lents. 
Option C: LRT alon Banfield to 1-205, south on 
1-205 to ivision, east on Division to 
Gresham. 
The final list of altemativ used for the DEIS were as 
follows: 
1 No-Build (Freeway in pre-197 6 condition) 
2 Low Cost Improvements 
Option A: Improve arterial streets for transit, 
freeway returned to pre-1976 conditions. 
Option B: Construct six lane minimum freeway 
from 1-5 to 1-205, plus improvement of 
arterial streets for transit. 
3 HOV Lanes 
Option A: HOV lanes center of freeway from CBD to 
1-205 plus six-lane freeway from 1-5 to 
37th Avenue, four-lane freeway from 
3 7th to I-205 , HOV lanes center of 
fr t way CBD to 1-205, plus six-lane 
freeway with no shoulders from 1-5 to 
1-205. 
Option B: HOV lanes center of freeway , CBD to 
1-205, plus six-lane freeway with 
shoulders 1-5 to 1-205. 
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4 S epara ted Busway 
Opuon . Busway ep rated north side of freeway, 
plus six-lane freeway with should rs 
from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Option B: Busway separated median of freeway, 
plus six-lane freeway with shoulders 
from 1-5 to 1-205. 
5 LRT 
Option A: LRT two tracks CBD to 1-205, two tracks 
south along 1-205 to Burnside, e c on 
Burnside median to Gresham , in luding 
six lane freeway from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Option B: Same as above with addition of standard 
lane widths and shoulders along fr way 
from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Option C: LRT two tracks CBD to 1-205, two lracks 
south along 1-205 to Division, e l n 
Division median to Gresham including 
six lane freeway minimum width from 
1-5 to 1-205. 
Option D: Same as above with addition of standard 
lane widths and shoulders from 1-5 to 
1-205. 
Option E: LRT two tracks CBD to 1-205, two tracks 
south along 1-205 to Foster Road in-
cluding six-lane minimum-width 
freeway from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Option F: Same as above with addition of standard 
lane widths and shoulders along freeway 
from 1-5 to 1-205. 
Appendix D 
Interviews 
Paul Bay 
Banfield Project Affiliation 
Executive Director, Planning & 
Development, Tri-Met 
Leonard Bergstein Office of the U.S. Secretary of Trans-
portation; Assistant to the Mayor of 
Portland; Assistant to the Governor 
Robert Bothman 
of Oregon 
Metropolitan Engineer, Oregon 
Department of Transportation 
Peter Cass Former General Manager, Tri-Met 
Andrew Cotugno Director of Transportation, Metro-
politan Service District 
Gerard Drummond President, Board of Directors, Tri-
Don Emerson 
Richard Feeney 
Mel Gordon 
Charles Graves 
Met 
Washington Office, UMTA 
Executive Director, Public Affairs & 
Marketing, Tri-Met 
C mmi . ioner, Multnomah County 
Dir ct r, Office of Planning 
As i ·tance, UMTA 
Richard Gustafson Ex ~ utiv Officer, Metropolitan Ser-
William Hall 
Ron Higbee 
Susan Long 
Don MacDonald 
Steve McCarthy 
Ernie Munch 
Ray Polani 
johnR. Post 
Bebe Rucker 
Miriam Selby 
Theodore Spence 
Ray Weil 
Phil Whitmore 
Doug Wright 
vice District; Senior Planner, Tri-Met 
Planning Director, Tri-Met 
LRT Project Director, Tri-Met 
Appropriations Committee Staff to 
Senator Hatfield 
LRT Project Director, Tri-Met 
Acting General Manager, Tri-Met 
Chief Transportation Planner, City 
of Portland 
Citizens for Better Transit 
Executive Director, Planning & 
Development, Tri-Met 
Senior Transportation Planner, 
Multnomah County 
Director, Administrative Services, 
Banfield Project, Tri-Met 
Plan & Program Manager, Metro-
politan Region, Oregon Department 
of Transportation 
Washington Office, US DOT 
joint Development Director, Metro-
politan Service District 
Deputy Secretary of Transportation; 
City Planning Director, Portland 
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Appendix E 
Banfield Light Rail Project Chronology 
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Appendix F 
Summary of Local and Federal Actions 
Affecting Funds Allocated to the 
Banfield Transitway Project 
Action Ta ken 
I. Mt. Hood withdrawal-CRAG allocation of 
$69,875,000in 1976 $-R lutionBD 761104in 
November 1976. 
Local Allocation: 
(e)( 4) 
Match 
6t .875,000 
12.330,882 
.. 82.205,882 
II. 1-505 withdrawal- RA G allocation of 
$15,000,000in1978 $- Resolution BD 781213. 
Local Allocation: 
(e )( 4) 
Match 
$1 5,000,000 
2,647,059 
$17,647,059 
III. Various adjusnnems prior to negotiation of Letter of 
Intent. 
A. Escalation of base allocation to 12/31/79 $ 
plus allocation of $1,403 ,560 ofBanfield funds 
to TSAP by Metro Resolution 80-13 7 in March 
1980. 
Local Allocation: 
(e)(4) $127,559,574 
Match 22,510,513 
$150,070,087 
B. De-es alation to 03/ 31/80 $and transferof 
$2,374,809 into Banfield from Highway 212 
by Metro Resolution 80-184 in September 
1980. 
Local Allocation: 
(e)( 4) 
Match 
$124,497,737 
21 ,970,1 89 
$146,467,926 
IV. Negotiations with UMTA for Section 3 Letter of 
lntent-1980. 
A. Funding/Cost Basis for $85. 7 million Letter of 
Intent: 
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A ~um d 
I 9li0 0-.1 
& I unJlng 
.... .... ,um d1' 
[:K.i.1.m n Proposed 
J.l<J, Funding 
Highway Funds: 
(e)( 4 )-Highv. J 1 (e)(4) 
Sl 27m 
$ 66.Sm $16.5rn (e)(4) $ 83.Jm 
Transit Funds : 
(e)(4)-Transit 
Section 3 
60.2 
Sl 69.3m 
25.8 86.0 
85.7 
Total 
Total w / Match 
$255.0m 
$306.Jm 
Key points to initial funding program : 
• Initial federal commitment was to a $306.3 
million project, including inflation. 
• $127 million (e)( 4) was "assumed" to 
escalate from 1980 through 198 5 by $4 2.3 
million to $169.3 million; thi never hap-
pened-in f; c1, dc-c calation rcu lt d in a 
loss of funds . 
• Section 3 commitment of $85.7 million in-
cluded firm commitment of $24 8 million 
escalation. 
B. Letter of Intent for $85.7 million Section 3 
funds issued in December 1980; (e)( 4) had 
escalated by $4.4 million. 
Local Allocation: 
(e)( 4) 
Match 
Section3 
Match 
$128,958,496 
22,757,382 
85,700,000 
21,425,000 
$258; 840,878 
V. No New Rail Starts (with Section 3) policy instituted 
in 1981 ; n gotiations with UMT A/ Congress to 
develop alternate funding program; actions final-
ized by FY 1981 Appropriations Bill. 
A. A portion of the (e)( 4) funded highway project 
was redefined by Congress as a transit project 
(on the basis that a portion of the highway 
reloca~ion was due to LRT construction adja-
cent to the freeway) to be funded with (e)( 4) 
transit; no change in total project cost or scope 
or share of project to be (e)( 4) funded; resulted 
in more of the project being into the 
Full-Funding had the effect of more 
"assumed" (e)( 4) escalation being built into 
the Full-Funding Contract. 
Revised "Assumed" 
1980 Cost Escalation 
& Funding @12% 
Highway Funds: 
Revised 
Funding 
Program 
(e)(4)-Highway $ 27,000,000 $ 1,500,000 $ 28,500.000 
Transit Funds: 
(e)( 4 )-Highway 
(e)( 4 )-Transit 
Section 3 
39,800,000 15,000,000 
60,200,000 25,800,000 
60,900,000 24,800,000 
54,800,000 
86,000,000 
----
Total $187,900,000 $67,100,000 $255,000,000 
Total w/match $225,500,000 $306,300,000 
B. The Banfield Section 3 Letter of Intent was 
'Traded" for (e)(4) that was allocated to other 
bus projects in the Portland particularly 
Westside Corridor. 
• $8.9 million of original $85.7 million ap-
propriated to Banfield in 1981-$76.8 
million balance involved in trade through a 
re-issued Letter of Intent. 
• Metro Resolution 82-323 accomplished 
trade (in June 1981 $) adopted in April 
1982; Base Value of Section 3 fends only in-
volved in trade, not Inflation Reserve. 
• Inflation Reserve of million set aside to 
allow traded bus projects to escalate as if 
they were (e)( 4) with the balance 
unallocated. 
Section 3/(e)( 4) Trade of Local Allocation 
{ e )( 4) Change Change 
Updated to Due to Initial Due to 
06/30/81 "Trade" Section 3 "Trade" 
Banfield $123. +$55.056,363 85.7m -76.8 
Other Bus 71,997,577 - 55,056,363 0 +51.82 
Inflation Reserve 0 0 0 + 24.98 
C. Due to one-year delay in negotiating Full-
Funding Contract, UMTA increased overall 
funding commitment by $4.8 million to ac-
count for inflation that had occurred; addi-
tional amount in Full-Funding Contract did not 
increase locally allocated funds-simply in-
cluded higher level of "assumed" inflation. 
Funding program as a result of A, B and C 
above. 
Local Allocation (in 06/30/81 $): 
$ 26,578,500 
152,047,140 
Section 3 8,900,000 
Total 
T oral w /Match 
$187,525,640 
$221,272,813 
Federal Funding Commitment: 
Highway(e)(4) $ 28,500,000 
Transit (e)( 4) 230,654,079 
Section 3 8,900,000 
Total 
T oral w /Match 
$268,054,079 
$316,012,152 
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Note that the original December 1980 ( e )( 4) 
level of $128. 9 million de-escalated to $123.6 
million by June 1981 widening the difference 
between local (e)( 4) ~uthority and federal 
(e)( 4) commitment to $80.5 million. 
VI. FY 1982 Actions. 
A. Due to the realization locally that "assumed" 
escalation would not occur and "firm" escala-
tion that in part belonged to the Banfield was in 
the $76.8 million Letter of Intent-authoriza-
tion was obtained from Congress to use a por-
tion of the Inflation Reserve in completion of 
the Banfield rather than "non-rail" purposes. 
The Inflation Re.serve was subsequently 
allocated in part to the Banfield and in part to 
the other "non-rail" projects. Allocation to 
"non-rail" projects was an amount equivalent 
to what those projects would have received if 
they were Interstate Transfer (i.e., prior to the 
(e)(4)/Section 3 Trade) with the "Rollback" to 
June 1980 adopted in the Surface Transporta-
tion Act (STA) of 1982. 
The effect of this action was to increase the 
level oflocally authorized funds for the Banfield 
by $20.15 million (Metro Resolution 83-401); 
the federal funding commitment as defined in 
the Full-Funding Contract 1 remained at the 
same level, simply increasing Section 3 and 
decreasing Interstate Transfer accordingly. 
Local Allocation of$ 76.8 million Letter oflntent: 
Inflation Reserve 
Banfield 
Non-Rail Projects 
Base 
Updated to 
06/30/82 $ 
$26,886,561 
0 
49,913,439 
$76,800,000 
Revised 
Change Allocation 
$-26,886,561 $ 0 
+ 20,150,000 20,150,000 
+ 6, 736,561 56,650,000 
0 $76,800,000 
B. In order to improve the quality of the down-
town Portland portion of the LRT project plus 
allow inclusion of a vintage trolley element of 
the project, Congress provided an additional 
$5 million of Section 3 funds to increase the 
project scope. 
This plus the local match (for a total of $6.25 
million) was added to the Full-Funding Con-
tract. 
C. One year of Metro Corridor studies was funded 
as an element of the Banfield funding; $300,000 
of additional local authority was added to the 
project with no additional federal funding com-
mitment. 
Funding program as a result of A and B above: 
Local Allocation (06/30/82 $): 
Highway(e)(4) $ 26,584,501 
Transit(e)(4) 146,870,375 
Section 3 
Original 
Inflation Reserve 
CBD 
Total 
T oral w /Match 
8,900,000 
20,150,000 
5,000,000 
$207,504,876 
$246,627,060 
Federal Funding Commitment: 
Highway (e)( 4) $ 28,500,000 
Transit(e)(4) 209,244,704 
Section 3 
Original 8,900,000 
Inflation Reserve 20,150,000 
CBD 5,000,000 
Total 
Total w/Match 
$271,794,704 
$322,262,152 
Note that addition oflnflation Reserve narrowed the 
difference between local (e)( 4) authority and 
federal (e)( 4) commitment by $21.4 million, but 
that local ( e )( 4) authority de-escalated from $1 78.6 
million to 1 73.5 million, widening the difference by 
$5.l million, resulting in a net reduction of the dif-
ference from $80.5 million to $64.3 million. 
VII. 1983 Actions 
With adoption of the STA of 1982, the provision for 
escalation of Interstate Transfer funds was elimi-
nated. This froze the (e)(4) authorization at the June 
198 2 level with no hope for realizing the 
"assumed" escalation built into the federal funding 
commitment. As such, committed "New 
Start" Section 3 funds to project holding the 
total transit funding commitment constant, reduc-
ing the federal (e)( 4) funding commitment to the 
level authorized locally (in June 1982 $) and pro-
viding the difference in Section 3 funds. With this 
change, the local and federal funding commitments 
are the same with no "assumed" escalation built in-
to any figures. 
Local Allocation and Federal 
Funding Commitment: 
Highway(e)(4) $ 26,584,501 
Transit(e)(4) 146,870,375 
Section 3 
Original 
Inflation Reserve 
CBD 
New Start 
Total 
T oral w /Match 
8,900,000 
20,150,000 
5,000,000 
58,705,251 
$266,210,127 
$320,008,624 
VIII. Anticipated 1984 Actions 
Because of high demands for Section 3 funds na-
tionwide, it is apparent that the full $58. 7 million of 
funds from the "New Start" category will not be 
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available. As such, Section 9 funds allocated to Tri-
Met will be used to provide sufficient funds for a 
$307. 7 million project. 
Local Allocation and Federal 
Funding Commitment: 
Highway(e)(4) $ 26,584,501 
Transit(e)(4) $146,870,375 
Section 3 
Original 
Inflation Reserve 
CBD 
New Start 
Section 9 
Total 
Total w /Match 
8,900,000 
20,150,000 
5,000,000 
42,698,353 
6,160,000 
$256,363,229 
$307,700,000 
Unused portion of Full-Funding Contract (New 
Start Section 3 + Match) - $20,008,624. 
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